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u.s. ARMY CORPS OF'ENGINEERS
INSTITUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE
CALIFORNIA DROUGHT (1987-1992)

NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING D'ROUGHT

SEPTEMBER

1993

IWR REPORT

93-N DS-5

National Study

0/ Water Management During Drought Reports

This report is part of a series of reports which are being published during the study. Reports on
three studies conducted under the aegis of the National Study of Water Management During
Drought were published in 1991:
The National Study of Water Management During Drought: Report on the First Year of
Study (IWR Report 91-NDS-1) prepared by the Institute for Water Resources, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.
A Preliminary Assessment of Corps of Engineers Reservoirs. Their Purposes and
Susceptibility to Drought (IWR Report 91-NDS-2), prepared by the Hydrologic Engineering
Center, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Davis, California.
An Assessment of What is Known About Drought (IWR Report 91-NDS-3) prepared by
Planning Management Consultants, Ltd., Carbondale, Illinois.
A number of reports presenting the final results of the National Study are expected to published in
1993. Among these reports.'
The National Drought Atlas (IWR Report 93-NDS-4). The drought atlas is a compendium of
statistics which allows regional water managers to determine the probability that a given
volume of precipitation will occur in an "n" month period, with "n" = 1, 2, 3, 6, 12, 24, 36,
or 60. The Atlas can be used in may ways, but two uses are considered most important.
First, planners can estimate the return interval of the drought of record, and thus can make
a more informed judgement about whether this is a suitable design drought for planning
purposes. Second, in the event of a drought, operators and managers can better estimate
the probability of the drought continuing, or of reservoirs refilling to normal levels within
the next n months. The Atlas also includes information on streamflow and the Palmer
Drought Index.
Managing Water for Drought will be a "how to" book for those interested in reducing
drought impacts. The main text will explain how a variety of different readers can apply a
model planning process on a very limited or very expansive budget and timetable. The
process is designed to integrate across technical, political, and institutional boundaries,
across water management purposes, and over the long and short term.
For further information on the National Drought Study, contact the Study Manager.'
William J. Werick
Institute for Water Resources
Casey Building
7701 Telegraph Road
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-5586
Telephone.' (703) 355-3055
Reports may be ordered by writing (above address) or calling Arlene Nurthen, IWR Publications, at
(703) 355-3042.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As of the date of this report, the Governor of the State of California has declared the
drought over. Although restoration of water to aquifers will take years to accomplish, the public
and private sectors are turning their focus on other socioeconomic issues. This current condition
should be assessed as only a reprieve-a temporary relief in the hardships and impacts delivered
by a drought-and implies that it will occur again. Whether the next drought occurs later this
year or 10 years from now is not the issue here. What is relevant are the lessons learned from
this recent drought experience and the actions to be taken to protect against and plan for
mitigating adverse drought-related impacts.
This report describes the lessons learned of the six-year California drought that are aimed
at improving the management of water resources during future droughts in California and other
states throughout the nation. These lessons capture the views of some 100 key members of the
California water community representing 57 organizations. The participating organizations
represented federal, state, regional, and local water supply agencies as well as environmental,
private, and governmental entities that influence water management in the state.

STUDY APPROACH AND REPORT DESIGN

Our analytical approach is described in Chapter I, "Introduction." Our approach to
identifying the important lessons of the drought consisted of three research activities: (1)
literature review of published and unpublished documents, (2) field interviews, and (3) feedback
critiques of the draft report by survey participants and other water professionals.
The 1987-92 drought in California put the long-term strategy of drought protection as
well as short-term drought response measures to a severe test. In order to allow the readers to
draw their own conclusions about the emerging lessons, we included the relevant background
information and data on California's economy and water resources and on the existing water
management system. This information is included in Chapter IT, "California's Economy and
Water Resources, " and Chapter lIT, "Water Management System." Chapter IV, "Recount of the
1987-1992 Drought," contains the chronology of the major drought events and significant
drought response actions during each consecutive year of the drought. Statewide statistics of
water use during this drought by various types of water use sectors and water districts were not
available and therefore were not included for evaluation.
The three chapters that follow the background information summarize the views of the
survey participants. Chapter V, "Survey Results: General Perceptions," summarizes the
contents of the interviews pertaining to four general aspects of the drought: (1) critical drought
impacts, (2) communication and cooperation, (3) the role and responsibilities of the media, and
(4) response to the drought of the general public and water users. Chapter VI, "Survey Results:
Water Management Issues," summarizes the results of the interviews that pertain to four major
aspects of water management during drought: (1) new developments and innovative approaches,
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(2) critical legislation, (3) timing of drought response actions, and (4) performance of water
institutions. Finally, Chapter VIT, "Suggested Initiatives and Reforms," presents the views of
survey participants on actions that should be taken to enhance the ability of California's water
management system to cope with future droughts. These suggestions are presented under four
broad categories including (1) water policy initiatives, (2) agricultural initiatives and needs, (3)
urban water management, and (4) environmental protection.
In presenting the survey results in these three chapters, our purpose was to summarize
the views of survey participants and draw some conclusions from these opinions while
withholding our judgment to the extent possible. We necessarily had to use our judgment in
Chapter VITI, "Synthesis of Lessons Learned." This synthesis represents our understanding of
the experiences of survey participants and factual information which allowed us to formulate the
lessons of the drought.
LESSONS FOR WATER MANAGEMENT
The California drought experience provided the water community with many important
lessons. Some of these lessons have been learned and acted upon during the later stages of the
drought. Other lessons are yet to be confirmed and are presented in this report as
recommendations of the survey participants for water management initiatives and reforms. The
drought experience and emerging lessons apply not only to California but to all states that face
the potential of long-term (multiyear) water shortages. This report should be gleaned by the
national water community for experiences that reflect similar possible impacts in their region.
Drought planning will improve relative to who learns these lessons and to what actions are taken
by them to create improved drought policy.
Table 1 lists the titles of new and continued lessons for long-term drought planning and
for preparedness for drought response in the short term. A description of each lesson and
background information can be found on pages shown after each title.
The experiences and lessons of the ongoing 1987-92 drought were translated by survey
participants into specific actions that should be taken in order to enhance the capability of
California's water management system to cope with future droughts. Table 2 presents some of
the participants' suggestions under the categories of strategic and tactical measures. The
sequence of these suggestions does not follow any particular order. Complete listings of these
suggestions are included in Appendix D and discussed in Chapter VIT.
The 1987-92 drought focused the attention of the public and water institutions in
California on the shortcomings of the existing water management system in the state as defined
by water infrastructure, institutional arrangement, and the current system of water rights. The
drought experiences clearly demonstrated the need for enhancing the infrastructure and reforming
water institutions in order to achieve greater efficiency in using the existing sources of water
supply as well as restoring and maintaining the state's environmental resources. Without such
improvements, additional growth of the state's population and economy will translate into
increased hardships and damages to the environment during future droughts.
xviii

TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF LFSSONS LEARNED

New Lessons for Strategic Planning

•

The nature of social, environmental, and economic impacts of a sustained drought points
to a need for careful and more realistic drought planning (p. 183).

•

Severe drought can change longstanding relationships and balances of power in the
competition for water (p. 185).

•

Irrigation can provide complementary environmental benefits (p. 186).

•

Land use regulation must be the mechanism for urban growth management policies which
accept limited water supply (p. 187).

•

The success of drought response plans should be measured in terms of the minimization and
equitable redistribution of actual impacts (as opposed to water shortages), but there is much
to be learned about the best ways of accomplishing it (p. 188).

•

Severe droughts can expose some inadequacies in the performance and roles of state and
federal water institutions (p.189).

•

The overall success of water rationing plans depends on their design and reliance on
increases in water rates (p. 190).

•

Mass media can playa positive role in drought response, especially if some guidelines are
followed (p. 192).

•

Market forces are an effective way of reallocating restricted water supplies (p. 193).
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
SUMMARY OF LESSONS LEARNED

Conf"nmed Lessons of Previous Droughts
•

Water in the aquifers continues to be the most effective strategic weapon against drought
(p. 194).

•

The surest way to mitigate the adverse social, environmental, and economic impacts of a
sustained drought is to obtain more water (p. 195).

•

Early drought response actions and proper timing of tactical measures are essential in shortterm management of droughts (p. 196).

•

Local and regional interconnections among water supply systems proved to be a good
insurance policy against severe water shortages (p. 197).
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TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF SUGGESTED CHANGES NEEDED IN WATER MANAGEMENT

Strategic Measures Suggested by Survey Participants

•

The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta problem has to be resolved (p. 198).

•

SWP facilities have to be completed (p. 198).

•

A permanent Water Bank should be established (p. 198).

•

The state should move away from "crisis management" and focus more on "long-term
planning" (p. 198).

•

Marginal cost pricing should be incorporated into long-term water plans (p. 198).

•

Groundwater management should be improved (p. 198).

•

Water management should be centrally coordinated (p. 198).

•

The state should develop a computerized data bank (p. 198).

•

California water law should be revised to allow for in-stream water rights (p. 198).

•

Enforced mitigation of impacts on aquatic resources should be undertaken in order to
enhance water quality and minimum-flow standards (p. 199).

•

More conservation technology and know-how should be infused into California's agriculture
(p. 199).

•

Improved reliability of urban water supplies is needed (p. 199).

•

Long-term water management plan should take environmental needs into account (p. 199).

•

Environmental needs for water should be met (p. 199).

•

A better management of fish and wildlife under normal conditions is needed (p. 199).

Tactical Measures Suggested by Survey Participants

•

State should develop and adopt clear triggering mechanisms for drought response (p. 199).

•

Californians should establish water use priorities (p. 199).
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TABLE 2 (Continued)
SUMMARY OF SUGGESTED CHANGES NEEDED IN WATER MANAGEMENT

Tactical Measures Suggested by Survey Participants, Continued
•

A streamlined approval process for all water transfers should be developed (p. 199).

•

A massive public information and education program is needed (p. 2(0).

•

The state should cut down on the amount of firm hydroelectricity production during drought
(p.200).

•

Agricultural water districts should be more flexible (p. 2(0).

•

A better accountability in agricultural water use must be achieved (p. 2(0).

•

Urban water suppliers should develop very clearly defined carry-over storage goals and
adhere to them during drought (p. 2(0).

•

Urban water agencies should plan for water deficits (p. 2(0).

•

Water rationing should be done through pricing (p. 2(0).

•

Water agency representatives should improve the communication of their water supply
situation (p. 2(0).

•

Environmental impacts must be given greater attention (p. 2(0).
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I. INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE
The purpose of this report is to identify, categorize, explain, and verify the important
lessons learned during the mUltiyear California drought of 1987-92. The lessons of the drought
were formed using a carefully designed research approach consisting of personal interviews with
members of the California water community and other key individuals in the state as well as a
thorough review of documents and reports pertaining to the drought. The resulting lessons
pertain to various aspects of drought management. They are directed to federal, state, and local
levels of government, water institutions, and water users (urban, agricultural, environmental,
and others) for improving the management of water resources during future droughts in
California and other states.
This report is part of a comprehensive study that has been undertaken in response to
recommendations of the National Drought Study. After the drought of 1988-89 that affected
many regions of the United States, the President's budget included funds to begin a National
Water Management During Drought Study (NWMDS) as part of the administration's 1990
budget. Authority for the study was given to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
Works as provided in Sections 707 and 729 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1986.
The Institute for Water Resources managed the study for the Assistant Secretary and the U. S.
Army Corps of Engineers Headquarters. The NWMDS team thought that the California drought
would provide worthwhile lessons learned for the rest of the nation, especially given California's
existing water projects and preparedness, which were thought to be better than most in the
country.
This report follows several previous reports of the NWMDS performed by federal
agencies. These reports include:
•

The National Study of Water Management During Drought: Report on the First
Year of Study IWR Report 91-NDS-l, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute
for Water Resources, May 1991

•

The National Study of Water Management During Drought: A Preliminary
Assessment of Corps of Engineers Reservoirs. their Purposes and Susceptibility
to Drought IWR Report 91-NDS-2, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for
Water Resources, September 1991

•

The National Study of Water Management During Drought: A Research
Assessment IWR Report 91-NDS-3, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for
Water Resources, August 1991
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STUDY OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives and research design of the study have been developed based on
extensive discussions between the Program Manager of the National Study of Water Management
during Drought, his staff, the research study team, the staff of the California Department of
Water Resources, and other water professionals in the state and the nation. Several research
paradigms were considered in developing an appropriate approach. During preliminary
discussions, it was recognized that the state of California has a sophisticated and complex water
management system. Because of this complexity, the California system has not been addressed
by a unified and comprehensive statewide drought management plan. In the absence of an
evaluation of the performance of a formal statewide drought plan, the lessons learned had to be
obtained by (1) contrasting "expectations" and "what actually happened," (2) examining the basis
for decision making during the various stages of drought, and (3) analyzing the degree to which
the California water management system met expectations.
In light of the complexity of water management in California, specific study objectives
were formulated as follows:
•

To characterize the setting for year-to-year management of water in the state in
terms of the balance of supply and demand, legal framework, and water
management institutions

•

To identify the overall approach to drought management that prevailed in the state
prior to the onset of the drought in terms of the roles and responsibilities of water
institutions and prior drought experience

•

To examine the current perceptions and concerns of key individuals in the
California water community who control or influence water management at
federal, state, regional, and local levels of government

•

To identify the lessons learned from the drought as viewed by the key individuals,
with respect to several aspects of drought management including:
Critical impacts of the drought (economic, environmental, and other)
Role and performance of water institutions
Public response to water shortages
Communication and cooperation
Role of the media
Critical water management legislation
Timing of drought response actions
Innovative drought management approaches
Most pressing needs for change in the present water management system
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•

To verify the validity of the lessons identified by the key individuals by placing
them in the context of the:
Chronology of major events during the drought
Actual response actions and actual outcomes of these actions
Data on economic, social, and environmental impacts of the drought
Other measures of performance of drought management policies and
actions

•

To conduct a synthesis of findings stemming from the previous objectives in order
to determine:
What worked and what did not work?
What were the major gaps between expectations and actual performance?
What needs to be changed, preserved, or done in the future?
What are the most valuable lessons for governments, water institutions,
and other parties in California and other states?

By accomplishing these specific objectives, the sponsors of this study intended to use the
lessons of the Great California Drought of 1987-92 in developing recommendations for a national
strategy for better management of the nation's water resources during future droughts.

STUDY APPROACH

The following discussion describes the research method used to accomplish the preceding
study objectives. It describes the process of identifying the water management structure in the
state and selecting the key individuals of California's water community representing various
levels and functions of this structure.

Development of a Research Platform

Several important design issues were confronted in devising an appropriate research
approach:
•

What are the best sources of information on the drought?

•

How does one capture a full spectrum of opinions on lessons learned?

•

How does one identify and separate the political agendas in order to identify the
objective and genuine lessons learned?

•

What is the best overall paradigm for identifying and verifying the important
lessons of the drought?
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These and other questions have led us to the development of the overall research platform
that is presented in Figure I.l. This approach consisted of two intertwined research activities:
literature search and field interviews. The purpose of each activity is briefly described below.

Literature Search
In order to understand the complexity of water resource management issues, especially
in California, it was initially essential that we established and understood the existing water
management system in the state. Literature sources and governmental documents were searched
in order to obtain data and information that are indispensable to understanding the year-to-year
management of water in California. These included statistical data on the state population,
economy, water supply, and water use. In addition, information was collected regarding the
legal framework for water management in the state, existing institutional structure, and major
issues in water management.

Once the background information was collected, we identified California's approach to
managing droughts that existed prior to the 1987-92 drought. Again this information was
gleaned through the search of drought literature. Documents pertinent to the 1976-77 drought
in California provided a primary source of information for identifying the existing approaches
to managing droughts in the state.
The final component of the literature search was to obtain factual and, therefore,
objective data and information on the 1987-92 drought. Extensive published information on
drought events and response actions together with their chronology was obtained, studied, and
assimilated into our knowledge base. Also, information on actual outcomes of response actions
and data on impact measurements were recorded for further reference.

Field Interviews
The most important sources for identifying the lessons of drought are the key individuals
who control or influence the management of water resources in California. By examining their
firsthand views, opinions, and concerns and placing them in the context of factual data and
information obtained through the literature review, we expected that the lessons of the drought
would emerge.

Dermition of a Lesson Learned

The Random House College Dictionary (Revised Edition, 1984) gives the following
meanings of the word "lesson": (1) "something to be learned or studies as in 'the lessons of the
past'" or (2) "a useful piece of a practical wisdom acquired by experience or study." By adding
the action modifier "learned," the identifiable lessons imply that the respondent has recognized
4
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the event as a lesson worth knowing and deserving attention during the development or revision
of future drought contingency plans. The concept of a "learned" lesson should not be taken to
mean that all who should have recognized the intrinsic value of the lesson have done so.
Our survey was designed with this broad definition of the term "lesson learned" in mind.
Purposefully, we did not offer a specific definition of the term "lesson learned" at the beginning
of each interview. Instead, we encouraged the survey participants to look retrospectively on
their experiences during the drought and give us answers to such questions as, what worked and
what did not work? and what needs to be changed, preserved, or done in the future? We also
asked for the respondents' opinions on various aspects of drought management. We analyzed
all answers to our questions, as well as all statements offered by the respondents that went
beyond our questions, in order to identify lessons for water management. Finally, we used
published sources in order to determine the chronology of events and used actual response
actions and their outcomes, and data on drought impacts to identify additional lessons and to gain
better insights into the lessons identified from the interview material.
Lessons that are presented in the concluding synthesis chapter are labeled as "lessons
learned" because each lesson satisfies one or more of the following criteria:
•

It represents "useful pieces of practical wisdom" acquired from drought
experience.

•

It represents new knowledge that was not available before the drought.

•

It emerged by analyzing changes in decision-making processes during the drought
or examining the performance of the water management system.

•

It can be formulated as a recommendation for future actions that should be taken
in order to avoid repeating the same errors or enhancing the performance of
actions previously taken.

This broad definition allowed us to include a number of "useful pieces of practical
wisdom" gleaned from the experiences of the 1987-92 drought in California. In formulating the
lessons for water management, we made an attempt to cast each statement in a format that would
indicate changes and conditions needed for making decisions and taking actions for managing
future droughts and avoid statements indicating general conclusions and observations or
statements of fact. The reader may conclude that there are additional lessons after reading all
parts of this report.

Design of Survey Instruments

The field interviews were conducted using two survey instruments: personal interview
design and group interview design. These instruments were designed to obtain the participants'
views on the relevant aspects of water management during drought.
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Personal Interview Content
Table 1.1 shows the content of the personal interview. The interview consisted of five
questions on general aspects of the drought, which were followed by five questions on specific
drought issues. At the end of each interview, the respondents were asked to clarify their
answers and offer their observations on some prominent issues that surfaced during previous
interviews.
Each interview began with questions about the roles and responsibilities of the
interviewee and his/her organization in drought management and about the interviewee views
on the critical drought impacts, communication and cooperation, role of the media, and response
of the public to the drought. Each of these topics delineated a potential category of lessons
learned.
The questions on specific drought issues were focused on (1) new developments and
innovative approaches to drought management, (2) critical state and federal legislation, (3)
timing of drought response actions, (4) role and performance of water management institutions,
and (5) critical needs for change in water management. Again, each of these topics was selected
for its potential in surfacing lessons learned. The last question was directed toward focusing
participant attention on the implications of his/her experiences for water management in the
future.

Group Interview Guide
Corresponding information was gathered through group interview sessions. Table 1.2
shows the group interview guide used during these sessions. The number of participants in each
session ranged from two to seven.
The participants were graphically shown the identical areas of interest posed during the
individual interviews. They were then asked to record on paper their views about the most
important impacts of the drought and actions to be taken to preserve or change water
management during drought. If some of the areas of interest did not surface during the
participants' remarks or the free-flowing discussion, they were raised and appropriately discussed
at the end of the session.

Selection of Participants
The usefulness of the field interviews was judged to be critically dependent on the
selection of the institutions and individuals interviewed. In order to obtain representative views
it was necessary to identify the institutional structure of water management in California.
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TABLE 1.1
PERSONAL INTERVIEW GUIDE

PART A. GENERAL ASPECTS
•

Responsibilities and Roles
Could you briefly describe the role of your organization and your personal involvement
in drought management?
•

•

Drought Impacts
What do you see as the most critical impacts of this drought on you, your organization,
as well as, on other parties and activities (environmental, financial, social, economic,
political, etc.)?
Communication and Cooperation
How would you characterize the communication and cooperation between your
organization and other water management organizations during the drought period?

•

Role of the Media
How do you view the performance of the media and their desired role during drought?

•

Public Response
What is your opinion of the public response and that of other water users to the drought?

PART B. SPECIFIC ACTIONS
•

New Developments and Innovative Approaches
Are there any new developments or innovative approaches to coping with drought that have
been used during this drought?

•

Critical Legislation
Are there any state and federal acts or local ordinances that you consider critical to
managing this drought?

•

Timing of Drought Response Actions
What is your view on the timing of response actions and the usefulness of triggering
mechanisms?

•

Role and Performance of Water Institutions
How would you characterize the role and performance during this drought of water
institutions such as retailers, wholesalers, and state and federal agencies?

•

Things to Be Done
What, in your view, are the things that should be done, changed, or preserved in the way
water is managed during drought in California?
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TABLE 1.2
GROUP INTERVIEW GUIDE

•

Introduce interviewers and participants.

•

Present the objectives and design of the National Water Management During Drought
Study and the Lessons Learned study.

•

Provide verbal directions for individual written responses:
"We would like you to use these cue cards and spend four to five minutes writing down
your thoughts regarding two aspects of this drought. "
The first aspect is the IMPORTANT IMPACTS OF THE DROUGHT. What do you
see as the most important impacts of this drought on you, your organization, as well as
on other parties and activities (including environmental, financial, social, economic,
political, and other).
The second aspect is the THINGS TO BE DONE. What in your view are the things
that should be done, changed, or preserved in the way water is handled during drought?
For example, what are the needed changes pertaining to communication and cooperation,
role of the media, public response, innovative approaches, legislation, timing of drought
response actions, and performance of water institutions?

•

Solicit remarks from each participant and encourage free-flowing discussion.

•

Remind everyone to convey their personal thoughts based on their written notes.

•

Ask follow-up questions as needed.

Figure 1.2 gives a representation of the water management structure in California devised
for the purpose of this study. The water management institutions were placed into a hierarchical
structure rising from the local level of communities and industries to the state and federal levels.
The pyramid shape of the aggregated hierarchy shows that the number of organizations is the
largest at the local level. At the state and federal levels there are fewer agencies, but their
actions have considerable impact on water management in California.
A horizontal distinction was also made within the pyramid. We distinguished "water
controllers" from "water influencers" at each level of management. The controllers of water
represent organizations and individuals who make direct decisions on water allocations, have
been allocated water rights, and can decide on how, where, and when to release or move water.
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These groups include the State Water Project (SWP), the Central Valley Project (CVP), and all
water districts (both urban and agricultural) in the state. The influencers in water management
do not make day-to-day decisions in storing, releasing, and wheeling water and may not have
water rights, but they have critical influence on the decisions of water controllers. The
influencer group includes all environmental organizations and government agencies that regulate
water and related land resources.
The participants were closely involved in preparing this report. Two workshops were
held at the California Department of Water Resources in December 1992 at which they critically
reviewed the preliminary draft report, especially its conclusions and lessons learned. Eleven of
the organizations interviewed for the study participated in the workshops, representing about one
quarter of all the agencies interviewed. Their comments and critique were considered and
included in the final study document.
Table 1.3 lists all institutions who participated in the individual interviews or group
interview sessions and classifies them according to hierarchy and their controlling/influencing
role. Several other organizations were approached but could or did not participate for various
reasons. Some institutions cannot be readily compartmentalized because of their dual roles as
controllers and influencers.
However, the most important purpose of this structural
representation was to make sure that all key players in California's water management were
included in our survey.
A total of 101 key individuals participated in 12 personal interviews and 22 group
interview sessions. The participants represented 57 organizations. Some interviews of
institutions included representatives of member organizations. Table 1.3 does not list all 57
organizations. The 34 interviews were conducted over a six-month period. The first 14
interviews conducted in December 1991 represented 20 organizations. The remaining 20
interviews were completed in May-Iune 1992. Those participants represented 37 organizations.
The total survey was made up of 20 interviews with controllers and 14 interviews with
influencers. A summary of each personal interview or a group interview session was prepared
from the interview notes and notes taken during playback of the recorded interviews. The
summaries were used to identify the lessons learned.

CHAYI'ER SYNOPSFS

The sequence of chapters of this report generally follows the research sequence of this
study. Chapters II-IV give the necessary background information on population, economy, and
management of water resources in California and also present a chronological recount of the
major events and response actions during the 1987-92 ongoing drought. Chapters V-VIII present
perceptions of targeted interview participants in light of the background information and identify
lessons learned.
Chapter II gives background information on the state economy and water resources and
presents the breakdown of water use in the state.
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TABLE 1.3
PARTICIPATING INSTITUTIONS

Influencers

Controllers
I.

Federal and nationwide
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Environmental Defense Fund
Sierra Club
Soil Conservation Service

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

ll. State or statewide
Department of Parks and Recreation
Department of Fish and Game
California Farm Bureau

Department of Water Resources
C-DWR State Water Project
C-DWR Drought Center
California Resources Agency

m. Regional and wholesalers
State Water Project Contractors
Committee for Water Policy Consensus
CVP Water Users Association
California Urban Water Agencies

San Francisco Water Department
Metropolitan Water District
of Southern California
Westlands Water District
Kern County Water Agency
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District
Santa Barbara County Water Agency

IV. Community and retailers
Southern California Water Company
East Bay Municipal Utility District
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
City of Santa Barbara
City of Goleta

Sacramento Bee
Mono Lake Committee

V. Commercial and industrial
California Landscape Contractors Assn.
California Energy Commission
Green Industry Council

Pacific Gas and Electric
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Chapter ill displays the balance of water supply and demand under normal conditions and
characterizes the existing water management system in California. The water management
system is presented in terms of its legal and institutional setting. The chapter also describes the
overall approach to preparing and responding to droughts in the state that existed prior to the
1987-92 drought. It describes the roles of water institutions and other parties in drought
management and contrasts these roles with experiences of the 1976-77 drought. The status of
drought preparedness and the level of long-term drought protection are assessed. The chapter
concludes with a summary of the major concerns and challenges facing the managers of water
resources in the state.
Chapter IV gives a recount of the major events and developments during the 1987-92
drought. A chronology of events is re-created beginning with the early signs of drought
followed by a description of significant drought response actions during each consecutive year
of the drought. The last section of this chapter characterizes the current status of the drought.
Chapter V presents the results of personal interviews and group interview discussions
concerning four general aspects of the drought: (1) critical drought impacts, (2) communication
and cooperation, (3) the role and responsibilities of the media, and (4) response of the general
public and water users to the drought.
Chapter VI summarizes the views of the key individuals concerning four specific issues
of water management during the drought. These include (1) new development and innovative
approaches, (2) critical legislation, (3) timing of drought response actions, and (4) performance
of water institutions.
Chapter VII presents views on initiatives and reforms needed in water management. The
discussion summarizes the views of the survey participants on actions that should be taken to
enhance California's water management system handling of future droughts.
Throughout Chapters V-VII, the responses of the survey participants are supplemented
with factual information to verify the opinions and perceptions of the participants.
Finally, Chapter VIII delivers nine new lessons learned from the drought and four
confirmed lessons of previous droughts based upon an analysis and synthesis of collected data.
It outlines the expected approach to drought response and describes the important lessons for the
development of future drought management policies in California and other states. Specific
lessons and recommendations are given for strategic (long-term) and tactical (short-term)
measures for drought planning.
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n.

CALIFORNIA'S ECONOMY AND WATER RESOURCES

This chapter gives background information on water supplies and water uses in the state
and characterizes the overall water management system.

POPULATION AND ECONOMY

Population Growth

California's population was approximately 32 million in early 1993 and is projected to
reach 41.4 million by 2010 (C-DWR, Statewide Planning Branch 1992h). Between 1980 and
1990, California's population increased 27 percent (6.3 million persons). From 1980-85, net
migration to California accounted for about 52.5 percent of the increase in population, while
natural increase made up 47.5 percent. Average annual population increase in the state between
1980 and 1985 was 2 percent or 481,000. The South Coast region constituted about 54 percent
of the state population in 1985 and this region grew by the greatest number of people: 1.25
million, between 1980 and 1985; and 3.3 million from 1980-90. Table IT. 1 and Figure 11.1
depict the historical and projected population in California.
Population growth in the counties of the South Coast region has been triggered by several
factors. Increased migration from Asia and Latin America together with natural increase
induced growth in Los Angeles County. The location of the San Bernardino and Riverside
counties within the commute zone for the metropolitan Los Angeles area has made these counties
major growth areas. Growth in Kern County since 1980 can be attributed to the incentives of
relatively low living costs and the county's proximity to the Los Angeles metropolitan market
area. The slowest growth in the state has occurred in the San Francisco Bay and Central Coast
regions.

Economic Activity

California's economy ranks eighth largest in the world, slightly smaller than the United
Kingdom (Spectrum Economics, Inc. 1991). The California gross state product has more than
doubled during the last decade, from about $319 billion in 1980 to $697 billion in 1989 (U.S.
Department of Commerce 1992). Private industries generally account for about 89 percent of
the gross state product and the government makes up the remaining 11 percent. The top three
contributors to the economy in 1989 were the services sector (21 percent); the finance,
insurance, and real estate sector (20 percent); and the manufacturing sector (17 percent). Other
private industry sectors listed in descending order of their contribution to the economy include
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TABLE H.l
CALIFORNIA'S POPULATION - 1980, 1985, AND 2010
(In Millions)

Region

Increase
1980-1990

Increase
1990-2010

1980

1990

2010

5.8

6.8

8.3

1.0

17%

1.5

22%

12.9

16.2

21.9

3.3

26%

5.7

35%

Sacramento River

1.7

2.2

3.3

0.5

29%

1.1

50%

San Joaquin River
and Tulare Lake

2.2

3.0

4.7

0.8

36%

1.7

57%

Colorado River

0.3

0.5

0.8

0.2

67%

0.3

60%

Remaining regions

0.8

1.2

2.3

0.4

50%

1.1

92%

23.7

30.0

41.4

6.3

27%

11.4

38%

San Francisco Bay
and Central Coast
South Coast

California total

Adapted from: C-DWR, Statewide Planning Branch 1992h.

retail trade; transportation, communication, and utilities; construction; agriculture, forestry, and
fishing; and mining (Table ll.2).

Major Contributors to the California Economy

Services Sector. The services sector leads the private industries in its contribution to
economic development in California. Services constituted more than $146 billion of the gross
state product in 1989. The leading tertiary activities included business services, health services,
miscellaneous professional services, and legal services.

Finance, Insurance, and Real &tate. This sector closely follows the services sector
in stimulating economic development in California. Finance, insurance, and real estate services
made up over $139 billion of the gross state product in 1989.
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TABLEll.2
CALIFORNIA GROSS STATE PRODUCT, SELECTED YEARS
(Millions of Dollars)

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

12,142
7,361
21,765
92,572

12,920
4,470
24,593
98,495

15,043
4,871
27,686
105,827

15,800
5,389
30,577
113,010

16,039
5,111
33,590
117,782

39,208
36,625
50,721

42,273
37,239
53,579

44,005
38,655
57,168

46,526
42,419
61,946

48,852
46,325
66,213

87,060
95,343
442,797

97,334
105,736
476,639

109,189
119,870
522,314

120,613
133,866
570,145

139,138
146,121
619,169

38,311

57,742

62,667

66,997

72,165

78,212

~191~21

5fl1l1~~8

~~9.~~7

~§9.311

6421~02

697.3§1

1980
Private industries
Agriculture, forestry,
and fishing
10,883
Mining
6,018
Construction
16,132
Manufacturing
58,892
Transportation, communication, and utilities
24,051
Wholesale trade
23,654
Retail trade
32,806
Finance, insurance,
and real estate
55,236
Services
53,336
Private industries total 281,010

Government total

Grand total

Source:

u.s.

Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Finance, Financial and Economic Research
(California Statistical Abstract 1992).

Manufacturing Sector. Manufacturing ranks third among the private industries and this
sector contributed to over $117 billion of the gross state product in 1989. The manufacturing
sector is led by high technology and defense industry groups-aircraft aerospace, computer, and
computer components. These groups provide 27 percent of manufacturing employment in
Southern California and 42 percent in the San Francisco Bay area. Each job in these industry
groups indirectly supports 1.8 additional jobs in trade, services, and diversified manufacturing
in the state (Spectrum Economics, Inc. 1991). California's manufacturing sector contributes to
11 percent of the manufacturing employment in the United States (1987 Census of
Manufacturers).
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Other Contributors to the California Economy

The three major contributors described above made up 58 percent of the California
economy in 1989. Additionally, a number of sectors contribute to the state economy. The
discussion that follows examines the role played by three of these sectors, agriculture, the "green
industry," and recreation and tourism in the economy.

Agricultural Sector. California agriculture is considered one of the most diversified in
the world with over 250 different crops and livestock commodities (California Department of
Food and Agriculture, 1990). According to the California Department of Food and Agriculture
(DFA), agriculture had $18.3 billion in farm production in 1990, and it plays a dynamically
influencing role in the state's and nation's economy. The 1990 statistics from the DFA revealed
that California's 30 million acres of farmland (of which irrigable acreage is about 9 million
acres) account for only 4 percent of the country's farmland but produce 50 percent of the value
of the nation's fruits, nuts, and vegetables. California has been the leading agricultural state in
the U.S. for the last 43 years and cash farm receipts for 1990 were estimated to have generated
over $70 billion in related economic activities.
In the livestock industry, cattle constitutes the largest livestock population, followed by
sheep and lambs, and then hogs and pigs. The cattle population has varied from 4.65 million
to 5.0 million from 1981 to 1991 (Table 11.3). Cash receipts for cattle showed a boost during
1988 to 1990, and overall receipts for cattle and hogs (Table 11.3 and Figure 11.2) recorded a
second high in 1990 (Gleick and Nash 1991).

Green Industry. The "green industry" includes landscaping services, retail and
wholesale nurseries, florists, garden stores, golf courses, and garden equipment manufacturers.
California's environmental horticulture industry has economic activity exceeding $7.2 billion
annually, but its various segments are not unified (pittenger, Gibeault, and Cockerham 1991).
Additionally, an equipment category and industry service segments such as public facilities and
golf courses were identified, but the value could not be determined. The previously cited report
predicts that these segments would account for another $2 to $4 billion in value.

Recreation and Tourism. Recreation and tourism is the largest single industry in
California (Gleick and Nash 1991). This industry includes a number of activities such as hiking,
boating, tourism to theme parks and beaches, and skiing in the Sierra Nevada. The 1989
estimates reveal that nearly $50 billion was spent in California on recreation and tourism, and
over 700,000 jobs are associated with this industry (Gleick and Nash 1991).
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TABLE H.3
CALIFORNIA LIVESTOCK POPULATIONS AND CASH RECEIPTS

Cash Receipts
(1,000 dollars) (b)

Population
(1,000 animals) (a)

Year

All
Sheep and
Lambs
Cattle

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

4,760
5,000
4,900
5,000
4,960
5,000
4,750
4,650
4,700
4,800
4,750

1,205
1,210
1,115
1,115
1,065
1,065
980
970
940
1,000
1,015

Hogs and
Pigs

All
Cattle

180
160
160
155
140
145
150
140
130
140
180

1,262,907
1,481,400
1,325,141
1,463,485
1,275,693
1,347,044
1,350,012
1,616,615
1,575,944
1,739,859

Sheep and

Lambs
37,867
52,541
44,358
51,209
51,771
57,830
74,034
61,250
53,698
44,583

Hogs and
Pigs

29,627
28,169
27,952
26,811
22,142
28,134
33,414
20,860
21,617
38,486

Notes:
(a) Population numbers are for January 1981 to January 1991.
(b) Cash receipts are for marketings ending December 1 of each year.
Source: CASS 1991c, Gleick and Nash 1991.

WATER RESOURCES

Precipitation and Runoff

The average annual precipitation in California is nearly 21 inches, ranging from almost
zero in desert areas to more than 100 inches in the mountainous North Coast region (C-DWR
1987). Table IT.4 shows that the North Coast region averages 53.5 inches of precipitation per
year, while the annual average for the Central Valley region (including drainage areas of
Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers) is about 27.8 inches. The region experiencing the lowest
precipitation is the Colorado River region with 4.1 inches annually.
About 60 percent of the total supply from precipitation, or almost 108 million acre-feet
(MAF), is evaporated and transpired by native trees, brush, and other vegetation. The
remaining 40 percent constitutes 71 MAF of streamflow that drains from the land in an average
year (C-DWR 1987). It is evident from Table IT.4 that almost 29 MAF, or 40 percent, of the
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FIGURE ll.2
CASH RECEIPTS FROM MARKETING OF LIVESTOCK,
POULTRY, AND HONEY, 1981-1990
Sources: CASS 1991c, Gleick and Nash 1991.

average statewide runoff occur in the North Coast region. However, flows of North Coast
rivers contribute only one water diversion to the rest of the state, since many rivers in the north
are protected by state and federal laws that do not allow major export water developments. The
Sacramento River region contributes 22 MAF annually to natural runoff, and the lowest runoff,
about 0.2 MAF occurs in the Colorado River region. California's 71 million acre-feet average
annual runoff displays a huge 120 MAF range, varying from an annual low of about 15 MAF
in 1977 to an annual high of 135 MAF in 1983.

Surface-Water Resources

Most of the surface-water resources in the state originate from runoff that is generated
within the state. Relatively small amounts are provided from Oregon and from the Colorado
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TABLEll.4
CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCFS

Average annual precipitation (Inches)
Statewide by hydrologic region
53.5
27.8
23.4
20.4
18.5
8.7
4.1

North Coast
Central Valley
San Francisco Bay
Central Coast
South Coast
Lahontan
Colorado River

Average annual natural runoff (MAF)
Statewide by hydrologic region
28.9
22.4
7.9
3.3
2.4
1.8
1.3
1.2
1.2
0.2

North Coast
Sacramento River
San Joaquin River
Tulare Lake

Central Coast
North Lahontan
South Lahontan
San Francisco Bay
South Coast
Colorado River

Surface-Water storage
State jurisdiction
Dams and reservoirs
Gross storage capacity, acre-feet

1,188
19,700,000

Federal (in and adjacent to California)
Dams and reservoirs
Gross storage capacity, acre-feet

125
22,900,000

Total number of dams and reservoirs
Total storage capacity, acre-feet

1,313
42,600,000
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TABLE 11.4 (Continued)
CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCES

Number of major reservoirs
Total capacity, acre-feet

155
37,688,000

Historical average storage
on October 1, 1990, acre-feet

22,497,000
158,295

Area of California, sq. mi.
Average renewable supply, acre-feet/year

78,600,000

Groundwater resources
Number of wells
67,770
8,143
3,320
359,584
438,817
2,000,000

Irrigation wells
Public supply wells
Community supply wells
Household wells
Total number of wells
Annual overdraft, acre-feet
Sources:

1. USGS 1984.
2. C-DWR 1991b.
3. C-DWR 1987, including updated infonnation from C-DWR, Statewide Planning Office.

River. The Oregon streams provide an inflow of about 1.4 MAF, and imported water from the
Colorado River contributes an additional supply of 4.8 MAF.
The North Coast is California's wettest region, but the abundance of distributable water
has been curtailed by designation of wild and scenic rivers to protect their natural state. This
category includes about 1,200 miles of streams contributing about 17.8 MAF of runoff. The
wild and scenic category incorporate parts of the Klamath, Trinity, Eel, Smith, Van Duzen,
Salmon, and Scott rivers (C-DWR 1987).
The state has jurisdiction over the safety of 1,188 dams and reservoirs with a total
storage capacity of 19.7 MAF. In addition, there are 125 federal dams and reservoirs in and
adjacent to the state of California with a gross storage capacity of 22.9 MAF. Altogether there
are 1,313 state and federal dams and reservoirs that store about 43 MAF. Figure ll.3 shows the
location of the major storage reservoirs and aqueducts that are found in California (C-DWR
1987).
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MAJOR STORAGE RESERVOIRS AND CONVEYANCE FACILITIES
Source: C-DWR 1987.

Groundwater Resources

Major Groundwater Aquifers

Groundwater occurs primarily in unconsolidated'sedimentary deposits that underlie much
of the state's agricultural lands and large portions of the urban areas. California has abundant
groundwater resources, and in absolute terms, these resources are much larger than the state's
surface-water reservoirs. On a statewide basis, there are nearly 400 groundwater basins that
store nearly 850 MAF (C-DWR 1987). However, much of the groundwater is not available for
use because of factors such as economical extraction, high pumping lifts, usable storage capacity
of good quality water, limited potential for annual natural recharge, and distribution limitations.
In areas overlying usable groundwater basins, the basin characteristics, hydrology, and water
quality must be examined to determine the amounts and qualities of groundwater that may be
utilized.

Groundwater Storage and Safe Yield

Groundwater pumpage in California amounts to an average of 16.6 MAF on a yearly
basis, accounting for about 39 percent of the state's applied water requirements for municipal,
industrial, and agricultural uses (C-DWR 1987). Groundwater basins in the state range from
hundreds to millions of acres in size. However, much less than half the groundwater in storage
lies close enough to the earth's surface to be pumped economically. The usable groundwater
reserves are estimated to be 250 MAF (C-DWR, personal communication 1992h).
Groundwater recharge plays a significant role in assuring the production of reliable good
quality water from groundwater basins. Recharge occurs in various ways (C-DWR 1987) in the
state and these include the following:
•

An average of 5.8 MAF occurs through natural recharge from rainfall, snowmelt,
and stream seepage.

•

Annual return flows from agricultural, municipal, and industrial uses account for
7.4 MAF.

•

Imported surface water of about 1.1 million MAF annually is used to recharge
groundwater basins in the southern area of the state.

•

Seepage water from unlined irrigation canals makes up about 300,000 acre-feet
of additional annual recharge.
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Artificial and natural recharge makes up about 14.6 MAF of total recharge, but it does
not completely replace the 16.6 MAF volume of water pumped annually. Statewide groundwater
pumping exceeds recharge by an average of 2.0 MAF annually. This condition is referred to
as overdraft (or groundwater mining). However, the amount of groundwater extracted varies
considerably from year to year. The ability to increase withdrawals from the groundwater basins
during drought emergencies is California's most important drought management mechanism.

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES

The drought impacted fisheries and aquatic resources. The chinook salmon emerge from
eggs in the cold headwaters of a river and then move downstream to the saltwater conditions of
the ocean, where they mature into 20- to 50-pound adults. At 3 to 4 years of age, they respond
to instinct and return from the ocean, completing the trip upstream to spawn. This trip upstream
by the chinook salmon is referred to as escapement. The numbers of troll salmon (chinook and
coho) were about 1.06 million in 1979 and about 0.68 million in 1990. During these years, the
catch value was $22 million and $12 million, respectively. Figure II.4 illustrates the annual
salmon catch and catch value for the state from 1979 to 1990 (pacific Fishery Management
Council-PFMC 1991, Gleick and Nash 1991). The numbers of fish reveal a fluctuating trend,
recording a low of 0.48 million in 1983 and a high of 1.56 million in 1988. The record catch
of salmon during the 1979-90 period occurred in 1988, the second year of the drought. The
fisherman were catching upward of three-quarters of all salmon in the ocean moving toward
California streams.
The Sacramento-San Joaquin system has the major salmon runs in the state. A total of
120,000 fall-run chinook salmon returned to spawn in the Sacramento River basin in 1990.
However, the salmon runs exhibit declining trends. The 1990 estimate of 26 percent was below
the escapement averaged in the 1971-75 period (Gleick and Nash 1991). The escapement of fall
chinook in the San Joaquin in 1990 was about 1,100 fish, and this represented only 8 percent
of the 1971-75 average (Figure II.5).
In addition to the fall-run chinook, which represents the major salmon fishery in
California, there are three other distinct runs of salmon: late fall, winter, and spring
(Table II.5). All of these salmon runs have fluctuated and declined since 1987 (Gleick and Nash
1991). Since 1989, the winter run, which is already classified as a threatened species, has
reached extremely low numbers and it may be near extinction.

San Francisco Bay, one of the world's largest estuaries, is vulnerable to "Delta outflow, "
i.e., reduced freshwater inflows from the Sacramento and San Joaquin Delta. The striped bass,
an introduced species representing the principal sport fish in the estuary, has been a common
indication of the Bay's ecological condition. The industries related to striped bass contribute
about $45 million to local economies. Figure II.6 shows the fluctuations of the index in larval
abundance from a high of about 110 in 1967 to about 80 in 1974, and to less than 10 during the
1976-77 drought. Besides the striped bass, the abundance of the Delta smelt in the San
Francisco Bay Delta region has shown considerable decline since 1984, and this is closely
correlated with the prevalence of reversed flows in the Delta (Gleick and Nash 1991).
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TABLE

n.s

SACRAMENTO RIVER LATE FALL, WINTER, AND SPRING
CHINOOK SALMON SPAWNING ESCAPEMENTa ESTIMATES, 1981-1991
(Thousands of Fish)
Year
1971-75
1976-80
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Late Fall
c
c

19.0
11.2
7.0
4.9
15.2
10.4
10.2
7.0
15.7
16.6
11.4
8.4
7.1

Winter

Springb

30.6
15.4
20.0
1.2
1.8
2.6
5.0
2.3
2.3
2.1
0.5
0.5

7.2
11.7
22.0
27.4
8.0
9.4
14.9
17.2
12.4
16.7
10.8
8.3

unknown

unknown

Notes:

a Escapement refers to the number of fish that successfully complete the trip upstream to spawn.
b Spring-run totals include Feather River hatchery fish.
c 5-year average.
Sources: PFMC 1991, Gleick and Nash 1991.

The Central Valley of California also supports millions of wintering waterfowl.
However, the bird populations have declined over the last decade. In 1980, long-term averages
indicated that the wintering population was about 10 to 12 million, while the 1990 population was
estimated at around 2 million (Gleick and Nash 1991). The state and national wildlife refuges
that receive water from the SWP and CVP project supplies provide a major part of the wetlands
for the waterfowl. The current average annual water deliveries (1975-85) to the refuge, which
are designated as Level 2 condition of the wetlands, have been estimated at 380,000 acre-feet
(Table ll.6). For the current potential of the refuge to be fully used, an average annual supply
of 493,000 acre-feet would be needed, and with full development of the refuges optimum
management would required 526,200 acre-feet (Gleick and Nash 1991).

WATER USE

California's agricultural, urban, and other regional uses were approximately 40.5 million
acre-feet (MAF) of freshwater in 1985 (Table ll.7), two years before the current drought (CDWR 1987). This amount represents water removed from the ground or diverted from surface28

1W~---------------------------------------------------'

'67 '68 '69 70 71 72 73 '74 75 76 77 78 79 'SO '81 '82 '83 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90
Year

FIGURE n.6
SAN FRANCISCO BAY STRIPED BASS INDEX
Sources: SWRCB 1991, Gleick and Nash 1991.

water sources for public water supply, industry, irrigation, livestock, thermoelectric power
generation, and other uses. Approximately 24 MAF (or 57 percent) of water withdrawn is not
available for further use and is referred to as consumptive use. This portion of water is
evaporated, transpired, incorporated into products or crops, or consumed by humans or
livestock. Much of the difference between applied water and consumptive use is reused either
as groundwater percolation or as surface drainage water (irrigation return flows).
Approximately 60 percent of freshwater use is supported by surface-water sources (Le.,
reservoirs, lakes, and rivers). The other 40 percent is withdrawn from groundwater aquifers.
The availability of groundwater and surface-water storage affords the state a fair degree of
protection against droughts.
California accounts for the highest percent of total freshwater withdrawals in the nation,
because the withdrawn water also serves the highest percent of the United States' population.
In 1985, 10.9 percent of the United States' population lived in California, and the state used
11.1 percent of total freshwater withdrawals in the nation. These withdrawals were equivalent
to 1,420 gallons of water per capita per day. The national average per capita use of freshwater
was 1,400 gallons per day.
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TABLE n.6
WATER SUPPLY NEEDS FOR
WILDLIFE REFUGES IN THE CENTRAL VALLEY
(In Acre-Feet>

Levell

Level 2

Level 3

Level 4

ModocNWR
Sacramento NWR
Delevan NWR
Colusa NWR
Sutter NWR
Gray Lodge WMA

18,500
0
0
0
0
8,000

15,550
46,400
20,950
25,000
23,500
35,400

19,550
50,000
25,000
25,000
30,000
41,000

20,550
50,000
30,000
25,000
30,000
44,000

Total Sacramento Valley

26,550

169,800

190,500

199,550

Grassland RCD(a)
Volta WMA
Los Banos WMA
Kesterson NWR
San Luis NWR
Merced NWR
MendotaNWR
Pixley NWR
Kern

50,000
10,000
6,200
35,000
0
0
25,463
0
0

125,000
10,000
16,670
3,500
13,350
13,500
18,500
1,280
9,950

180,000
13,000
22,500
10,000
19,000
16,000
24,000
3,000
15,050

180,000
16,000
25,000
10,000
19,000
16,000
29,650
6,000
25,000

Total San Joaquin Valley

95,163

211,750

302,550

326,650

121.713

381.559

493·950

526.200

Refuge

Total

Level 1:
Level 2:
Level 3:
Level 4:

(b)

Existing firm water supply.
Current average annual water delivers.
Full use of existing development.
Optimum management if refuge were fully developed.

(a) As of 1985, Grassland River Conservation District (RCD) no longer receives agricultural drainage flows due to water quality
concerns.
(b) Only 18,500 acre-feet can be delivered to the Mendota WIldlife Management Area (WMA) without modifications of existing
facilities .
Source: USBR 1989, Gleick and Nash 1991.
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TABLE ll.7
REGIONAL USE OF CALIFORNIA'S DEVEWPED WATER SUPPLIES,
1980, 1985, AND 2010
(In 1,000s of Acre-Feet)

APPLIED WATER
Agricultural

Totals

Other

Urbaa

Regions

1980

1985

2010

1980

1985

2010

1980

1985

2010

1980

1985

2010

San Francisco Bay
and Central Coast
South Coast
Sacramento River
San Joaquin River
and Tulare Lake
Colorado River
Remaining regions

1,310

1,320

1,260

1,210

1,360

1,600

110

100

110

2,630

2,780

2,980

990
900
650
9,600 7,800 9,000
18,890 17,600 17,680

2,780
560
830

3,120
630
920

4,020
840
1,400

30
250
170

20
270
170

30
270
190

3,280
1,620

210
270

250
310

410
440

20
280

20
380

20
400

36,120 32,910 33,490
84.3
81.3
77.5

5,860
13.7

6,590
16.3

8,710
20.2

860
2.0

960
2.4

1,020
2.4

STATE TOTALS
Percent of total

3,580
1,750

3,660
1,630

3,800 4,040 4,700
10,410 8,700 10,110
19,890 18,690 19,270
3,810
2,300

3,930
2,320

3,710
2,460

42,840 40,460 43,220
100
100
100

APPLIED WATER is the quantity of water delivered to the intake to a city's water system or a farm headgate; water diverted from a stream
or pumped from underground sources, as in self-developed supplies; and water supplied to a wetland for wildlife. Because of the large amount
of reuse that occura, this term overstates the supply of water needed for a large region.

NET WATER USE
Agricultural

Other

Urbaa

Totals

Regious

1M

1985

2010

1980

1985

2010

1M

1985

2010

1980

1985

2010

San Francisco Bay
and Central Coast
South Coast
Sacramento River
San Joaquin River
and Tulare Lake
Colorado River
Remaining regions

1,020

1,010

980

1,160

1,310

1,530

130

130

130

2,310

2,450

2,640

790
750
570
6,900 6,710 6,880
13,880 13,650 13,860

2,510
460
490

2,820
500
530

3,590
680
760

210
270
340

190
270
370

200
270
390

3,120
1,340

140
220

170
260

270
360

560
320

380
340

300
390

27,340 26,950 26,750
80.1
78.8
75.1

4,980
14.5

5,590
16.3

7,190
20.2

1,830
5.4

1,680
4.9

1,680
4.7

STATE TOTALS
Percent of total

3,400
1,350

3,480
1,350

3,510 3,760 4,360
7,630 7,480 7,830
14,710 14,550 15,010
4,110
1,890

4,030
1,950

3,690
2,090

34,150 34,220 35,620
100
100
100

NET WATER USE is computed by adding evapotranspiration (the amount of water taken up by plants, transpired by them, and evaporated from
the soil), the losses from a water distribution system that cannot be recovered, and outflow leaving an area. This estimate is essential in
determining whether an area needs more water .•

Source: C-DWR 1987.
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While the statistics on freshwater withdrawals do not distinguish California from other
states in the union, the statistics on consumptive water use do. The state accounts for almost
23 percent of total consumptive use in the nation, more than two times its share of population.
This situation can be attributed to the nature of agricultural and manufacturing activities found
in the state. Approximately 17 percent of all irrigated land in the United States is located in
California, and the size of livestock in the state almost equals the livestock in Texas. Also, the
state has a large food-processing industry. These factors and the desert climate of the major
agricultural areas contribute to the high consumptive use of water.

Agricultural Water Use

Irrigation Use

According to the C-DWR, 1985 agricultural withdrawals amounted to 32.9 MAF and
accounted for almost 81 percent of total freshwater withdrawals in the state (fable IT.7).
Approximately two-thirds of the withdrawals came from surface-water sources, with the balance
obtained from groundwater. An additional 263,000 acre-feet of irrigation water were obtained
by reclaiming wastewater (Solley et ale 1988).
According to the USGS 1985 estimates, the irrigation withdrawals (net of 1.04 MAF of
conveyance losses) were applied on 9,580,000 acres of irrigated lands including farm and
horticultural crops, as well as public and private golf courses. Irrigation water is primarily
applied to land through flood irrigation (including flooding, furrow, and ditch methods).
Approximately 80 percent of irrigated acres are flooded, and the remaining 20 percent are
irrigated using center pivot, traveling gun, trickle, and drip irrigation methods.
In 1987, slightly more that 90 percent of 7,676,000 acres, representing total harvested
cropland, were irrigated (U.S. Department of Commerce 1989). In 1982, the agricultural
products from irrigated farms were valued at $10.3 billion, or 82 percent of all farm production.
On average, 3 acre-feet of water are applied per acre of irrigated land (Bajwa, Crosswhite, and
Hostetter 1987).

Livestock Use

Livestock use is sometimes referred to as agricultural nonirrigation use. Livestock water
use includes multipurpose uses, including water for stock watering, feed lots, dairy operations,
fish farming, and other on-farm needs. Livestock freshwater use in California totaled 201
million gallons per day (or 225,000 acre-feet per year). About 80 percent of the total applied
use came from surface-water withdrawals and 20 percent from groundwater withdrawals. About
78 percent (176,000 acre-feet per year) of the total applied livestock water was consumptive use.
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Urban Water Use
There are about 300 urban water agencies in California that were affected by the Urban
Water Management Planning Act (Act), Section 10610 of division 6 of the Water Code. This
act was known as Assembly Bill (AB) 797 and became effective on January 1, 1984. The 300
urban agencies that have to prepare and adopt an urban water management plan represent water
suppliers providing water for municipal purposes to more than 3,000 customers, or supplying
more than 3,000 acre-feet of water annually.
A recent survey by the C-DWR's District Offices summarized per capita water use for
129 of the 300 urban agencies from 1980 through 1990 (C-DWR 1992b). The analysis
conducted through the survey indicates that most urban areas reduced their peak summer use
during the drought years 1988 through 1990. The average annual statewide per capita water use
for 1987 was 195 gallons per capita per day (GPCD), and this decreased to 191 GPCD for the
1988-90 period. Some of the reductions, however, were accompanied by increases in water use
during the dry winters (C-DWR 1992b).
The magnitude of the state's projected urban growth will increase the need for additional
water supplies. California's projected increase in population is estimated to increase urban
applied water deliveries by 32 percent from 1985 to 2010 (Table n.7). The consumptive use
or net urban water use is projected to increase by about 4 percent from 1985 to 2010. This
increase is due largely to the state's coastal regions, where 80 percent of California's population
lives. More specifically, net urban use is increasing in the warmer inland coastal areas. The
projected increase in urban consumptive use is accompanied by the development of several
significant trends aimed at reducing per capita water consumption. These trends (outlined in CDWR 1987) include:
•

Construction of more multiunit housing

•

Reduction in residential lot sizes

•

Increasing the number of residences built since mandatory low water use fixtures
have been instituted

•

Local agency water conservation programs including the influence of Best
Management Practices (BMPs)

•

Increased plantings of low water-using landscapes

•

More efficient watering

•

Increased recycling of industrial process water

Baseline unit urban demand is projected to increase 10 percent in the 1990-2020 period
due to increased growth in the warmer, drier areas inland from the coast. However, the trends
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outlined above should cause a downward shift of about 15 percent, so the net change in unit
urban demand is projected to be about -5 percent.
This also reflects other factors:
•

More parks

•

More landscape greenery for highways and businesses

•

Population shifts inward to hotter drier climates

•

Smaller household sizes

SUMMARY

California's economy was worth more than $760 billion in 1992, and the three major
contributors have been the services sector; the finance, insurance, and real estate sector; and the
manufacturing sector. These sectors made up 58 percent of the California state product in 1989.
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing accounted for about 2 112 percent of the state's GDP, but one
dependent upon the availability and usability of more than three-fourths of California's delivered
water resources.
California has abundant groundwater resources, and in absolute terms, these resources
are much larger than the state's surface-water reservoirs. However, much of the groundwater
is not available for use, and annual groundwater pumpage amounts to an average of 16.6 MAF.
The state and federal dams and reservoirs store about 43 MAF. The 1985 net water use for
agriculture accounted for 78.8 percent, urban use was 16.3 percent, and other uses accounted
for 4.9 percent. The water use is based on 1985 conditions and will vary with changing
assumptions across time.
With this underpinning knowledge of the California economy and water-using sectors,
let us now move to a discussion of the management systems for the delivery and allocation of
this water.
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m.

WATER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

This chapter describes the existing water management system in California. It
characterizes (1) the statewide balance of water supply and demand, and regional differences in
supply availability, (2) the large-scale water development projects that serve to mitigate regional
supply deficiencies, (3) the California system of water law, (4) the institutional structure of
water management, and (5) the overall approach to managing the recurrent droughts in the state
that existed prior to the 1987-92 drought.
SUPPLY-AND-DEMAND BALANCE
The atmospheric circulation patterns and the location of the major mountain chains of the
Coast Ranges, southern Cascade Range, and Sierra Nevada produce very uneven spatial
distribution of precipitation and runoff. The values of normal annual precipitation range from
3 inches in the desert areas of Southern California to 120 inches in the coastal mountains in the
northwestern comer of the state. At the same time, the areas of highest precipitation and runoff
are least populated and removed from the areas with irrigated agriculture. As a result, the
northern half of the state is rich in renewable water supplies, while the southern half has to deal
with a natural condition of water scarcity. In addition to the uneven spatial distribution of water
surplus and deficit areas, there is a temporal disparity between the seasonal water needs for
irrigated agriculture and seasonal precipitation. Precipitation is rare during the summer growing
season. Most of the annual precipitation falls during the winter months of November through
March, with much of that precipitation as snowfall in the higher elevations.
In order to alleviate the uneven temporal and spatial distribution of precipitation and

runoff and the mismatch of water supply-and-demand areas, a complex water management
system has been developed. Hundreds of reservoirs and extensive water conveyance systems
have been built to compensate for the seasonal and year-to-year variation in runoff, as well as
to move water to deficit areas. This supply system has developed in response to water needs
of each local area and region and over the 140-year period since California was declared a state.
On average (or during years of normal precipitation and runoff), California can be
viewed as a water surplus state. Average renewable statewide surface supply is 78.6 million
acre-feet. This estimate includes 72.4 MAF of runoff generated within the state, 1.4 MAF from
Oregon streams, and 4.8 MAP of imported water from the Colorado River. Total freshwater
withdrawals are estimated at 40 MAF per year. They consist of 16 MAP of groundwater and
24 MAF of surface water. Groundwater withdrawals exceed natural and artificial recharge by
about 2.0 MAP. This condition is referred to as groundwater overdraft. The consumptive use
in the state is 24.0 MAF or approximately 30 percent of average renewable supply. However,
statewide statistics may give a false impression of the availability of water supply for all regional
areas within the state. Severe imbalances between the demand for water and the available supply
can be found in various regions, especially in the densely populated southwestern comer of the
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state. Because of these imbalances, California has developed an extensive plumbing system of
intrastate water transfers illustrated in Figure ill. I.
Widespread water development continues. However, the pace of development has slowed
during the last two decades because of environmental concerns and other issues affecting water
management. The following section describes the major water development projects that when
taken together, constitute a major portion of the existing system of water supply and distribution
in the state (and are referred by California water professionals as "developed water").

CALIFORNIA MAJOR WATER PROJECTS
A major portion of the state can be served by water obtained from two prime water
suppliers who operate major storage reservoirs and aqueducts-State Water Project and Central
Valley Project. The water distribution systems operated by SWP and CVP can reach more than
75 percent of the state's population (C-DWR 1987). Both projects export water from the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, which has become the focal point for a number of water-related
issues. The complex network of the natural and man-made Delta channels is shown in
Figure llI.2. The Delta is a major hub for California water transfers and, because of the
problems of saltwater flows, creates a bottleneck in the operations of SWP and CVP. Currently
the pumping stations in the Delta are operated by releasing extra water to the Bay (called
carriage water) in order to control reverse flows. Depending on the existing flow conditions,
the amount of carriage water may reach a significant portion of water released for export during
a period of drought.
According to Contra Costa Water District (CCWD 1992), limitations on CVP and SWP
pumping are imposed by the SWRCB, which requires salinity and flow standards to be met by
the projects. It has been assumed for about 30 years that there is a carriage water requirement,
with carriage water being additional outflow required to maintain some salinity standards when
exports cause net reverse flows. The C-DWR proposed the hypothesis in the early 1960s, but
never tested its validity (CCWD 1992). The District maintains that the data of the last 20 years
contradict the hypothesis and the carriage water model. In fact, the data suggest that outflow
requirements to meet a standard decrease with increased pumping, not increase, the exact
opposite of the assumptions. The CCWD maintains that C-DWR acknowledged that the District
had "raised valid points." However, C-DWR's official position, i.e., carriage water is needed,
remains unchanged.
In addition to the SWP and the CVP, there are four large regional projects-Colorado
River, Hetch Hetchy, Mokelumne River, and Los Angeles aqueducts. In addition to the
Colorado River aqueduct in the southeastern comer of the state, the Colorado River water is
distributed by two federal aqueducts-Coachella Canal and All American Canal. A brief
description of each major project is given below.
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EXISTING INTRASTATE WATER TRANSFERS
AT 1980 LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT
ACRE-FEET PER YEAR

1. SOUTH BAY AQUEDUCT
1SO,OOO
2. CQIITRACOSTACANAI.
.',000
3. MQCe.UMNEAQUEDUCT
210,000
4. HETCH HETCHY AQUEDUCT 240,000

FIGURE ill. 1
EXISTING INTRASTATE WATER TRANSFERS
AT 1980 LEVEL OF DEVEWPMENT (Acre-Feet per Year)
Source: C-DWR 1983.
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FIGUREill.2
NATURAL AND MAN-MADE DELTA CHANNELS
Source: C-DWR 1987.
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State Water Project
The history of the State Water Project dates back to 1947, when the state legislature
funded the water resource investigation that resulted in the publication of The California Water
flail. The plan laid a foundation for the design of waterworks for transferring surplus water
from the north to the water-deficient south (C-DWR 1990). In 1959, the state legislature
enacted the California Water Resources Development Act (known as the Burns-Potter Act) that
authorized funding for the construction of SWP facilities. Initial facilities included two dams
and reservoirs (Oroville and San Luis) and three aqueducts (South Bay Aqueduct, North Bay
Aqueduct, and California Aqueduct). The first SWP water deliveries were made in 1962.
Currently the existing SWP facilities consist of 22 reservoirs including 2 built and
operated in cooperation with the Central Valley Project. The total storage of the 20 SWP
reservoirs is 5,279,000 acre-feet, with additional 1,062,000 acre-feet share of SWP in San Luis
Reservoir and 29,600 acre-feet in O'Neill Forebay Reservoir. These reservoirs are connected
with 445 miles of aqueducts served by 21 pumping plants with design flows ranging from 80 to
13,200 cubic feet per second (cfs) and an average annual energy demand of 12.4 billion kilowatthours (kwh), which constitutes the SWP share. The SWP facilities also include 13 power plants
capable of producing 7.324 billion kwh of hydropower.
The SWP is managed by the California Department of Water Resources. In 1960, CDWR and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California signed the first water supply
contract. Currently 30 agencies have long-term water supply contracts that call for water
deliveries to eventually total 4.2 MAF. The current firm yield of SWP is estimated at 2.3
MAP. In 1990, the contractors' requests for water totaled about 3.2 MAP.
The service areas of the SWP long-term water supply contractors total 24.8 million acres,
or 25 percent of the state's total area. Population of these areas totals 19.7 million persons, or
70 percent of the total state population. The SWP water is used primarily for urban and
industrial purpose in all of the SWP service areas except for the San Joaquin and Feather River
areas.

Central Valley Project
The federal Central Valley Project (CVP) was developed in order to transfer surplus
water from the northern to the southern portion of the great Central Valley of California.
Although the California legislature and the voters authorized the construction of CVP in 1933,
federal authorization and financing were requested under the Rivers and Harbor Act of 1937,
due to lack of funds. The U.S. Congress authorized the construction of the project by the
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) for the purpose of flood control, irrigation and domestic uses,
and power generation on the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers. Subsequent reauthorization
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of the project added recreation and fish and wildlife as project purposes. The export of water
to the south began in 1940 after a partial completion of the 48-mile-Iong Contra Costa Canal.
Today the Central Valley Project includes twenty reservoirs with combined storage
capacity of 13.6 MAF. Five reservoirs (i.e., Shasta Lake, Clair Engle Lake, Folsom Lake, San
Luis, and New Melones) represent 92 percent of the total storage (approximately 12.5 MAF).
San Luis and three smaller reservoirs (O'Neill, Los Banos, and Little Panoche) are operated by
the state and used jointly with the SWP. The project water is distributed within the region by
eight aqueducts with a combined length of 613 miles. The four longest aqueducts include FriantKern (151 mi.), Delta-Mendota (116 mi.), Tehama-Colusa (113 mi.), and San Luis (101 mi.).
CVP delivers about 7 MAF of water annually to some 300 water contractors. The longrange net yield of the CVP presently available for allocation to water users is about 7.8 MAF
per year, assuming full use of water by present and potential water contractors (C-DWR 1987).

Colorado River Project
The Colorado River Aqueduct extends 242 miles from Lake Havasu to its terminal
reservoir, Lake Mathews, near Riverside. The aqueduct and pumping plants were completed
in 1941 by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. The facilities were expanded
in 1961 to a capacity of about 1.2 MAF per year. Metropolitan's dependable supply from the
Colorado River water is 550,000 acre-feet (entitlement amount).

Coachella and All American Canals
California's basic apportionment of Colorado River supplies is 4.4 MAF per year plus
not more than half of any surplus water. The Colorado River Project waters are part of
California's basic apportionment of Colorado River supplies. The major portion of this supply
(almost 4 MAF) is delivered to the Imperial Valley and Coachella Valley by the Coachella and
All American canals and to the Palo Verde Valley. These canals are operated by the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation. The four agricultural agencies that receive the Colorado River water
include Imperial Irrigation District, Coachella Valley Water District, Palo Verde Irrigation
District, and the Yuma District.

Los Angeles Aqueducts

The city of Los Angeles obtains a major portion of its water supply from the Owens
Valley and Mono Basin through the Los Angeles aqueducts. The first aqueduct was completed
in 1913 and extended from the city to Owens Valley. In 1940, this aqueduct was extended to
Mono Basin. In 1970, a second barrel was added to the aqueduct.
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The Los Angeles Aqueduct has historically supplied an average of about 450,000 acrefeet/year, of which 360,000 acre-feet/year were obtained from the Owens Valley and 90,000
acre-feet/year from the Mono Basin. Recently, the city's diversions from the Mono Basin have
been reduced because of litigation.

East Bay MUD Project

In 1929, the East Bay Municipal Utility District built the 90-mile Mokelumne Aqueduct
in order to import water from the Pardee Reservoir on the Mokelumne River. In 1963, another

reservoir, Comanche, was built. The combined storage of these two reservoirs is 640,000 acrefeet.

The San Francisco Hetch Hetchy Project

In 1934, the city and county of San Francisco completed the construction of a 152-milelong Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct in order to import water from the Hetch Hetchy reservoir. The
Hetch Hetchy reservoir, which lies within Yosemite National Park on the western slope of the
Sierra, about 170 miles east of San Francisco, has a capacity of 360,400 acre-feet. In 1956, a
second reservoir, Lake Lloyd (Cherry Valley), was added. The combined storage capacity of
all San Francisco reservoirs is approximately 880,000 acre-feet.

CALIFORNIA SYSTEM OF WATER LAW

There are two major tenets of water law in California. First, water within the state is
"the property of the people of California [Le., the state] and the people of California have an
interest in its use." Second, individuals can obtain "a right to the use of that water," but that
right is limited by what is "reasonable and beneficial." The guiding water law regime in the
state recognizes both riparian and prior appropriation water rights and is referred to as a "dual"
system. In addition to the riparian and appropriative rights to surface water, historic pueblo
rights and unique groundwater doctrines also exist.

Surface-Water Laws

The adoption of the prior appropriation system dates back to the 1849 gold rush that
brought about judicial protection of the "first in time, first in right" customary use of water in
mining operations. After California acquired statehood in 1850, the California Supreme Court
decided that both riparian and appropriative rights were to be recognized. Today, California
remains the only western state to permit the initiation of new riparian uses.
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Riparian Rights
The riparian rights in California are subject to several limitations. The riparian parcel
of land must be contiguous at some point to the stream in which the right is claimed. Water
may be used only on the portion of the riparian parcel that is within the watershed of the stream.
If a portion of the riparian parcel is severed from contiguity, it loses its riparian right unless
such a right is expressly reserved. Finally, the right does not extend to seasonal storage of
water on the riparian land.
Riparian rights are not quantified in terms of the amount of water that can be diverted.
However, they designate only the amount of water that can be reasonably and beneficially used
on the riparian parcel without imposing on other riparian rights on the watercourse. Transfer
of riparian rights occurs only through the conveyance of the riparian parcel. A transfer of right
for use on nonriparian land can be permitted only if it harms no other riparian rights holder or
is approved by the other holders.

Appropriative Rights
Prior appropriation rights were recognized by the courts as early as the mid-1850s but
were not administered by the state until 1914. The Water Commission Act of 1913 required all
new appropriations to make application to, and be approved by, a state agency (now the State
Water Resources Control Board [SWRCB]). Currently the permit system is the only mechanism
for acquiring a new nonriparian water right in California. The SWRCB, prior to granting an
appropriative permit, must investigate existing water rights, conduct a public hearing, and issue
a finding that unappropriated water is available. All existing riparian uses in a watercourse must
be satisfied before appropriators may take water. Upon issuing the permit, water must be put
into beneficial use before the right is perfected and a license for use is granted. Once perfected,
water right carries a priority dating back to the time of permit application. Water rights carrying
senior priority dates must be satisfied even if this requires the suspension of uses by junior rights
holders. Domestic use does carry a statutory preference, but this applies primarily to competing
applications for unappropriated water rather than to existing appropriative rights. Appropriative
surface-water rights are transferrable, but changes in the type of use, place of use, and point of
diversion must be approved by the SWRCB.

Pueblo Rights
A small number of communities founded under Spanish laws hold pueblo water rights
that are based on the needs of a community to serve its inhabitants. Today's water rights
priorities for the cities of Los Angeles and San Diego have pueblo rights that have been
recognized by the California Supreme Court a.a~rson's Guide to Water Ri2hts Law 1986).
The pueblo rights may be considered to expand with the growth of the municipality and are
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senior to all riparian and appropriative rights. They are not transferrable and are not subject to
loss through nonuse.

In-stream Water Rights
Historically, the development of water rights in the United States was focused more on
providing water for human needs, industry, and agriculture than on protecting in-stream uses
such as navigation, hydropower, fish and wildlife habitat, and recreation. An increasing
environmental awareness brought about greater attention to in-stream flow values. In the
western United States, 16 of the 18 states have a specific in-stream-flow water law, or the state
law has been interpreted to include in-stream water rights (Wright 1986).
In California, flow for in-stream beneficial use may be provided by water right permit
conditions, protected rivers authorizing legislation for water projects, project operation, or
application of the public trust doctrine. In determining the amount of water available for
appropriation, the SWRCB refers the application for a permit to the Department of Fish and
Game for recommendation regarding the amount of water that may be required for the
preservation and enhancement of fish and wildlife. The SWRCB is also required to take into
account the water required for recreation. In addition, California adopted a Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act that identified and closed natural rivers in Northern California to all or some types
of water appropriations.
Also, many of the federal and state water projects in California are required to provide,
in addition to other water uses, in-stream flows for navigation, water quality maintenance,
hydropower, fish and wildlife management, recreation, and protection of endangered species.
Another method of protecting in-stream uses in California is through the operation of water
storage projects to provide the desired in-stream flows.
Finally, protection of in-stream flows in the state can be achieved by the application of
public trust doctrine. This doctrine rests on the premise that each state owns certain property
that it holds in trust for public uses. The public trust doctrine has been invoked in a recent
Mono Lake case. The California Supreme Court directed the city of Los Angeles to reduce its
diversions from tributaries to Mono Lake in order to prevent extensive environmental damage
to the lake.

Groundwater Rights
Groundwater in California is not subject to administrative allocation by the SWRCB.
Groundwater rights are defined by the "correlative rights doctrine" under which owners of land
overlying a groundwater basin are to share the water in common for reasonable beneficial use
upon the overlying lands. When the availability of groundwater becomes limited, the reductions
in use are shared proportionately by all.
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Groundwater may not be exported outside of the basin unless there is surplus water. If
nonoverlying users continue their withdrawals after the overdraft begins, those uses may acquire
prescriptive rights against the existing correlative rights.
California legislature has adopted very few statutes affecting groundwater rights. This
is an unusual situation in western states water law. Only Texas is similar in this regard. The
existing laws (as described below) have been developed by the courts. In dealing with depleted
basins in Southern California, the courts developed a doctrine of "mutual prescription" under
which the water users are given a share of the "safe yield" of the basin. Usually the rights were
prorated on the basis of the use of water during the five years prior to adjudication.
In 1975, the California Supreme Court overturned the "mutual prescription" doctrine and
held that prescriptive rights do not apply against public entities. Under the court rulings, the
operators of major water projects can spread and have a prior right to recapture imported water
in basins with empty storage exceeding the present uses. Figure ill.3 depicts the existing rights
to groundwater in full and overdrawn basins in California. Currently total withdrawals are
limited to amounts that will not adversely affect the basin (Le., permanent damage or adverse
effects on the basins's long-term supply).

Administration of Water Rights

Before 1914 appropriators secured their water rights by taking and using the water or by
posting a notice at the point of diversion and filing a copy of the notice with the county recorder.
After 1914 the state established a permit system to administer appropriations of surface water.
Permits for post-1914 appropriative rights are now under the jurisdiction of the State Water
Resources Control Board.
The SWRCB was created by the state legislative in 1967 and was given the authority to
allocate surface-water rights and regulate water quality control. The board is composed of five
full-time appointees of the Governor supported by a staff.

STATUTORY LAWS AND OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

In addition to the common-law principles of riparianism and prior appropriation, the
development and use of water in California is governed by (1) constitutional provisions, (2)
statutes approved by the state legislature or the Congress, (3) statutes approved by the state
legislature and then approved by the people, (4) judicial decisions in both state and federal
courts, and (5) contracts and agreements between water management organizations. Appendix
A contains an extensive list of significant water policy legislation, litigation and agreements and
drought legislation since 1991. Brief descriptions of state and federal laws and regulations are
given below.
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RIGHTS TO GROUND WATER
FULL BASIN
OVERLYING LANDOWNERS SHARE
COEQUALLY OR CORRELATIVELY
FOR BENEFICIAL USES ON OVER
LYING LANDS WITHOUT REGARD
TO TIME OF USE.

c:;:,

.::.:::: ....

OVERDRAWN BASIN
IMPORTED WATER MAY USE STORAGE SPACE
NOT NEEDED FOR NATURAL RECHARGE

OVERLYING LANDOWNERS SHARE
NATURAL WATER COEQUALLY
SECOND PRIORITY

IMPORTED WATER PROJECT
OPERATOR AND CUSTOMERS

ttt

NO WATER AVAILABLE FOR
EXPORT BY APPROPRIATORS

NOTES:
•

Total uses 01 water limited to amount which will not do permanent damage to basin or have adverse elleets on the basins
long-term supply.

• Old Pasadena vs Alhambra 'mutual prescription' rule which apportioned water among all users both ovarly"mg and
appropriative on basis of uses during the last 5 years 01 overdraft prior to fUing adjudicatory action is no longer the law.
The case 01 Loe Angeles vs San Femendo overturned the 'Mutual prescription' doctrine and held prescriptive rights do
not apply against Public entities.
• Also the old Pasadena vs Alhambra rule which limited ground water withdrawalS of overlying landowners and appropriators
to the 'safe yields,' that is, the average annual natural recharge 01 the basin, has been modilied to allow withdrawals in
amounts which will not adversly ellect the basin.

FIGUREID.3
RIGHTS TO GROUNDWATER IN CALIFORNIA
Source: C-DWR 1975.
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Constitutional Provisions
A 1928 amendment to the California State Constitution was adopted to limit the amount
of water controlled by riparian rights holders. It included the requirement of reasonable and
beneficial use of water which is not typically a part of common-law riparianism.

State Water Policy Legislation
A number of state laws have been enacted to enhance water management in the areas of
water conservation, water transfers, groundwater protection and water quality, and safe drinking
water.

Water Conservation. The basis of California statutes regarding water conservation is
that water should be put to reasonable and beneficial use. Article X, Section 2, of the California
Constitution in 1928 aimed at preventing the waste of water and promoting conservation. The
conservation programs instituted during the 1976-77 drought revealed the significant amount of
water savings achieved by the people of California. This cutback in water use led to an upsurge
of local and state conservation programs during the 1980s. Executive Order B-62-80 of
February 1980 emphasized the implementation of water conservation practices among all state
agencies, departments, boards, and commissions. Executive Order B-68-80 of July 1980
required the C-DWR to take specific steps to ensure that conservation was high priority in the
management of SWP. Additionally, C-DWR was to recycle agricultural and brackish water.
The SWRCB was also urged to request water conservation plans when authorizing water rights.
Water conservation in the private sector was promoted by Public Utilities Code Section 761 and
770. This law gave the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC) the authority to ensure
that water conservation was practiced among private utilities regulated by the PUC. Assembly
Bill 797 (AB 797), the Urban Water Management Planning Act of 1983 required all urban water
suppliers, serving more than 3,000 customers or supplying more than 3,000 acre-feet/year, to
design water management plans and submit them to C-DWR. Similarly, agricultural water
suppliers were expected to prepare water management plans through Assembly Bill 1658 (AB
1658).

Water Transfers. Water transfers assisted the state in coping with the 1976-77 drought
and this marketing and sharing process was expanded after the drought. During the period
1980-86, six laws were enacted to promote water transfers. Water transfer legislation was
designed to:
•

Encourage voluntary transfers.

•

Allow water agencies to transfer their surplus water.
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•

Facilitate the use of unused conveyance capacity by public agencies.

•

Generally allow for greater flexibility in effecting transfers.

Groundwater Protection and Water Quality. Generally, groundwater is controlled by
overlying pumpers who mainly represent local government agencies (C-DWR 1987). Senate Bill
187 (SB 187) was enacted in 1985, authorizing C-DWR to include feasible groundwater projects
as features of the State Water Project. AB 2668 and AB 3127, legislated in 1986, applied
existing provisions pertaining to well construction standards and reporting requirements to
monitoring wells. These laws were also designed to improve groundwater quality by ensuring
the protection of groundwater aquifers from contamination. Water quality gained even greater
prominence in the state since the 19608, and the Water Quality Control Act of 1969 authorized
the state to regulate the quality of surface- and groundwater reserves. Additionally, a number
of state laws have been passed to deal with groundwater problems and groundwater protection.
For example, the Water Conservation and Water Quality Bond Law of 1986 authorized financial
assistance for water conservation, groundwater recharge, and agricultural drainage management.

Other State Legislation
The 1980s have also witnessed the enactment of other state legislation and these included:
•

AB 3792 of 1984 dealing with off-stream storage, authorizing as part of the SWP,
the construction of Los Banos Grandes Reservoir, south of the Delta

•

Four laws enacted from 1984 to 1986 aimed at the protection and enhancement
of fish and wildlife

•

Legislation aimed at ensuring the protection and maintenance of Delta levees

Federal Legislation
The federal government's Clean Water Act was passed in 1972, providing capital to
control pollution mainly through the construction of municipal and industrial sewage treatment
facilities. The Clean Water Act proved to be the forerunner of a number of federal and state
laws to deal with the issue of water quality. Problems and issues included (C-DWR 1987):
•
•
•
•
•
•

Land disposal
Groundwater protection
Underground storage tanks
Solid waste management
Agricultural chemicals and pesticides
Hazardous and toxic wastes
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Environmental protection has been the focus of most federal legislation since the 1980s.
Public Law 98-541 (PL 98-541) and PL 99-552 were designed to maintain fish and wildlife in
the Trinity and Klamath River basins, respectively. Previously referred to as H.R. 429, Public
Law 102-575, Title 34-Central Valley Project Improvement Act (October 1992), was introduced
to protect, restore, and enhance fish, wildlife, and associated habitats in Central Valley and
Trinity River basins of California. The law also addresses the impacts of the CVP on fish,
wildlife, and associated habitats.

Judicial Decisions

Water management in California is also significantly affected by the major court decisions
pertaining to the state and federal authority over water projects, environmental protection, and
the authority of the SWRCB.

United States Supreme Court Cases

The 1978 litigation, California v. United States strengthened the state's water rights
appropriation process and increased the authority of SWRCB over water rights matters. The
1978 case of United States v. New Mexico, applied state law to determine the acquisition of
water for primary and secondary purposes.

California Cases

The 1986 cases, Imperial Irrigation District v. SWRCB and United States v. SWRCB
confirmed the authority of the SWRCB to impose conditions on federal projects, to protect
public trust values wherever feasible, and to apply its discretionary powers over water rights and
water quality issues. The state's responsibility for its navigable waters was affirmed in the 1983
case of National Audubon Society v. Su,perior Court. The state, under the supervision of the
SWRCB, was to ensure protection of public trust values such as navigation, fisheries, and
environmental values.

Agreements

The Joint Exercise of Powers Act enables agencies to enter into agreements aimed at
improved management of water resources in the state. Several such agreements are described
below.
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The Coordinated Operation Agreement

In 1986, the California Department of Water Resources and the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation signed the Coordinated Operation Agreement (COA) for coordinating operation of
the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project to ensure that each project shares
equitably in the obligation to limit exports to meet Delta water quality standards (under
controlled flow conditions).

Suisun Marsh Preservation Agreement

The Suisun Marsh covers 55,000 acres of wetland area in the Central Valley and provides
a feeding and resting area for wintering waterfowl along the Pacific Flyway. Reduction in Delta
outflows affected the viability of the marsh, and this led the SWRCB in 1978 to impose water
rights Decision 1485 requiring the USBR and C-DWR to establish a plan to protect the marsh.
The C-DWR developed the plan, and in 1981 initial facilities were completed. The Suisun
Marsh Preservation Agreement of 1987 involved four agencies: C-DWR, USBR, the
Department of Fish and Game (DFG), and the Suisun Resource Conservation" District. The
agreement was designed to protect the water quality in the marsh by moderating the effects of
future upstream diversion and construction of proposed facilities. These facilities are beneficial
to the nontidal portions of Suisun Marsh (about 80 percent), but they do not afford the same
protection to the tidal marshes.

Fish Protection Agreement

The Delta Pumping Plant, at the head of the California Aqueduct, had initially installed
seven of its eleven pumping units. The intended installation of the four additional units in the
1980s led to negotiations between C-DWR and DFG concerning the preservation of fish affected
by the operation of the Delta pumps. The Fish Protection Agreement was signed by these two
departments in December 1986 in order to ensure the protection of fisheries from adverse
impacts of the SWP. The agreement requires the calculation of direct annual fishery losses, and
the C-DWR is responsible to pay for mitigation projects that would compensate for the losses.
Initial actions will be directed at offsetting losses of striped bass, chinook salmon, and steelhead.
Mitigation of losses impacted on other species will be handled later. C-DWR will also begin
a restoration program to stabilize fishery levels to what they would have been, had the Delta
Pumping Plant not been in operation.

49

PREVIOUS DROUGHT EXPERIENCE IN CALIFORNIA

Lessons of the 1976-1977 Drought

As stated in Chapter I, there is no formal statewide drought plan in California.
Accordingly, this study was not designed to track the performance of a specific drought plan
during the 1987-92 drought. If a preexisting plan was available, then the structure of the study
would have been different. It would have been scientifically most feasible to first identify the
elements of the drought plan prior to the onset of the 1987-92 drought; thereafter, look at the
actions taken during the drought; and finally examine these actions in light of the plan in order
to determine the lessons learned. However, this evaluation was not possible, since there was
no written and comprehensive statewide plan developed, nor was there a plan on hand at the
beginning of this drought. Additionally, there was no documentation of expected actions of
controllers and influencers prior to the onset of the current drought. Therefore, we first defined
a general drought strategy from historical records of actions taken during and following the
1976-77 drought. Second, we qualified those actions as being unannounced ingredients of a
plan. Third, through the interview process, we compared what actually happened during the
drought with what was perceived by controllers and influencers in California.
The lessons learned during the 1976-77 drought had a significant influence on the overall
approach to managing droughts in California. Therefore it is important to remember these
lessons and contrast them with drought response actions of the 1987-92 drought. The following
is a list of lessons learned as presented in two sources: (1) a memorandum to the Secretary of
the California Resource Agency dated September 8, 1977, and (2) the C-DWR Bulletin "The
1976-77 California Drought: A Review" published in May 1978.

Lessons of the 1976-1977 Drought by C-DWR Drought Group

The Drought Group prepared a memorandum on September 8, 1977, to answer two
questions asked by the Director of the Department of Water Resources: (1) What have we
learned from this drought? and (2) What should we do differently on the basis of what we have
learned so far? The following ten lessons were identified.
•

There is a considerable waste of water during normal water years.

•

Freshwater is a more limited resource than many people had realized before the
drought.

•

Water agencies, farmers, and people in general have not prepared advance
contingency plans for a drought as severe as the 1976-77 drought.
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•

In a drought, urban residents will generally conserve water voluntarily, without
mandatory rationing, if they perceive a legitimate need. Mandatory rationing
with fines serves best to impress the public with the seriousness of the situation.

•

Industrial use also can be reduced but probably not as much as urban use. Many
industries are capable of taking cuts up to 25 percent without substantial economic
loss.

•

Farmers can get by on somewhat less water, but not to the same degree (in terms
of percentages) as urban users.

•

Farmers tend to use total available water supply in a given year rather than cut
back to save water in case the following year is dry.

•

In a dry year, more water is generally needed and would be used if available.
The patterns of water use also change as more water than normal is used earlier
in the year to make up for lower-than-normal soil moisture and because of higher
air temperatures.

•

Although the carry-over surface-water storage helped in maintaining the economy
and domestic uses during the drought, it was primarily the state's vast
groundwater resources that have prevented 1977 from becoming a disaster. The
pumpage of groundwater basins in 1977 was about 25 MAF, and this exceeded
natural recharge by 10-11 MAF.

•

There is always a possibility of a severe drought. To be prepared, water systems
should be capable of being put into full operation, despite the fact that full
capacity operations are almost never required under normal conditions because
of redundancies in design.

The last lesson pertains to the operation of the Colorado River Aqueduct. On March 1,
1977, Metropolitan Water District turned on all nine pumps at each of its five pumping plants
on the aqueduct to maximize the importation of Colorado River water into the state. All 45
pumps went into operation on a 24-hour day, 7-day per week schedule, with no backup pumps
available. As a result, 320,000 acre-feet of Metropolitan's entitlement water from SWP were
released for use in the northern and central portions of the state that had no alternate sources of
supply.
In recommendations stemming from the 1976-77 drought that pertained to the "things to
be done," the Drought Group emphasized (l) the need for preparing drought contingency plans
both by the state and all local water supply agencies, (2) promotion of water conservation, (3)
high priority for conjunctive use of surface and groundwater storage and groundwater recharge,
and (4) reevaluation of California water law, particularly groundwater law to take into account
the unique water needs that are encountered in a drought.
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Lessons of the 1976-1977 Drought by C-DWR Drought Review

In its fifth and final report on the 1976-77 California drought, the Department of Water
Resources discussed lessons learned from the drought and suggested future actions for improved
water management in the state. The following is an abbreviated listing of the lessons learned
section of this report ("The 1976-1977 California Drought: A Review," pp. 167-75).
•

An extreme variation in year-to-year annual precipitation is possible, giving the
state no guarantees that any of the next several years will not be dry.

•

Runoff in California rivers also has an extreme year-to-year variation with no
apparent weather cycles.

•

An important role of the Department is to educate the public and provide
information useful in making more beneficial use of the water resource.

•

The social and economic impacts of a repeat of the 1976-77 drought can be
minimized so as to create even less strain than in 1977. There is a substantial
advantage in spreading out the urban impacts of drought over two years. The
urban problems encountered in 1977, including the rationing and its adverse
consequences, were a direct result of starting urban water conservation too late.

•

Some water conservation in urban areas persists beyond the end of the critical
period, thus forcing some agencies to increase water rates and leading some water
district officials to believe that during the drought urban dwellers have learned
how to conserve water and will continue to do it.

•

The experience of 1977 clearly showed that Californians can carry on nearly all
domestic activities, with little more than a minor crimp in lifestyles, with a rather
substantial reduction in water consumption. Few people really suffered from
water shortage; they changed habits to "waste" less.

•

Urban conservation in 1977 achieved an estimated one-year reduction in water
usage of 1 MAP (or approximately 3 percent of 32 MAP used annually in the
state prior to the drought and about 20 percent of urban water use statewide).

•

Urban areas are able to reduce water consumption more readily than agricultural
users and should be expected to do so. The existing contract priorities that
require agriculture to take the first and largest deficiencies seem to be backward.
The drought has shown that the reverse is easier and less disruptive economically.

•

California agriculture has demonstrated its ability to take shortages by changing
cropping patterns, using the more efficient drip and sprinkler irrigation
techniques, and reusing tail water supplies.
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•

The ability to interconnect urban and agricultural water systems is necessary
because it allows the ready exchange of water from areas of surplus to areas of
need.

•

Farmers and urban users were willing to pay more for water during the drought.
Farmers who normally pay $7 to $25 per acre-foot paid from $40 to $80 per
acre-foot (three to five times more). Urban users who normally pay $40 to $150
per acre-foot paid from $50 to $375 per acre-foot (two times or more higher).

•

The drought allowed the SWRCB to "fine tune" the standards for water quality
in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta during extremely dry years. During 1977,
C-DWR and the USBR were unable to provide normal minimum releases from
the upstream storage for purposes of maintaining Delta water quality.

•

The drought demonstrated the need for cooperation among various users in the
Delta, as well as upstream users in order to maintain water quality standards in
order to protect existing water rights, anadromous fish, wildlife, and the
productivity of the bay. During the drought, the actions of each users, in many
cases, adversely affected the other users.

•

Conventional hydrologic techniques for predicting water supply were inadequate.
Because of the extreme dryness of the ground, much of the precipitation during
the drought percolated directly into the ground, thus reducing expected river
flows. Water from the rivers flowed to the lowered groundwater tables, reducing
still further the expected surface-water supply. Also, agricultural water demand
began earlier in the year and increased during drought because natural rainfall did
not "preirrigate" the fields.

•

The drought has shown that operational techniques and criteria long used by
major water projects do not work well enough in a major drought. For example,
SWP delivered too much surplus water in 1976 instead of maintaining higher
carry-over storage for 1977. The CVP forced low-quality water upon one of its
major urban customers. Other multipurpose projects made large releases for
power generation at the expense of other uses.

•

Federal drought response efforts were too slow, inflexible, and lacking
communication with the public. Because of the delayed response, what might
have become "mitigation measures" actually became "relief efforts."

•

The drought and the growth of California showed that additional water supplies
must be found so that a recurrence of the natural drought cycles does not find the
state unprepared.

Several conclusions (Le., lessons) from the experience of 1976-77 drought call for
additional elaboration. First, water managers kept hoping that the drought-induced conservation
behavior of water users would continue into the future. By 1980, water use did return to normal
predrought levels. Second, urban users who responded so well to drought by conserving almost
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20 percent of water used in urban areas were only given credit for "wasting less" with "a minor
crimp in lifestyles." Third, although it is true that urban areas can reduce consumption on a
short notice, shifting the burden of water deficiencies from agriculture to urban areas cannot be
justified on the case of urban conservation alone. Economic impacts of urban conservation are
not small, and the achievements of urban conservation from the statewide perspective is not high
(Le., 20 percent cutback represents about 1 MAF in applied urban use but about 7 MAP in
applied agricultural use). Fourth, the criticism of reservoir operation rules has to be considered
in the context of the worst dry year on record, it clearly was unexpected. Finally, the
environmental impacts as well as role of the media are absent from the lessons learned.
Actually, the water quality standards in the Delta were relaxed in order to conserve water stored.

Summary of the 1976-1977 Drought Lessons for Water Management

A water management strategy has emerged from the 1976-77 drought. The drought has
shown that water storage alone cannot solve the drought problem. It has to be supplemented
with efficient water delivery systems and efficient use for urban, agricultural, and other purposes
including greater recycling. To accomplish this, it was suggested that the major water projects
and groundwater basins in the state would best be operated as a single system under a set of
coordinated policies. In lieu of this, water transfers allowed by the construction of the
appropriate facilities as well as the development of additional conjunctive use capacity can serve
to improve the existing system (C-DWR personal communication 1992i).
These lessons of the 1976-77 drought were used by the authors in this study to formulate
(or reconstruct) a statewide drought management plan that existed prior to the onset of the 198792 drought. The reader should be aware that what follows is a "conceived and derived" plan
that is not documented or formally adopted except within the framework of this study.

PRE-1987 CALIFORNIA'S DROUGHT MANAGEMENT PLAN

The approach to drought management that existed prior to the 1987-92 drought can be
defined in terms of strategies and tactical response actions that would be expected given the
experiences of the 1976-77 drought. The sponsor of this study, Institute for Water Resources
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, has devised a planning framework for studying the
performance of water management systems and developing a better way to manage water during
drought. According to this framework, all responses toward water shortages can be categorized
as strategic, tactical, or emergency.
Strategic measures are defined as long-term planning actions that tend to reflect
permanent water conservation or drought mitigation measures. They may involve changes to
existing water storage or source infrastructures, local ordinances, or regional/statewide
legislation. Tactical drought preparedness measures tend to lessen the impact of a recognized,
oncoming drought, with actions to induce reductions in water use proportional to the growing
drought intensity. Finally, emergency measures are taken to reduce immediately water use or
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loss when all other measures have been exploited. Tactical and emergency measures are shortterm drought response actions instituted and governed by existing laws and infrastructure. These
measures can be divided into two categories: demand reduction measures and supply
management measures (Ihe National Study of Water Mana&ement During Drought: A Research
Assessment. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Institute for Water Resources, August 1991).
A proper understanding of the roles of strategic, tactical, and emergency measures is
critical to the effective overall drought management. Water supply agencies emphasize strategic
long-term measures which would limit the need for tactical (short-term) measures and minimize
the chances of reaching crisis situations during which emergency measures must be invoked.
Environmental community tends to favor tactical measures, since these actions will prevent
additional water development at the expense of in-stream uses of water. The U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers planning framework designates strategic and tactical measures as "drought
planning." By definition, a crisis situation cannot be "planned for" because we pursue drought
planning in order to prevent "crisis." We can only prepare for crisis by designating the disaster
declarations and relief assistance responsibilities.
The California water community is not clear on what constitutes "a crisis in water
supply." Some outcomes of a water supply shortage, such as drained or contaminated water
distribution system in a community, would likely be seen as a crisis by the majority of water
professionals and general population. It is less clear, however, whether "water rationing"
represents a crisis situation. If water rationing represents a crisis, then the tactical and strategic
measures should be developed to minimize the chances of having to implement water rationing
during future droughts. If rationing is an acceptable tactical measure, then it can become a
component of the plan for coping with droughts. This dilemma can only be solved by
California's society. The social behavior during the 1976-77 drought indicates that the general
population views severe water rationing with enforcement as an emergency measure taken in
response to a "real crisis situation." Numerous studies show that individuals will change their
behavior (Le., conserve water) if they believe that there is a crisis. In other words, the general
public tends to see water supply conditions as either "crisis" or "normal" (Le., noncrisis). The
success of rationing programs measured as deep cutbacks in water use provides a proof that the
situation was perceived as a crisis. If the supply shortages were not viewed by the public as
"crisis," then most rationing programs would fail to produce the called-for reductions in water
use.
Accordingly, we can classify rationing programs as tactical measures as long as they are
aimed at eliminating water waste and improving the efficiency of water use. All plans that call
for "significant sacrifice" by allocating fixed quantities of water to each user that are insufficient
for supporting normal lifestyles and that result in property damage, inconvenience, and
significant burden should be classified as emergency measures taken in response to a crisis
situation. Such a distinction is by no means arbitrary. It reflects the views of the general
population as to what is a crisis that calls for a temporary change in their behavior and sacrifice
in their lifestyles. Again, if crisis conditions can be avoided by planning, then they should be.
We can include "water deficits" in water supply plans, but not "water shortages" that would
result in crisis conditions.
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Strategic Long-Term Drought Protection
The water management system in California has been established in order to provide
"dependable supplies" to the major population centers and agricultural areas in the state. The
dependability of supplies relates to drought protection and planning preparedness. Therefore the
major water development projects, such as the Central Valley Project and the State Water
Project, were designed and are operated to provide adequate protection to water users against
periodic droughts. Given the existing water storage capacity, the degree of drought protection
is a function of the amount of "carry-over" storage in the major reservoirs. However, a higher
level of drought protection (or dependability in water supply) can only be achieved at the
expense of the amount of water made available to users during normal and slightly less-thannormal supply. In other words, much of water management in California centers on the tradeoff between the amount of water stored for a potential drought year and water made available
during a normal year.
In general, the long-term drought protection in the state consists of the following five
features:

•

Provision of extra storage in surface-water reservoirs and maintenance of the
stored water as carry-over water

•

Conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater to optimize the availability of
total supply during periods of drought

•

Development of a statewide water distribution system to move water from supply
surplus areas to water shortage areas

•

Improvement in the balance of supply and demand by increases in efficiency of
water use (Le., water conservation)

•

Development of additional supplies to enhance supply reliability

The above long-term features of the water management approach in California, if provided at
some optimal level of development and optimal operation, would carry the state through all
drought events less severe than the droughts of record without the need to impose restrictions
on water use or adverse impacts on the state environmental resources. Only during the most
rare events would there be a need to mitigate potential shortages of water supply through tactical
drought response measures. However, the experience of the 1976-77 drought demonstrated that
the level of long-term drought protection in California is not adequate for protecting against
drought events that approach in severity the bench-mark events used for planning purposes. This
lack of reliability is viewed by water supply agencies as being due in large measure to the failure
to complete the SWP and other planned projects because of the virtual standstill of project
development for the last two decades. Tactical restrictions on water use must be used in order
to reduce the risk of running out of water at the end of two critically dry years. In some
communities, water shortages lead to crisis conditions calling for emergency measures.
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Long-term drought planning and preparedness for a potential drought implies adequate
planning and preparation to cope with an occurrence. In California, drought planning is required
by the California Urban Water Management Planning Act (Water Code Sections 10610 through
10656 were added by Statute 1983, Chapter 1009) which became effective on January 1, 1984.
The act was known as Assembly Bill (AB) 797 while pending before the Legislature. The act
requires that "every urban water supplier providing water for municipal purposes to more than
3,000 customers or supplying more than 3,000 acre-feet of water annually to prepare and adopt
... an urban water management plan. "
Water-conserving codes passed by the local city council can require water-conserving
.plumbing devices such as low-flow showerheads and 1.6 gallon capacity toilets in new residential
developments. Long-term drought impact reduction can include the provision of sufficient local
and regional storage of water in times of high rainfall for use during periods of drought. Longterm protection against regional drought can also be achieved by developing interregional water
transportation systems (Le., aqueducts) that can import water from distant sources.
The SWP and the CVP facilities in California are examples of interregional water
transportation systems. Local city ordinances and state and federal legislation also include
strategic adjustments to drought. For example, the Warren Act restricts the movement of water
through the CVP to urban users. This legislation is presently under revision. The six-year
drought in California revealed that the Warren Act is outdated. Presently, there is verbal
opinion from the Regional solicitor with concurrence from the Washington, D.C. solicitor that
restricts the Bureau of Reclamation from executing Warren Act-type contracts for agricultural
purposes. However, this verbal opinion does not restrict the Bureau from executing Warren
Act-type contracts for municipal and industrial purposes (USBR, personal communication 1993).
During the sixth year of the drought there was a move to bring the CVP under state control.
Presently, these negotiations are for all practical purposes It dead," and the issue remains
unresolved (USBR, personal communication 1993).
Other long-term adjustments to drought are evident in the agricultural sectors. These
include better management of existing systems during shortages and technological innovations
such as drip irrigation systems.

Tactical Short-Term Drought Response Plans
The majority of the developed water supply systems in the state are operated with
provisions for reducing water deliveries during periods of shortage. For example, the basis for
the design and operation of most large surface storage reservoirs in Northern California is the
1928-34 drought in the Sacramento River basin. The amount of water that could be delivered
if the 1928-34 dry weather conditions were repeated is referred to as "firm yield" of the CVP
and SWP. The actual operating criteria rely on a rule curve that balances the need for drought
protection and the amount of water delivered in any given year.
The onset of a drought is marked by public awareness campaigns and conservation
programs to reduce water demand. Public awareness campaigns persuade consumers that they
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should conserve water and provide consumers with information on how to conserve. Changing
behaviors associated with high water use and promoting the use of water-saving devices are often
viewed as the most effective means for achieving reduction in water use (Dziegielewski et al.
1988). Technological devices usually are readily accepted by consumers. Retrofit campaigns
also increase public awareness of drought and thus enhance the overall conservation effects. For
example, mass mailings of conservation kits during the 1976-77 drought in California reduced
indoor residential water use by 5 to 10 percent (California Department of Water Resources
1978). As the magnitude and intensity of a drought increases, selected commercial uses such
as car washes can be prohibited, and drought emergency prices and rationing programs are
enforced. Restrictions on selected urban uses of water and water-rationing plans were reported
to reduce water use by up to 65 percent for the targeted uses (Hoffman et al. 1979).
Supply management techniques can include water system improvements such as
modifications of the distribution system and emergency supply sources such as interdistrict
transfers. Water banking is a resource management alternative that has proved effective in
California. For example, the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) has
two ongoing water-banking efforts. MWD has concluded negotiations with the Arvin-Edison
Water Storage District for a program that would allow MWD to store SWP water during wet
periods and receive in exchange a portion of Arvin-Edison's entitlement to water from the
Central Valley Project (CVP) during dry periods. MWD also has a local banking program, the
Seasonal Storage Program, that is a rebate program encouraging customers who have facilities
to store water during high-flow months. Furthermore, the recent California drought led to the
development of the Emergency State Water Bank during the fifth year of the drought. This
alternative proved effective in generating water supplies by buying water from water rich areas
and selling it to areas that needed it. However, much of the "generated" water was pumped in
the areas of origin so that the long-term impacts of this alternative on ground water levels are
a concern.
The following sections describe the preexisting strategies and tactical measures that
existed in California prior to the six-year drought of 1987-92.
In general, the short-term drought response plan in the state consists of the following
response actions:
•

Curtailment of surface-water deliveries to urban and agricultural users in order
to maintain adequate carry-over storage for possible subsequent dry year

•

Relaxation of in-stream water quality standards

•

Increase in the use of groundwater in order to replace the surface-water supply
shortages (or water left in storage)

•

Transfers of water within the state from sources with available water (e.g.,
Colorado River, Yuba River) to water-short areas (e.g., Santa Barbara County)
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•

Reduction of water use through conservation and rationing in urban areas and in
agriculture to make up for the reduced deliveries and protect the remaining
supplies

•

Activation of emergency supply alternatives such as reclamation of brackish or
saline water and municipal wastewater, cloud seeding, and other alternatives

The importance of these actions depends on actual drought conditions and the feasibility
of each action. For some areas, the use of groundwater and emergency supplies are not feasible.
Generally, large-scale transfers of water depend on the availability of interconnections to the
major state distribution network and available water that can be transferred. Some options exist
for significant intraregional transfers. The two short-term response options always available are
protection of the remaining supplies and reduction in water use. This is actually a single option
if viewed from the perspective of a local self-contained water supply system. At the state level,
reduced deliveries of the CVP or SWP water can be met (replaced) using alternative sources,
water conservation, or cessation of some uses.
The success of the drought response plan is critically dependent on the timing of drought
response actions. Normally, significant shortages in precipitation and runoff in the Sacramento
River basin will not translate to automatic proportionate reductions in water deliveries. The
large amount of water storage affords the operators of the projects some response lag time.
However, two consecutive dry years will most likely trigger a response action. Once the
drought conditions are in effect, the decisions on water deliveries and the amount of carry-over
storage are made for one year in advance and can be changed from year to year. The following
sections describe the operation of the supply sources during drought and the use of other drought
response options.

The SWP "Rule Curve" Criteria
Water deliveries by the SWP are determined using the concept of "firm yield" operation,
which is defined as the "dependable annual water supply that can be made available without
exceeding specified allowable reductions in deliveries to agriculture during extended dry periods"
(C-DWR 1987). Figure IDA shows the availability of the SWP water supply under conservative
firm yield operating criteria with total annual demand set at 3.27 million acre-feet (MAF).
The operating criteria are derived by examining the historical record of natural runoff
as measured by the Sacramento River-Four Rivers Index. This index is the sum of unimpaired
water year runoff from the Sacramento, Feather, Yuba, and American rivers. Figure ID.5
shows the Sacramento River Index flows since 1906. The State Water Resources Control Board
used the index to designate five hydrologic classes of water years in order to set the outflow
requirements to meet the water quality standards in the Delta adopted in 1978 (Decision 1485).
These operating criteria determine total water deliveries in a given hydrologic year. These
criteria are based on the amount of water in storage at the beginning of the year and the required
amount of carry-over storage, assuming that there is a seven-year drought in the Sacramento
River basin like the one experienced during 1928-34.
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The SWP contractors perceived that the firm yield operations are too conservative and
therefore too restrictive in determining annual water deliveries. Figure rn.4 shows water
availability under the 1986 rule curve operating criteria that relaxed the minimum reservoir
carry-over storage requirements, thus permitting increased deliveries in all but the driest years.
Under the 1986 rule curve, the average dry period deliveries during a repeat of the 1928-34
drought would have been about the same as those obtained under the firm yield criteria. The
actual operating criteria of the SWP are not fixed. They can be changed from year to year in
response not only to the amount of water in storage but also to other circumstances such as
contractual and legal limitations, hydropower requirements, Delta and upstream user's needs,
and other considerations. For example, the rule curve for 1978 shown on Figure rn.6 shows
that SWP expected that the delivery of full entitlement amounts of 1.8 MAF to SWP contractors
would be made if the combined runoff of the four basins reached 10 MAF. Each water year's
curve is distinct. A detailed discussion of the SWP's water delivery risk analysis and criteria
for 1989 is presented in Appendix B (C-DWR 1988).

The CVP Operations
The surface-water storage reservoirs of the CVP are operated according to rules
established by the United States Congress which authorized the project and its facilities. The
specific operating criteria are similar to those used by the SWP. The project is operated to
deliver the entitlement water to its contractors and to meet water quality standards in the Delta
according to the Coordinated Operation Agreement with the SWP. The operating criteria
include provisions for reduction of water deliveries during drought years. However, the CVP
deficiency criteria vary from contract to contract and are therefore characterized by a number
of different criteria rather than a single set of criteria.

Groundwater Reserves
The conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water is an important element of longterm drought protection. The CVP, SWP, and other surface-water supply projects are capable
of delivering significant quantities of surplus water during wet years. This water can be
"banked" in groundwater basins for use during periods when surface-water deliveries are
reduced. The actual banking can take a form of conjunctive use (i.e., surface water is used in
place of groundwater, thus leaving water in the ground) or groundwater recharge (i.e., surfacewater is pumped into spreading basins or injected into deep wells for direct storage).
The total storage capacity of all groundwater basins, which underlie about 40 percent of
California, was at one time estimated to be some 1.3 billion acre-feet, with 143 MAF
representing known usable storage (C-DWR 1975). The most recent estimates show only 850
MAF of water stored, but a higher estimate of 250 MAF of usable groundwater. For example,
6,400 square miles of the Sacramento Basin Hydrologic Study Area (HSA) is underlain by 24
significant groundwater aquifers, of which the largest Sacramento Valley basin covers an area
of 5,000 square miles and has usable storage capacity of 22 MAF. One of the largest
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groundwater basins in California, located in San Joaquin Valley, contains more than 80 MAF
and covers an area of 13,500 square miles. Finally, the Southern California region contains 42
basins, of which 29 have the combined usable storage capacity of 10.4 MAF.
During a normal year, about 40 percent (14.8 MAP in 1985) of California's applied
water supply comes from groundwater basins. Groundwater pumping exceeds natural recharge
in some basins, causing an estimated statewide overdraft of 2.2 MAF. During drought, the use
of groundwater tends to increase to about 60 percent of all freshwater withdrawals, thus
representing about an 8 MAF increase in the amount of groundwater pumped during normal
years. Although this increase represents an overdraft, it provides an excellent option for
mitigating surface-water shortages during drought.
However, not all groundwater districts have access to abundant groundwater supplies or
have groundwater rights. Fortunately, some recent court decisions have established rules
facilitating conjunctive operation of groundwater basins with surface-water supplies. Agencies
who import water into a basin have a right to recapture the imported water that percolates into
the aquifer and can prevent the capture of that water by overlying landowners or appropriators.
If recharge from natural sources is not sufficient to keep the basin full, the imported water may
use the empty storage space not needed for natural recharge. Additionly, in adjudicated basins,
an old court rule that limited groundwater withdrawals of overlying landowners and
appropriators to the average annual natural recharge of the basin (Le., safe yield) has been
modified to allow overdrafts as long as the basin is not adversely affected.
The availability of groundwater storage and the existing groundwater laws make this
drought response option very important. Significant amounts of water are artificially recharged
into groundwater basins in Southern California and in Kern County for the purpose of banking
the surplus water for droughts.

Water Transfers
Large-scale transfers of water are the main element of California's existing water
management system. Many communities and farmlands use water imported by aqueducts to
supplement local sources. The federal, state, and local aqueduct systems have been
interconnected over the years to allow the sharing and exchange of water supplies. Such
interconnections are invaluable during drought because they make it possible to move surplus
water from distant areas to alleviate local shortages.
The existence of interconnected aqueducts allowed the state to receive significant supplies
of surplus water from the Colorado River. For example, during the 1976-77 drought, the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California released to SWP more than 300,000 acre-feet
of water to be used in northern and central regions of the state. Metropolitan replaced the SWP
water with imports of the surplus Colorado River water.
Prior to the 1987-92 drought, there were a number of water-sharing and exchange
agreements among water districts to alleviate potential water shortages. Some examples of these
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agreements include the San Luis Dam Emergency (1981-82), the Kern River Intertie (1983), and
the agreement for interim water supply for the city of Needles (1984). Many agreements are
negotiated and implemented during periods when there is a need for them. Additional
interconnections are built to make more exchanges and transfers possible. Also, between 1980
and 1986, several laws were enacted to encourage voluntary transfers and facilitate such
transfers by encouraging public agencies to allow other public agencies to make use of unused
conveyance capacity.

Water Conservation
Temporary reduction of water demand plays an increasingly important role in coping with
California droughts. During the 1976-77 drought, significant reductions in water use were
achieved, thus demonstrating that people can cut back on water use if they have to because of
a drought crisis. Many conservation measures implemented during a drought crisis are of a
permanent nature (e.g., retrofit of showers and replacement of standard toilets with ultralowflush toilets), therefore they contribute to the long-term drought protection through permanent
increases in water use efficiency. Although in extreme crisis conditions, some communities
implemented rationing programs requiring close to 50 percent reduction in water use, moderate
rationing calling for 10-20 percent reduction in use is more easily absorbed by water users and
generally does not cause major economic impacts (if properly structured). However, as
communities adopt and implement conservation practices, their ability to absorb reductions
decreases. Generally, no significant business-related economic impacts occurred in urban areas
other than employment losses within the "green industry. "

Standby Water Supplies
When water supplies become critically depleted, communities and water supply agencies
usually consider a number of options for obtaining emergency supplies other than those discussed
above. These may include (1) building dual distribution systems (although very limited) and
reusing wastewater for urban irrigation and other nonpotable uses, (2) desalination of brackish
and seawater to drinking-water quality levels, (3) importation of water by cisterns or hauling of
icebergs, (4) cloud seeding to increase precipitation, and (5) many other possible options such
as blending water of poor quality with good water. The first two options require substantial lead
times in order to make them available.
Some emergency options are also available to the state. For example, about a dozen
different weather modification programs are conducted each year in the mountain watersheds in
California. Although during a drought there are few cloud-seeding opportunities, there is a
chance of up to 10 percent increase in runoff if all opportunities are used. It is estimated that
a two-seeder aircraft should be able to generate 70,000 acre-feet of additional runoff during a
single wet season at a cost of $10 per acre-foot or less. However, it should be noted that not
all experts believe that cloud seeding can augment rainfall totals.
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Emergency Measures
The current drought and the previous 1976-77 drought in California revealed that major
disaster declaration and relief assistance responsibilities fall upon state and federal governments.
Government relief has come to the limelight as a high-priority issue since 1976, in response to
increasing impacts of drought.
Although the government has readily responded in creating relief programs, not all
agencies affected by drought received emergency assistance. This was due mainly to a lack of
awareness of what assistance is available. Federal programs approved in California as loans and
grants in the 1976-77 drought made up about $222 million while state assistance contributed
about $17 million. Federal and state drought assistance programs are available to an individual,
or community, provided the entity meets the following criteria:
•

The entity is located in a county designated as a disaster or emergency area.

•

The entity is designated as an Emergency Drought Impact Area by an appropriate
agency (C-DWR 1978).

In the first case, designations are made by the President at the request of the Governor.
In the second case, designations area made by the Interagency Drought Emergency Coordinating
Committee (IDECC). This committee includes representatives of the Secretaries of Agriculture,
Commerce, and Interior, and of the Administrator, U.S. Small Business Administration. These
representatives are the administrators of the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), Economic
Development Administration (EDA), U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), and Small Business
Administration (SBA). The secretary of this committee is the Administrator (or his designee)
of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) (C-DWR 1978). A summary of the
major drought assistance programs approved in California by the end of the 1976-77 drought is
provided in Table Ill. 1. Water shortage emergencies are governed by Sections 350-358 of the
California Water Code (Appendix C).

Summary of Emergency Measures and the Pre-1987 Statewide Drought Plan
The pre-1987 statewide drought plan was characterized mainly by strategic and tactical
drought response measures. Strategic or long-term drought protection is targeted toward
providing extra storage in surface-water reservoirs, conjunctive use, developing the statewide
water distribution system, and increasing the efficiency of water use. Short-term tactical
response measures include reduction in water deliveries to urban and agricultural users,
increased use of groundwater, increased transfer of water to areas of need, increased
conservation in urban and agricultural areas, and implementation of emergency supply
alternatives. The emergency measures primarily consist of declarations of disaster areas and
provisions for relief measures.
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TABLEm.l
MAJOR DROUGHT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Loans and Grants Approved in California
(Amounts Approximate at End of November 1977)
FEDERAL PROGRAMS

Approvals

U.S. De.partment of AGriculture
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA)
(Individuals and small communities;
soil and water, emergency livestock loans)

$ 65.4 million

Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
Service (ASCS) (Individual farmers and ranchers)

22.3 million

Emergency livestock feed and transportation programs

8.9 million

U.S. DtaJ3.I1ment of the Interior
Bureau of Reclamation (USBR)
(Irrigators served by federal water projects)

19.5 million

U.S. Department of Commerce
Economic Development Administration (BDA)
(Loans and grants to large communities)

79.2 million

Small Business Administration (SBA)
Physical loss loans

7.4 million

Economic injury loans
Total federal assistance

19.4 million
$222.1 million

STATE OF CALIFORNIA PROGRAMS
California Safe Drinking Water Bond Act of 1976
(Water companies serving at least 25 persons and 15 connections)
California Davis-Gronsky Act
(Communities under 200,000 population)

$ 4.2 million

.7 million

Tax relief available
SB 1033 (Vuich) for livestock ranchers (available)
AB 776 (Fazio) for dry-land farmers (available)
Total State Assistance
Source: C-DWR 1978.
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2.5 million
10.0 million
$ 17.4 million

IV. RECOUNT OF THE 1987-1992 DROUGHT

This chapter, recounting the 1987-92 drought in California, is based on a thorough
literature review of available reports, documents, and newspaper coverage of the drought. The
story of the drought begins with its onset, followed by the subsequent progress of drought events
and response actions. The recount continues with an examination of precipitation and
hydrological data during the drought, the resultant drought management outcomes, and the
associated economic and environmental impacts of the drought.

RECOGNITION OF THE ONSET OF DROUGHT

The ongoing six-year drought in California began in water year 1987 (October 1, 1986,
through September 30, 1987) and has continued for six consecutive years into 1992. It is
important to think of drought in terms of water year, which begins three months earlier than a
calendar year.
It is also important to differentiate between the definition of the "drought phenomenon"
and the definition of the "problem of drought." Typically, three types of drought are
distinguished (Dracup 1980) with regard to the drought phenomenon. These include:

•

Meteorologic drought; defined based on the deficit of precipitation

•

Hydrologic drought; defined based on low streamflow

•

Agricultural drought; defmed based on soil moisture deficiency

A major difficulty arises when one attempts to define the societal problem of drought.
For example, the people of the state of California face the problem of the ongoing six-year
drought not only because the precipitation in California has been less than normal, but because
there is not, or will not be, enough water to satisfy all the established and new (in-stream and
off-stream) uses of water in the state. Therefore the "problem of drought" must be defined from
the perspective of adjustments to drought. With respect to off-stream uses, the real issue of the
drought problem revolves around the social desirability of securing ample supply of water for
all uses at all times. In more general terms, the need and level of drought mitigation (Le.,
reducing the adverse consequences of water supply shortages) may be determined by comparing
the social, economic, and environmental impacts of drought with and without additional human
intervention.
Drought is measured in various ways in California, including total precipitation received,
the volume of streamflow or runoff expected, reservoir storage, the Sacramento River Index,
and the condition of soil moisture. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the California
Department of Water Resources classified 1987 as a critically dry year, based on four drought
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indicators: precipitation, runoff, reservoir storage, and the Sacramento River Index as set by
the SWRCB. The first year of the drought was characterized by below-average precipitation (61
percent of normal), water year runoff (48 percent), reservoir storage (84 percent), and the
Sacramento River Index (50 percent). The Sacramento River Index refers to the sum of
unimpaired water year runoff from the Sacramento River near Red Bluff, the Feather River
inflow to Oroville, the Yuba River at Smartville, and the American River inflow to Folsom (CDWR 1991b). The Sacramento River Index is a standard index used to measure water supply
conditions in California, and normal flow is reflected by the 50-year average (1941-90) of 18.4
MAF. This index has been classified by C-DWR into five categories: wet, above normal,
below normal, dry, and critically dry.
Drought is a creeping phenomenon, and the current California drought really began after
a wet 1986 water year. As a result of abundant water supplies in 1986, it was difficult to
recognize the onset of drought in water year 1987. This year was critical; a drought year
hydrologically, but carry-over was good, and therefore no hardship was experienced in 1987.
However, the drought was visible in 1988, and this year marked the establishment of the
Drought Information Center at C-DWR.

RETROSPECTIVE DATA ON DROUGHT CONDITIONS

Precipitation and Runoff
Since the onset of drought in 1987, California has experienced at least one month of
above-normal precipitation during each water year. For example, the Miracle March in 1991
and a wet February in 1992 assisted in improving water conditions over the short term in the
state. However, these precipitation "bursts" were not adequate to overcome water shortages in
most parts of the state accumulated during the previous months of the respective water years.
The Miracle March doubled the average statewide runoff and precipitation during the period
March 1, 1991, to April 1, 1991.
The current drought is extremely close to the severity of the 1929-34 drought experienced
in the Sacramento River basin. However, the average annual runoff during the previous drought
was lower. In the San Joaquin River drainage basin the 1987-92 drought is the worst six-year
period on record. The 1987-92 drought period has been characterized by below-average
precipitation varying from a lower limit of 61 percent in 1987 to an upper limit of 86 percent
of average in 1989. Water year runoff has varied from 43 to 72 percent of average during the
ongoing six-year drought. Reservoir storage has been below 100 percent over the drought
period and has averaged 60 percent over the last three years. The Sacramento River Index has
not risen above 9.2 MAF (Le., 50 percent of the 50-year average, 1941-90, of 18.4 MAF) for
5 of the 6 years. These 5 years (1987, 1988, 1990, 1991, and 1992) have been classified as
critically dry and the sixth year (1989) as dry. Table N.l provides a summary of the statewide
precipitation and water year runoff since 1987.
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TABLE IV.l
SUMMARY OF STATEWIDE WATER YEAR DATA
DURING WATER YEARS 1987-1992 AS OF OCTOBER 1
(In Percent of Average)

1987
Precipitation
61
Water year runoff
48
Reservoir storage
84
Sacramento River Index (MAF)* 9.2
Year type
Critical

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

82
47
66
9.2
Critical

86
72
74
14.8

69
45
60
9.2
Critical

76
43
61
8.4
Critical

87
43
56
8.9
Critical

Dry

* The Sacramento River Index is the sum of unimpaired water year runoff from the Sacramento River above Bend Bridge near
Red Bluff, Feather River inflow to Oroville, Yuba River at Smartville, and American River inflow to Folsom. The 50-year
average, 1941-90, is 18.4 MAP.
Source: C-DWR 1991b and personal communication 1992-93.

With the exception of the North Lahontan region, all the hydrologic regions have
experienced less-than-average precipitation (less than 100 percent) for at least five of the six
drought years. Three of the regions, North Coast, San Francisco Bay, and the Central Coast
have been characterized by less than average precipitation during the past six years. The
average runoff for nine of the ten hydrologic regions, with the exception of the South Coast, has
been below average (less than 100 percent) during the ongoing six-year drought. A description
of average annual precipitation and annual runoff for the ten hydrologic regions in California
during water years 1987-92 is provided in Figures IV. 1 and N.2.

Surface-Water Storage

California has built extensive reservoir storage facilities to provide sufficient water
supplies for a variety of human uses, recreation, and flood prevention in winter. The 1920s and
1930s saw the regional development of water projects followed by construction in the 1960s and
1970s to meet the state's increasing need for power and water. Presently there are 155 major
reservoirs in the state with a total storage capacity of almost 38 MAF of water. Table N.2
shows the total storage for the past six years in California for the 155 major reservoirs including
both the SWP and the CVP. A disaggregate breakdown of the surface-water storage according
to the ten hydrologic regions in the state is presented in Table N.3.
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FIGURE IV.l
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BY HYDROWGIC REGIONS, 1987-1992
Source: C-DWR 1991b and personal communication 1992-93.
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BY HYDROWGIC REGIONS, 1987-1992
Source: C-DWR 1991b and personal communication 1992-93.
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TABLE !v.2
STATEWIDE RESERVOIR STORAGE, 1987-1992
(MAF)

Year

155 major reservoirs
October 1, 1987
October 1, 1988
October 1, 1989
October 1, 1990
October 1, 1991
October 1, 1992
Total capacity
Normal (average) storage

-

-

-

18.9
14.8
16.7
13.6
13.8
12.7

84
66
74
60
61
56

3.22
2.64
3.07
2.06
2.59
2.29

85
55
81
54
68
60

6.3
4.6
5.1
4.0
3.3
3.1

100
73
81
63
52
49

5.60
3.81

CVP reservoir storage
October 1, 1987
October 1, 1988
October 1, 1989
October 1, 1990
October 1, 1991
October 1, 1992
Total capacity
Normal (average) storage

Percent
of Normal

37.7
22.5

SWP reservoir storage
October 1, 1987
October 1, 1988
October 1, 1989
October 1, 1990
October 1, 1991
October 1, 1992
Total capacity
Normal (average) storage

Storage

11.6
6.3

Source: C-DWR 1991b and personal communication 1992-93.
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TABLE IV.3
REGIONAL SURFACE-WATER STORAGE IN MAJOR RESERVOIRS
(In Thousands of Acre-Feet)

Region

No. of
Reservoirs

North Coast
7
SF Bay
18
Central Coast
6
South Coast
29
Sacramento
43
San Joaquin
33
Tulare Lake
6
North Lahontan
5
South Lahontan
8
Colorado River·
Total
155
Percent of average

Total
Capacity

Historical
Average

Oct. 1
1989

Oct. 1
1990

Oct. 1
1991

Oct. 1
1992

3,148
696
947
1,978
16,009
11,358
2,045
1,072
402

2,076
397
551
1,119
10,306
6,470
699
585
298

1,684
349
121
1,141
8,877
3,895
243
221
200

1,479
310
93
1,201
6,659
3,348
170
106
206

1,004
333
164
1,342
6,664
3,660
291
98
228

1,187
355
288
1,322
6,210
2,798
199
91
223

37,655

22,501

16,731 13,572 13,784 12,671
61
56
74
60

*

No in-state reservoirs in this region.
Source: C-DWR 1991b, 1992d and personal communication 1992-93.

Groundwater Storage

Groundwater generally contributes to about 40 percent of California's water supply, but
during the current drought water shortages resulted in increased groundwater pumping. As a
result, about 60 percent of the state's water during drought was obtained from groundwater.
Groundwater basin levels in California vary, and these levels are affected by the rate of
recharge, the total number of wells, and the amount of water pumped.
The San Joaquin Valley, California's largest and most productive agricultural region, has
been characterized by heavy utilization of groundwater during the ongoing drought. The decline
in groundwater storage basin reflects the increased pumpage and inadequate recharge during the
past six years. During the fifth year of the drought, it was estimated that groundwater storage
in the San Joaquin Valley had been depleted by about 11 MAF (C-DWR 1991b). Groundwater
levels in the southern Sacramento Valley had not declined significantly, although declining levels
were evident in the northern Sacramento Valley.
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A CHRONOLOGY OF DROUGHT EVENTS AND RESPONSE ACTIONS

The background of the drought conditions in the state sets the stage for a discussion of
drought events and response actions that occurred during the six-year period. In order to capture
the progress of the drought, a chronology of events and actions has been designed. This task
involved an intensive review of printed materials. Documentation of the most significant events
and response actions has been recorded by exact dates as far as possible. The following is a list
of some of the drought events arranged according to water years.

First Year: Water Year 1987 (October 1, 1986-September 30, 1987)

As described earlier, water year 1987 spelled the onset of the six-year drought in
California but was not recognized as the first year of drought until 1988.

Second Year: Water Year 1988 (October 1, 1987-September 30, 1988)

Although the survey of public attitude in the state revealed that the adult community was
aware of current water shortages, most of them (70 percent) believed that serious shortages
would occur in the next decade. San Joaquin County was the first county in the state to declare
a drought emergency 19 months after the onset of the hydrologic drought in the state. Around
this period, California Governor George Deukmejian urged residents to take voluntary steps to
cut water use. The first formal declaration that the state was in a drought was made during this
period by David N. Kennedy, California Water Resources Department Director (April 19,
1988). The second year of drought was characterized by conservation actions that included both
voluntary (e.g., Metropolitan Water District and San Diego County Water Authority) and
mandatory measures (city of Los Angeles). Other events and actions involved interconnections
and the easing of federal legislation to facilitate water exchanges and transfers, trucking in
water, and the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) hearings on the drought.

January 1988. Fifty-four percent believe there is

April 16, 1988.
California Governor, George
Deukmejian, said that he has ordered the Department
of Water Resources to draft contingency plans for a
"drought emergency" immediately.
He urged
residents to take voluntary steps to cut water use.
The Governor proposed to spend $10.3 million to
boost the state's fire fighting forces needed during the
current dry conditions. (Los Angeles Tunes, April
17, 1988)

currently a serious water shortage in California, and
70 percent believe that there will be a serious
shortage in ten years. (Survey of California adult
attitudes towards water use in the state) (Waterworks
Southwest, FebnJary 1988)
April S, 1988. As the snowpack and reservoir levels
continue to stay below normal level, San Joaquin
County declared a drought emergency. This was the
first county in the state to do so. They immediately
requested to get cattle feed to dirt brown ranches.
(Bakersfield Californian, April 8, 1988)

April 19, 1988.
California Water Resources
Department Director, David N. Kennedy, formally
declared a drought in California. This was the first
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admission by the state of the fact that California is in
a drought. (Los Angeles Tunes, April 20, 1988)

There were different versions of the water problem in
the state. For example, EI Dorado Irrigation District
believed that the District was in trouble due to the
drought, whereas, Coachella Valley Water District
felt that they "are able to maintain without a negative
impact on the rest of the state." (San Francisco
Chronicle, June 14, 1988)

April 27, 1988. City of Los Angeles adopted an
ordinance for imposing mandatory conservation
measures that included prohibition on serving water
in restaurants without customer's request, ban on
hosing patio and driveways, immediate repair of
leaky faucets. Also, the landlords and businesses
were required to install water-saving devices for
showers and toilets by October 13, 1988. (Los
Angeles Times, April 20, 1988)

June 14, 1988. During a hearing by the State Water
Resources Control Board, Mr. Kenneth Roed, Vice
President of the California Water Service Co.
testified that, during this drought in the state, there
has been no unified policy for saving water. Each
agency has its own policy and problems. For
example, San Francisco Water Department testified
that voluntary conservation "was not successful."
Therefore, the Department imposed mandatory
rationing. However, MWD testified that voluntary
conservation measures are effective and get results.
(San Francisco Chronicle, June 15, 1988)

May 2, 1988. The North Bay Aqueduct, a 24-mile
long, $100 million pipeline started serving Solano and
Napa Counties. This will provide 42,000 acre-feet to
Solano County and 27,000 acre-feet to Napa County
residents. (Vacaville Reporter, April 26, 1988)
May 10, 1988. MWD of Southern California
adopted a water conservation plan to conserve 10
percent of water in response to a statewide drought.
Also, for the first time, MWD notified its agricultural
customers of likely water rationing if current drought
continues through the winter 1988-89. (Pasadena
Star-News, May 11, 1988)

June 1988. MWD of Southern California and the
California Restaurant Association began distributing
the water glass pictures. The card will suggest, "if
you like a glass of water, just ask." (Los Angeles
Times, June 16, 1988)
August 11, 1988. Federal Disaster Assistance Act of
1988 (Aid to Water Transfers) was signed into law.
This Act authorizes the Secretary of Interior to assist
water exchanges and transfers. It authorizes the
Secretary "to assist willing buyers to purchase
available water supplies from willing sellers, and to
redistribute the exchanged water."
(Drought
Contingency Planning Guidelines for 1989)

May 13, 1988. The Colleguas Municipal Water
District and the Metropolitan Water District agreed to
study a plan to use a pipeline to bring water from
Lake Castaic to an underground storage area in
mountains between Moorpark and Santa Paula.
(Daily News, May 14, 1988)
May 1988.
Congressman Tony Coelho has
introduced emergency legislation that empower the
Secretary of Interior to determine if any of the
reservoirs of the Bureau of Reclamation has surplus
water. Also, the legislation authorizes the Secretary
to sell any surplus water of such reservoirs. (San
Francisco Chronicle, May 25, 1988)

1988. City of Willits trucked in water and a
temporary pipeline was used to transfer water from
Scout Lake. (Drought Contingency Planning
Guidelines for 1989)
1988. SWP purchased 122,000 acre-feet from
Bullards Bar Reservoir in a "trial transfer" approved
by the State Water Resources Control Board.
(Drought Contingency Planning Guidelines for 1989)

June 3, 1988. San Diego County Water Authority
began a voluntary conservation program targeted at
residents, government agencies, businesses, and
private developers. The Authority will provide
information about conservation and a conservation
kit. (San Diego Union, June 4, 1988)

1988. South San Joaquin Irrigation District (SSJID)
purchased 28,000 acre-feet of groundwater produced
by 70 wells located near SsnD canals. (Drought
Contingency Planning Guidelines for 1989)

June 13-14, 1988. State Water Resources Control
Board is currently holding hearings on the drought.
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Third Year: Water Year 1989 (October 1, 1988-September 30, 1989)
The third year of drought brought Assembly Bill 982 (AB 982) into effect, which
expedited procedures for temporary water transfers in California. The southern Sierra Nevada
runoff estimates were quite low during the middle of the third year of drought, and the
Governor's water awareness week (first week of May) was observed by about 300 public and
private agencies in the state. The San Francisco Water Department ended its year-long
mandatory water-rationing program, while Los Angeles activated its conservation package
program to 100,000 single-family homes. The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(LADWP) was ordered to temporarily suspend diversions from the environmentally sensitive
Mono Lake basin, and CVP water was conveyed by C-DWR for usage at the Kern National
Wildlife Refuge.
May 10, 1989. Mandatory water rationing imposed
on 2.2 million customers of San Francisco and
suburban communities about one year ago, officially
ended today. The San Francisco Water Department
declared that the drought "is over for us." Also the
San Francisco Public Utilities Commission dropped
the plans to purchase $2 million of water from Yuba
County. (The Orange County Register, May 10,
1989)

January 1989. Assembly Bill 982 (AB 982) became
effective in the state of California. This legislation
establishes new, expedited procedures for temporary
water transfers.
AB 982 allows State Water
Resources Control Board to exempt temporary
transfers from the California Environmental Quality
Act with a few minor exceptions. (California'S
Continuing Drought, January 1991)

May 1, 1989. A snow survey indicated that the
Augmt 2, 1989. Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley
announced a pilot program to deliver water
conservation packages from door-to-door to 100,000
single-family homes. (Los Angeles Herald Examiner,
August 3, 1989)

southern Sierra Nevada runoff estimates are quite
low. The Tule River drainage has the region's worst
runoff situation with 36 percent of normal. The
runoff estimates for the Kern, San Joaquin, and
Kings Rivers are 50-60 percent, 54 percent, and 55
percent, respectively. (Merced Sun Star, May 4,
1989)

August 22, 1989. An EI Dorado County judge
ordered the Department of Water and Power of the
city of Los Angeles to halt all diversions from the
environmentally sensitive Mono Lake Basin until
March 30, 1990. It is important to note that
environmentalists, led by Mono Lake Committee
have campaigned against any diversion of water from
the lake as it lowers the lake level threatening the
survival of nesting and migratory birds and other
wildlife. (Los Angeles TImes, August 23, 1989)

May 1-7, 1989. Governor George Deukmejian
proclaimed this week as Water Awareness Week.
There are about 300 water agencies in California,
both public and private, who will recognize and
observe this week. This week is observed to focus
everyone's attention on the need of conserving water.
The city of Los Angeles unveiled a 28O-pound replica
of a water faucet at the Music Center plaza during
the kick off celebration of this week. (Los Angeles
Herald Examiner, May 1, 1989)

Augmt 31, 1989. C-DWR conveyed 7,200 acre-feet
of CVP water for the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
The water was conveyed to be used at the Kern
National Wildlife Refuge. (Department of Water
Resources Bulletin, 132-90)

May 7, 1989. "The drought really isn't over," said
Loron Hodge, manager of the Water Association of
Kern County. There are no headlines of alarming
drought, but nothing much has changed in Kern
County as they are "still dependent on imported water
supply." (Bakersfield Californian, May 7, 1989)

78

Fourth Year: Water Year 1990 (October 1, 1989-September 30,1990)
In this year, there was a distinct emphasis on long-term water supply sources. MWD
studied proposals for potential sites for a desalting unit. MWD also purchased 705 acres of land
for a possible reservoir site. An increasing number of Canadian firms started competing with
each other to supply water to the drought-stricken Santa Barbara and other locations.
Meanwhile, Ventura City officials examined the feasibility of transporting icebergs from the
polar caps.
This period also saw instances of regional cooperation to supply water to the areas
severely affected by drought. This was also a period of extreme distress for some areas,
including Santa Barbara and Kern County. Governor Deukmejian proclaimed a state of drought
emergency for the county of Santa Barbara. Additionally, Kern County Water Agency declared
drought emergency. At the same time, however, Yuba County Water Agency was in a water
surplus situation.
Several urban entities in California adopted policies in the past that used constrained
water supplies in order to slow down or prevent urban growth. The drought has revived an old
controversy about the relationship between the availability of water supply and urban growth.
Many respondents gave the example of Santa Barbara to demonstrate a failure of such policies.
According to the city of Santa Barbara Public Works Department (personal communication
1992), many inaccurate statements about the drought emergency in Santa Barbara have received
wide circulation such that they are believed to be accurate. The Public Works Department
indicated that the local community does not believe that constrained water supplies failed to slow
down urban growth in the Santa Barbara-Goleta area. Constrained water supplies did not stop
growth as some would have wished; but shortage contributed to slowing growth in the area.
Additionally, the Public Works Department indicated that the city of Santa Barbara did not put
constraints on the expansion of its water supply to sustain a less than 10 percent growth. In the
early 1980s, the city adopted the Goleta Overlap Agreement that added 1,000 acre-feet per year
of demand, and the environmental review of that agreement documented the need for additional
supplies. The remainder of the 1980s was spent trying to add supplies, first by the enlargement
of Gibraltar Reservoir and then by the enlargement of Cachuma Reservoir. The city does not
share groundwater resources with Goleta Water District.
The desalination alternative seemed to have gained strength in this year as a possible
long-term solution to the water shortages. The city of Santa Barbara had examined several water
supply proposals and finally decided in favor of building of a desalting plant. The Santa Barbara
Public Works Department (personal communication 1992) states that the emergency situation had
little to do with the cost of additional supplies. The emergency desalination facility has costs
similar to the SWP supplies for the city. Due to the drought, the attitude toward paying for
expensive supplies changed. The Public Works Department notes that the city's location makes
these supplies expensive. The city of Santa Barbara voters never approved the "critical planning
period approach"; it was adopted by the City Council. The city of Santa Barbara signed a
contract with Ionics, Inc., for preliminary work on building a reverse-osmosis desalter. In fact,
the consensus of a meeting of the Assembly Committee on Economic Development, International
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Trade and Technologies favored desalination as an option during drought. Marin Municipal
Water District also opened a pilot desalination plant during this year.
The prolonged drought conditions resulted in overpumping of the groundwater in
California. In the Central Coast, the farm-rich Salinas Valley faced serious seawater intrusion
into its aquifers and the water table dropped an average of 15 feet below sea level during the
past three years of dry weather. Also, the city of Los Angeles was blamed for destroying the
Owens Valley vegetation due to overpumping of groundwater from its eastern Sierra Nevada
properties. Los Angeles stopped pumping groundwater from this region due to the pressures
from the Owens Valley ranchers and the Inyo County officials.
The Delta smelt, a three-inch-Iong fish, attracted much attention when the Fish and Game
Commission refused to list it as a threatened species. The Delta smelt remained a major issue
between the environmentalists and the state water lobby. Also, in this year, the C-DWR
released 30,000 acre-feet to aid outmigration of juvenile chinook salmon.

March 1990. The State Lands Commission, a
government watchdog over state landholdings, agreed
to file a legal brief supporting efforts by the National
Audubon Society and the Mono Lake Committee to
keep in effect a preliminary injunction that has
stopped the city of Los Angeles from diverting water
from streams feeding the Eastern Sierra Lake since
midsummer of 1989. (Los Angeles Times, March 29,
1990)

October and November 1989. C-DWR conveyed
30,000 acre-feet water through Banks Pumping Plant
for the Department of Fish and Game. This water
was released to aid the outmigration of juvenile
chinook salmon. (Department of Water Resources
Bulletin, 132-90)

March 1990. SWRCB Division of Water Rights sent
notices of curtailment of water use to 88 water right
permit or license holders on the San Joaquin River.
(California's Continuing Drought, January 1991)

April 1990. City of San Luis Obispo imposed a
rationing program to reduce residential use by 30
percent. (Western Water, May/June 1990)

March 1990. Officials of Simi Valley, Thousand
Oaks, Moorpark, Camarillo, and Oxnard in eastern
Ventura County indicated that they will comply with
the request from MWD of Southern California to
prepare ordinances that would require reductions in
water because of the worsening drought. (Los
Angeles Times, Ventura County, March 13, 1990)

April 1990. Under the pressure from Owens Valley
ranchers and Jnyo County officials, the city of Los
Angeles has agreed to stop pumping groundwater
from its Eastern Sierra Nevada properties. This
source is one of the city's three largest sources of
water. This step has been taken in response to the
prolonged drought and the toll it has taken on the
Owens Valley vegetation. Jnyo County residents had
blamed Los Angeles for pumping water and lowering
the water levels in private wells and killing
vegetation. Jnyo County and Los Angeles had battled
in court over the pumping. (Los Angeles TImes,
April 4, 1990)

March 14, 1990. The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld revisions of the 1902 Reclamation
Act that Congress enacted in 1982 providing that
farmers could get federally subsidized water to
irrigate up to 960 acres of land. The farmers will
pay full cost of water on acreage above 960 acres.
This decision was a significant blow to large
corporate farms such as J.G. Boswell Co. and
Southern Pacific Land Co. These corporate fanners
got subsidized water even though they controlled land
far in excess of the law's original 960 acre limit.
(Los Angeles TImes, March 15, 1990)

April 23, 1990. The Imperial Irrigation District
(lID) approved a plan designed to save up to 70,000
acre-feet of water per year. This plan was designed
to ensure that lID does not exceed 3.85 million acrefeet water consumption limit set by the Bureau of
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Reclamation. Last year, the county exceeded the
limit by 100,000 acre-feet. If no exceeds its water
allocation, the excess use will be deducted from
future water allocations. (Imperial Valley Press,
April 24, 1990)

Goleta in Santa Barbara County.
Continuing Drought, January 1991)

(California's

June 1990. Not all in California have been hit by
drought. The Yuba County Water Agency has
reaped a windfall of $15 million by helping less
fortunate regions with its "phenomenal water
surplus." This agency captures runoff from one of
the most generous watersheds in the state-"a swath
of the High Sierra between Donner Summit and the
Sierra Buttes." The District has rights to about five
times as much water as its irrigation customers use.
(Sacramento Bee, June 3, 1990)

April 24, 1990. The General Manager of Hetch
Hetchy water project, Mr. Andy Moran testified that
it faces the worst drought in its seventy years of
operating history. The testimony came at a meeting
of the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission.
(Placer County Journal, April 25, 1990)
May 1, 1990. The Demonstration Semitropic Local
Element Agreement executed to serve as a prototype
for establishing local elements of the Kern Water
Bank. (C-DWR Bulletin 132-90)

June 4, 1990.

Ventura city officials have decided to
study the possibility of transporting icebergs from the
polar caps and planting them off the county's shores.
The iceberg idea is one focus of a $175,000 research
project on possible long-term water supplies approved
by the City Council of Ventura. (Los Angeles TImes,
June 6, 1990)

May 1990. Reacting to Mayor Tom Bradley's
proposal for mandatory water rationing for the city of
Los Angeles, the Apartment Association of Greater
Los Angeles has asked how they can get their tenants
to cut back on water use when a vast majority of
apartments are master-metered. (Los Angeles Tunes,
May 13, 1990)

June 1990.

A heavy rain in Marin County late in
May allowed the directors of the Marin Municipal
Water District to call off possible mandatory water
rationing. Marin's seven reservoirs gained about
2,300 acre-feet of water from these unexpected heavy
rains. (San Francisco Chronicle, June 8, 1990)

May 1990. The farm-rich Salinas Valley in the
Central Coast of California is facing serious seawater
intrusion problems due to overpumping from the
groundwater aquifers. The ocean water is reported
to have seeped as far as five miles into these
groundwater aquifers. The aquifers in the valley
have dropped an average of 15 feet below sea level
in the past three years of dry weather. (Sacramento
Bee, May 13, 1990)

June 1990.

A plan to use the San Gabriel Valley's
vast underground water storage basin as a safety
valve for the Southland's dry spells is being
considered by the MWD of Southern California.
(Star News, June 12, 1990)

June

12, 1990. A Los Angeles City Council
committee recommended a 10 percent mandatory
water-rationing plan as water conservation efforts
average 5 percent this year. However, the Los
Angeles residents have saved an average of 11
percent in the two months of April and May of this
year. A full council will consider this proposal next
month. (Daily News, June 13, 1990)

May 1990.
San Diego County voters rank
California's water shortage as the number one issue
facing the state; higher than crime and drugs,
according to a poll conducted for the San Diego
Union. The survey interviewed 400 registered voters
and was conducted May 15-20. (San Diego Union,
May 24, 1990)

June 14, 1990.

May 24, 1990. Kern County Water Agency directors
declared a drought emergency. The declaration
allows the agency to execute drought-relief projects
without resorting to the time-consuming
environmental study and competitive bidding
procedures required by state law.
(Bakersfield
Californian, May 25, 1990)

MWD of Southern California
approves a $628 million operating budget for fiscal
year 1990-91 with key elements of large-scale water
conservation programs and construction and
expansion of needed water delivery systems for
Southern California. The District is offering $10
million worth of incentives to member agencies that
are able to cut water use by more than 5 percent this
summer. Overall, MWD's spending on conservation

June 1990.

Heavy structural losses resulted from a
fire that swept down from San Marcos Pass towards
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species under the state's Endangered Species Act.
The C-DWR and the water lobby had opposed the
recommendation of the Department of Fish and
Game. (Alameda Yodeler, October 1990)

efforts will reach $18.7 million. (1he Californian
and 1he Valley Press, June 15, 1990)

June 1990. Four years of continuing drought have
prompted some interesting water-saving classes and
seminars for this summer. Examples include "Drip
Irrigation for the Home Gardener" (one-day UCLA
extension program) and "Xeriscape: Gardening for
a Dry Climate" (meets five days at UCLA). (Los
Angeles 1imes, June 24, 1990)

September 1990. MWD has approved a $500,000
study to determine potential sites for a demonstrating
desalting unit.
"This planning program will
determine the appropriate actions taken by
Metropolitan to plan, design, construct, and operate
a demonstration seawater desalination plant on the
Southern California coastline." (U.S. Water News,
September 1990)

July 13, 1990. The city of Santa Barbara lifted its
ban on watering lawns during the drought. A
wildfire that destroyed hundreds of homes near Santa
Barbara led to lifting of the ban that was imposed last
February. These fire-damaged areas had brown
lawns and dry vegetation. (The Sacramento Bee,
July 13, 1990)

September 1990. MWD of Southern California
purchased 705 acres of land for possible reservoir
site. (Riverside Press-Enterprise, September 12,
1990)

July 16, 1990. The City Council of Los Angeles
defeated Mayor Tom Bradley's proposal to impose
mandatory water rationing this summer. In the event
of failure on the part of businesses and residents to
voluntarily conserve water use by at least 10 percent
any month, then the Council will reconsider imposing
water rationing. (Los Angeles 1imes, July 14, 1990)

September 15, 1990. The level of Lake Tahoe
dropped below its natural rim jeopardizing water
supplies for the downstream communities for the
second time during the four-year drought.
(California'S Continuing Drought, January 1991)
September 18, 1990. City of Santa Barbara signed
a contract with Ionics, Inc. for preliminary work on
a proposed 2,500 to 10,000 acre-feet/year capacity
reverse-osmosis desalter using
seawater.
(California'S Continuing Drought, January 1991)

July 17, 1990. Governor Deukmejian proclaimed a
state of drought emergency for the city of Santa
Barbara.

September 19, 1990. Imperial Irrigation District
(lID) objected to a request from the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation to conserve about 85,000 acre-feet of
water by the end of the year for the District.
(Imperial Valley Press, September 19, 1990)

August 1990. A Canadian company's proposal to
export water by tanker to drought-stricken Santa
Barbara is being challenged by an Indian tribe in
British Columbia that claims that the plan could
damage the environment near its reservation. As the
drought in California intensifies, an increasing
number of Canadian firms are competing with each
other to export water. The city of Santa Barbara is
expected to vote on whether to approve the tanker
water from Canada or build a desalination plant to
supply the city. (Los Angeles 1imes, August 3, 1990)

September 1990. Archbishop Roger Mahoney urged
all Catholics in Los Angeles Archdiocese to join in an
effort aimed at alleviating the severe drought now
plaguing California for the fourth straight year.
"Conservation is a form of worship," Mahoney
remarked. (Antelope Valley Press, September 21,
1990)

August 9, 1990. The Assembly of California
Legislature adopted Assembly Concurrent Resolution
No. 180. It requests C-DWR to submit a report to
the legislature by March 15, 1991, containing
specified information regarding the availability of
water for 1991. (California'S Continuing Drought,
January 1991)

September 20, 1990. Desalination as an option
during drought was the consensus expressed by
scientists, engineers, businessmen, and lawmakers at
meeting of the Assembly Committee on Economic
Development, International Trade, and Technologies
chaired by Assemblyman Richard Polanco. Mr.
Polanco compared Southern California's dependence
on imported water from the Sacramento Delta and the
Colorado River to America's reliance on foreign

August 30, 1990. The Fish and Game Commission
denied the recommendation of the Department of Fish
and Game to list the Delta Smelt as a threatened
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that uses "reverse osmosis." This is the first time
when the desalination technology is being used on
Bay water. (Marin County News Pointer, September
1990)

energy supplies. (San Gabriel Valley Tribune,
September 23, 1990)
September 25, 1990. Marin Municipal Water
District (MMWO) opened a pilot desalination plant

Fifth Year: Water Year 1991 (October 1, 1990-September 30, 1991)
During the fifth year of drought, Governor Deukmejian declared a state of drought
emergency for the county of Santa Barbara. The Standard and Poors reviewed the impact of
drought on the credit ratings of eight of the largest water system issuers of bonds. The review
showed that the credit rating of at least one was likely to weaken due to the drought, as reduced
water resulted in lower revenues. A preliminary report, submitted by Spectrum Economics to
California Urban Water Agencies showed that aerospace, defense, computer, and foodprocessing businesses are increasingly nervous about the expected water shortages in California
in the coming decade.
The October-February period of the 1991 water year was marked by an increase in
precipitation deficit. This was followed by a very wet March that recorded precipitation up to
three times the average for the month. The Miracle March turned a "desperate drought situation
into a manageable one" (C-DWR 1991b). The March rains provided only a brief respite to the
dry conditions, and 1991 turned out to be the driest of the 1987-91 period.
As the drought intensified, there were instances of cooperation among the water users.
Southern California Edison Company, Southern California Gas Company, Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California (MWD), and Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
formed a water-energy conservation partnership. At the same time, MWD and Imperial
Irrigation District (lID) entered into an agreement that would allow 100,000 acre-feet of the lID
water allotment to be transferred to MWD. Research, funded through MWD, investigated if
alfalfa could be grown with less water in Imperial County. During this year, MWD also agreed
to transfer 7,200 acre-feet of emergency water to the water districts in southern Santa Barbara
County through Oxnard and Ventura.
During this water year, the MWD started providing cash incentives to its member
agencies to conserve water. By the end of the year, this conservation effort created an
unexpected water surplus for the MWD. As MWD did not have sufficient storage capacity, they
decided to sell the surplus water.
Proposition 128, also known as "Big Green," was rejected by Californians. This
proposition included sweeping environmental reforms by providing full protection to fish,
shellfish, and their habitat. However, the environmental community rejoiced in the decision of
a U.S. District Judge ordering Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District to cut back in river pumping to
protect the chinook salmon population. By the end of the water year, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
had recommended to the U.S. Department of Interior to list the Delta smelt as a "threatened,"
rather than "endangered," species.
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In this year, a controversial Katz Bill (Assembly Bill 2090) was initiated to allow farmers
to sell water directly to the urban agencies. This bill was opposed by the agricultural sector,
who contended that this measure would transform the California farm belt into barren land.
Finally, the Senate Agriculture and Water Resource Committee voted against the bill.

The drought seemed never-ending, and the three participants of the Three-Way Process
struggled to survive. By the end of this water year, the environmental sector had secured its
position as a major player in the water politics of California.

October 1990. California Department of Fish and
Game and federal fisheries agencies met with a
number of water agencies to begin developing plans
for 1990. Operations for minimum flows and
temperature control were discussed.

reclamation, and other such projects.
Journal, October 18, 1990)

(Paramount

October 1990. Berrenda Mesa Water District has
proposed selling some of its water from the
California Aqueduct to a Southern California
developer (Summit Valley Partners) in what could be
the first transfer of SWP water out of Kern County.
The developer has offered $20 million in exchange
for permanent rights to 20,000 acre-feet of water per
year. (Bakersfield Californian, October 21, 1990)

October 2, 1990. Southern California Edison Co.,
Southern California Gas Co., MWD of Southern
California, and Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power announced the formation of a waterenergy conservation partnership. As a first project,
Edison workers will install 16,000 water-saving toilet
tank flappers supplied by MWD in low-income homes
in the electric utility service area. "Electricity,
natural gas, and water have in common the need for
conservation.
In fact, they are interrelated,"
remarked John Bryson, CEO of the Edison Co. (San
Gabriel Valley Tribune, October 3, 1990)

October 25, 1990.
Senator Pete Wilson, RCalifornia, moved to hold the water reclamation bill
that would limit the size of farms to 960 acres for
being eligible to receive subsidized water. Earlier in
August, the Orange County Register had examined
farm water policy and found that the CVP farmers
are using billions of federally subsidized water to
grow crops. Some water districts in the Sacramento
River Valley pay $1.50/acre-foot of water, whereas
MWD in Southern California pays $233/acre-foot of
water drawn from the same river delta. (Orange
County Register, October 26, 1990; San Diego
Union, October 20, 1990)

October 1990. San Diegans cut their water use by
10.7 percent for the months June through September.
This was achieved through voluntary conservation
measures. (San Diego Union, October 7, 1990)
October 1990. MWD of Southern California has
approved $150,000 to fund research in the Imperial
County to see if alfalfa can be grown with less water.
Alfalfa is a major crop in this county. The MWD
and Imperial Irrigation District (liD) have entered
into an agreement that will allow 100,000 acre-feet of
water to be transferred from lID's allotment of
Colorado River water to MWD. In return, MWD
will pay for expensive improvements in the irrigation
system, including lining of canals and new reservoir
construction. (Imperial Valley Press, October 12,
1990)

October 1990. Importing state water to Santa
Barbara County was favored 4 to 1 by county
residents surveyed in recent News-Press poll
conducted by Richard Hertz consulting firm. (Santa
Barbara News Press, October 22, 1990)
October 1990. Fitch Investor Service reported on
how drought was affecting four hydroelectric
projects.
Reduced water results in reduced
generation and lower revenues that can affect timely
payments of debt service on these projects' bonds.
The eight large drought-affected issuers monitored by
Standard & Poor's have a combined total of $3.6
billion in bonds outstanding. Recently, Standard &
Poor's also reviewed the effect of drought on these
eight of the largest water-system issuers of bonds and
concluded that the credit rating of at least one was

October 10, 1990. The Metropolitan Water District
of Southern California Board of Directors voted to
support Proposition 148. This proposition would
provide funding for water treatment facilities and
supply development, flood control, drought relief,
wastewater and contaminated groundwater
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likely to weaken due to the drought situation.
(Sacramento Bee, November 2, 1990)

the district.
(San Marino 1Hbune &
November 8, 1990)

October 30, 1990. Kern County Water Agency
unveiled their "What if" drought contingency plans at
a state Department of Water Resources. (Bakersfield
Californian, October 31, 1990)

November 14, 1990. Sierra Club officials asked the
city of Los Angeles to fill a wildlife lake with potable
water despite the current drought. They claimed that
thousands of migratory birds are passing Sepulveda
Basin without stopping. The city officials show
reluctance to use potable water as they had faced
serious public criticism last year when they put
drinking water in the 11 acre lake. The city officials
plan to put only the reclaimed water when they
receive it from the Tilman sewage treatment plant.
(Orange County Register, November IS, 1990)

November 1990. A proposed pipeline, called the
Inland Feeder, connecting the SWP's east branch
aqueduct in San Bernardino County with
Metropolitan's Colorado River Aqueduct in Riverside
County will be discussed in four community meetings
in November 1990. (Moreno Valley Butteifield
Express, October 21, 1990)

News,

November 16,1990. U.S. Deputy Regional Forester
David M. Jay ruled that propane cannot be sprayed
into the winter clouds over the middle fork of the
Feather River until the federal agency has reviewed
an appeal filed October 29 by a sport fishing
organization. The California C-DWR had planned a
five-year prototype $2-million project for cloud
seeding with a potential increase of 10 percent of the
snowpacks and adding 21,000 acre-feet of water to
the annual spring runoff into Lake Oroville.
(Bakersfield Californian, November 18, 1990)

November 1, 1990. The Department of Water and
Power (DWP) in Los Angeles announced that its
customers had cut down their water usage by only
5.2 percent in October 1990, far short of the 10
percent conservation goal. It was the first time in the
six months that the DWP has been measuring
conservation efforts that the city of Los Angeles
failed to meet its 10 percent goal. At this time, the
DWP officials do not see any mandatory rationing of
water for the city any time soon. (Los Angeles
TImes, November 2, 1990)

November 1990. Recently, the Association of
California Water Agencies (ACWA) presented the
vulnerability of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River
Delta to a possible major earthquake and resulting
The
disruption of water supply for the state.
opponents of the Peripheral Canal proposal accused
ACWA for implicitly attempting to revive the
Peripheral Canal proposal as a remedy to the
situation. (Bakersfield Californian, November 20,
1990)

November 13, 1990.
Governor Deukmejian
proclaimed a state of drought emergency for the
county of Santa Barbara.
November 1990. Eastern Municipal Water District
is providing area school districts a combination of
free information, teacher workshops, in-class
presentations, plays, computer programs, and contests
to teach students water awareness and conservation.
(Riverside Press-Enterprise, November 6, 1990)

November 1990. The Association of California
Water Agencies (ACWA) has sponsored an 18-month
publicity campaign, called "Living on the Edge," to
show the desperate situation of the California water
supply problem. The cost of the campaign is
estimated to be $350,000. (Bakersfield Californian,
November 21, 1990)

November 6,1990. Voters rejected Proposition 128.
This proposition included sweeping environmental
reforms known as "Big Green." Section 5.7 of Big
Green proposition provides a "full protection to and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and their habitat in the
state marine bay, estuarine, and ocean water.· The
opponents of this provision believed that it would
give priority to fish and game over people and
agriculture for their water needs, particularly during
this serious drought. (Los A.ngeles limes, November
8, 1990)

November 20, 1990. Modesto Irrigation District
agreed to sell water to San Francisco. The San
Francisco Public Utilities Commission still has to
approve the offer. (Modesto Bee, November 21,
1990)

November 1990. MWD and Wells Fargo Bank
teamed up to bring water conservation message to
public through a special water-saving kit prepared by

November 21, 1990. The state C-DWR released its
620-page draft environmental report on its five-year,
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$290 million plan to enlarge watelWays in the
northern Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. (Bakersfield
Californian, November 23, 1990)

week. This action was prompted by the fact that lack
of rains have caused the reservoir levels in the north
to dip to low levels. (Press Enterprise, December
28, 1990; Los Angeles TImes, December 24, 1990)

November 1990. MWD will provide cash incentives
to its member agencies to conserve water. (Madera
Tribune, November 21, 1990)

December 1990. Governor-elect Pete Wilson named
Douglas P. Wheeler, a former Sierra Club director as
his Secretary of Resources. Mr. Wheeler pledged to
aggressively mediate disputes between the
environmental movement and the business
community. (Los Angeles 1imes, December 27,
1990)

November 1990. It has been planned to transfer
7,200 acre-feet of emergency State Water Project
water through the MWD to Oxnard to Ventura water
main. Ventura would then exchange an equal amount
of water to Santa Barbara from its supplies at Lake
Casitas.
(Ventura County and Coast Report,
November 22, 1990)

1990. The Central Valley of Fresno drilled six new
wells and is exchanging reclaimed water for Kings
River water.

November 1990. As MWD faces a cutback in its
supply of water of 300,000 acre-feet from the
Colorado River next year, it is exploring the
possibility to enter into some "temporary"
arrangements with water districts such as Imperial
Water District, Palo Verde Water District, and
Coachella Water District. (Imperial Valley Press,
November 27, 1990)

1990. City of Napa purchased 6,500 acre-feet of
water from the Yuba County Water Agency's
Bullards Bar Reservoir and had it delivered via the
SWP North Bay Aqueduct.
1990. Three units of C-DWR's largest power plant
were shut down due to low reservoir levels at Lake
Oroville requiring the purchase of replacement
capacity and energy.

December 1990. A 16-inch steel pipe became a part
of a three-mile Oxnard-to-Ventura connection to
initiate exchanges and transfer to move emergency
state water to water districts in southern Santa
Barbara County in 1991.

1990. In 1990 alone, it is estimated that 5 billion
board feet timber were killed by drought-related
causes.
1990. Cities supplied by the CVP were cut back 2S

December 11, 1990. The Board of Directors of
Metropolitan Water District decided to impose a
mandatory water-rationing plan beginning February
1, 1991. This decision was taken in consideration of
the impending fifth year of drought. (Simi Valley
Enterprise, December 12, 1990)

to 50 percent. (C-DWR, January 1991)

1990. SWP cut deliveries to agricultural customers
by 50 percent. (C-DWR, January 1991)
1990. According to C-DWR economists, the direct
economic cost to California agriculture of the 1990
drought is forecasted to be $455 million (3 percent of
1989 value of California's agricultural output.)

December 1990. The farmers in Ventura County are
facing a 20 percent cut for the next year on use of
imported water from the Metropolitan Water District.
(Oxnard Press Courier, December 13, 1990)

February 15, 1991.
Governor Pete Wilson
established the Drought Water Bank as a part of a
four-point drought plan. (A Retrospective 1991
Emergency Drought Water Bank, March 1992)

December 1990. 12,530 citations for water wasting
have been issued since the last seven months when
the Drought Buster (drought-coping) program first
began. This $1 million-a-year program is part of the
anti-drought response of the Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power. (Daily News, December 23,
1990)

February 25,1991. The Water Districts in southern
Santa Barbara County began receiving emergency
SWP water deliveries. Emergency transfers were
made from C-DWR through MWD to Oxnard to the
City of Ventura. An equal amount of metered water
is accounted for as "in-lieu" exchanges at Lake
Casitas.
Water is conveyed from Casitas via

December 19, 1990. The state C-DWR shut off the
California Aqueduct deliveries from the Edmonston
pumping station to the Los Angeles basin for one
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of this bill charge that this would transform
California's farm belt into "another Owens Valley."
Owens Valley once a productive agricultural area,
had turned into barren land as Los Angeles bought
the land and pumped water to the city. (Los Angeles
TImes, June 5, 1991)

temporary pipelines through the Carpinteria County
Water District.

March 1, 1991.

SWP deliveries were cut to 10
percent of contractual entitlements for municipal
users and were suspended for agricultural users. The
First declaration of available CVP supplies was 25
percent of entitlements for agricultural customers, 25
to 50 percent for urban users, and 75 percent for
water rights holders in the Sacramento River, and
exchange contractors in the San Joaquin River.
(Howitt, R, Moore, N, and Smithe R. T., 1992)

June 4, 1991. Santa Barbara County voters
approved measures to import water through the State
Water Project into the region. The voters also
approved building of a desalination plant in an
advisory election. (Los Angeles TImes, June 6, 1991)
June

March 1, 1991. The city of Los Angeles imposed
water rationing requiring the residents to cut water
use immediately by 10 percent from 1986 levels and
an additional 5 percent by May 1. (Los Angeles
Tlmes, March 1, 1991)

20, 1991. The House of Representatives
overwhelmingly approved a bill that would bar
delivery of subsidized water to farms larger than 960
acres. This legislation is designed to plug the
loopholes that allow corporate farmers such as J.O.
Boswell, Co. to receive subsidized water. (Mercury
News, San Jose, June 21, 1991)

March 1991. A bill proposing to renew research and
development on seawater desalination was introduced
in the u.S. Senate by Senator Paul Simon, D-IL.
(Imperial Valley Press, March 3, 1991)

June 20, 1991. The House of Representatives passed
a bill requiring the farmers who use federal irrigation
water for growing subsidized crops to pay 100
percent of the delivery costs of the water. (Star
Tribune, June 22, 1991)

March 1991.

Despite the heavy March rainfall,
California's rainfall, snowfall, and runoff for the year
are still well below average. (Los Angeles TImes,
March 30, 1991)

June 26, 1991.

The officials attending the California
Association of Water Agencies Conference said that
the state was still in drought despite heavy March
rains. They believe that water rationing is likely to
continue. (Daily News, June 27, 1991)

March 1991.

Heavy March rainfall raises Lake
Cachuma (southern Santa Barbara County's principle
surface water supply) from 12 percent to 40 percent
of capacity thus avoiding drawing the lake down to 3
percent of capacity (approximately 50 percent of the
dead storage) during the 1991-92 water year.

July 2, 1991. The California State Assembly
approved the legislation that allows more freedom to
farmers to sell water rights to the drought-stricken
cities. The bill was sent to the state senate after a
46-25 vote. This bill was opposed by several rural
legislators. (Imperial Valley Press, July 3, 1991)

April ',1991. Santa Barbara city officials lifted a
14-month ban on lawn watering after the March
rains. (Los Angeles TImes, April 10, 1991)
April 1991. Spectrum Economics, energy and
natural resources consultants, submitted a preliminary
report to California Urban Water Agencies indicating
that aerospace, defense, computer, and foodprocessing businesses are growing increasingly
nervous about the expected water shortages in the
coming decade that creates corporate bias against
plant expansion and location in California. (Los
Angeles TImes, April 23, 1991)

July 2, 1991. In a 46 to 25 vote, the California
Assembly passed legislation that would allow farmers
to sell their water without interference from their
local irrigation districts. This was a clear victory of
the urban interests over the rural in this battle for
water. (Los Angeles TImes, July 3, 1991)
July 1991. MWD of Southern California proposed
to build a water bank in the Coachella Valley where
it will deposit water in wet years and withdraw it in
dry seasons. The Desert Water Agency directors fear
a loss of water quality should MWD bank: water in
the Coachella Valley. (Riverside Press-Enterprise,
July 17, 1991)

June 4, 1991.

California Assembly Committee
passed legislation that would make it easier for
farmers to sell water to drought-stricken cities. This
bill is still a long way from passage. The opponents
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July 16, 1991.

Gov. Pete Wilson temporarily
withheld the controversial water-sales bill that allows
individual farmers to directly sell water to cities.
Water Resources Director David Kennedy expressed
"serious concerns" with a number of provisions in the
bill. (Los Angeles 1imes, July 17, 1991)

under the federal law. The irrigation district had
contended that the cutback would result in a
significant crop damage in its area. A temporary
restraint order was requested by the National Marine
Fisheries Service, an arm of the U.S. Dept. of
Commerce. (Sacramento Bee, August 17, 1991)

July 23, 1991. Two Southern California officials

August 17, 1991. The MWD of Southern California
board of directors agreed to sell up to SO,OOO acre-

asked the U.S. Senate panel to provide federal funds
for desalination research. The Senate Committee is
considering legislation that would authorize the
Interior Department to fund at least $90 million worth
of research during the next five years. (Los Angeles
TImes, July 24, 1991)

feet of water to relieve an unexpected surplus of
water in local reservoirs. The surplus of water
during the drought was created as a result of
successful conservation efforts in Southern California.
(Daily News, August 21, 1991)

August 1991. Gov. Wilson signed legislation by

August 20, 1991. The Senate Agriculture and Water
Resources Committee voted against the Assembly Bill
2090 (Katz Bill) after Governor Pete Wilson refused
to support the measure. This bill would have allowed
farmers sell water directly to the urban agencies.
(Daily News, August 21, 1991)

Sen. Don Rogers to add nearly $2.3 million to
California Conservation Corps (Ccq for droughtrelated activities. This will provide extra help to the
state C-DWR and local agencies in looking for water
leaks, putting in drought-resistant plants and helping
with fish and wildlife habitat preservation.
(Bakersfield Californian, August 7, 1991)

August 20, 1991. MWD of Southern California
decided to abandon a multimillion dollar program of
water conservation rewards. The MWD has paid out
$26 million during the past five months as incentives
to agencies for conserving water. These incentive
payments will be eliminated as of October 1, 1991.
The MWD also decided to reduce the price of some
of its water. These steps were taken in view of
surplus reservoirs. The MWD has more water than
it can comfortably hold as a result of an unexpectedly
successful conservation program that includes cash
incentives to member agencies for using less water.
(Los Angeles Times, August 21, 1991)

August 6, 1991. The King River Report was
released. This indicated that there was a decline of
3 million acre-feet in water beneath the King River
Conservation District during the fall of 1986 through
the fall of 1990. This drop in underground water has
occurred due to the long drought. (Bakersfield
Californian, August 7, 1981)
August 1991. A congressional agency, Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) dismissed the idea of
an undersea 2000-mile pipeline carrying water from
Alaska to California. The agency considers this
alternative as unnecessary and unfeasible based on its
high projected cost and adverse environmental
implications. This Alaskan pipeline proposal was
earlier advanced by the Alaskan Governor, Walter J.
Hickel, and L.A. County Supervisor, Kenneth Hahn.
(Los Angeles TImes, August 13, 1991)

August 1991. Scientists at the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's Climate Analysis
Center in Maryland are tracing a "weak EI Nino" in
the Pacific Ocean. EI Nino, a powerful warm water
ocean current, can bring "drought-busting" storms to
Southern California this winter. (Daily News, August
22, 1991)

August 1991. Huntington Beach has been tentatively

August 16, 1991. A U.S. District Judge ordered the

August 1991. San Juan Suburban Water District
started installing water meters for its customers in
northeast Sacramento, California. This is part of a
program aimed at increasing water supplies up to SO
percent through conservation. (Sacramento Bee,
August 30, 1991)

largest water diverter on the Sacramento River,
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, to cut back in river
pumping to protect the population of chinook salmon.
Chinook salmon is listed as an endangered species

September 3, 1991.
The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency told the State Water Resources
Control Board that their Water Quality Plan (May

selected as a site for a $60 million experimental
ocean-desalting plant, owned by the MWD of
Southern California. (The Orange County Register,
August 13, 1991)
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September 24, 1991. MWD of Southern California
decided to break its traditional alliance with the
agricultural interests and pursue a free-market policy
of buying water wherever it can. Under the existing
law, urban agencies are not allowed to buy water
directly from farmers. The Katz Bill intended to do
this, but was recently defeated. MWD plans to draft
its own legislation to effect this change. MWD will
need this new legislation to pursue its new strategy.
(Los Angeles TImes, September 25, 1991)

1991) for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is
inadequate. The temperature and salt levels adopted
in the plan were not sufficient to protect "the
ecological health of the estuary." These variables are
controlled by varying the release of water in the
delta. (Los Angeles TImes, September 4, 1991)

September 1991. The MWD of Southern California
is planning to build a massive reservoir in Riverside
County. The proposed Domenigoni Valley reservoir
would hold 800,000 acre-feet of water. This will
nearly double the existing storage capacity ofMWD.
This project is being undertaken because during the
drought, MWD had to sell water at a bargain price as
it did not have enough storage capacity. (San
Gabriel Valley Tribune, September 8, 1991)

September 27, 1991. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service has proposed to list a three-inch long delta
smelt of San Joaquin-Sacramento River Delta as a
"threatened" rather than "endangered" species under
the Endangered Species Act. "Threatened" status is
less severe than the "endangered" one in terms of its
implications on the curtailment of exports of water
from the delta. This recommendation will later be
considered by the U.S. Department of Interior for
acceptance of the listing. (Los Angeles TImes,
September 27, 1991)

September 10, 1991. The East Bay Municipal
Utility District Board voted not to participate in the
statewide water pact which called for California cities
and suburbs to adopt voluntary conservation measures
that could save enough water to supply the residential
needs of 2.5 to 5 million Californians.
The
opponents of this pact think that the District already
conserves enough water and does not need any more
conservation. (San Francisco Chronicle, September
11, 1991)

Sixth Year: Water Year 1992 (October 1, 1991-September 30, 1992)
Despite higher rainfall than in previous years in the first half of this year, the drought
conditions persisted, with the Sierra runoff staying at below its normal level. California was in
a drought for the sixth year. The conservation efforts had paid off by reducing water use and,
at the same time, lowering the revenue. The drought proved to be a financial drag for most of
the water purveyors. This water year saw an effort by these purveyors to increase the water
rates to cover the cost of drought. The Los Angeles Water and Power Commission attempted
to increase the water rates, but the Los Angeles City Council rejected the idea. Many water
consumers believed that it was a penalty imposed on them for conserving water during drought.
The public becomes incensed by being required to pay more for less.

October 1, 1991. The Los Angeles Water and
Power Commission voted to seek an 11 percent
increase in water rates and to double an emergency
surcharge to cover part of a projected $98.8 million
deficit caused by the five-year drought. (Los Angeles
TImes, October 2, 1991)

October 15, 1991. Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power signed an agreement with the Inyo
County Board of Supervisors confirming the city's
water rights in Owens Valley and regulating the
amount of water that can be pumped out of the area.
(Los Angeles Tunes, October 16, 1991)
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December 1991. The Los Angeles City Council
rejected a proposed 11 percent water rate hike by the
Department of Water and Power (DWP). The DWP
argued that the rate hike was necessary due to
reduced revenues as a result of the city's mandatory
rationing. (Daily News, December 5, 1991)

Valley's farm economy suffered $545 million loss
last year. Nine thousand jobs in this sector were lost
and 253,000 acres ~re left fallow as there was
insufficient water available. (Tribune, March 20,
1992)

March 20, 1992. The Bureau of Reclamation
announced that CVP agricultural contractors will
receive 25 percent of their normal water allocations
this year. At the same time, State Water Project also
announced increase in deliveries to 45 percent of the
amount requested by the water agencies. (California
Farmer, April 1992)

December 5, 1991. The Department of Water
Resources announced that the farmers in Kern County
will at least get 20 percent of their requested SWP
water next year. (Bakersfield Californian, December
6, 1991)
December 17, 1991. The Sacramento City Council
decided to require all new homes to install water
meters. (Sacramento Bee, December 18, 1991)

April 6, 1992. Governor Pete Wilson announced his
new long-term water policy that emphasizes
marketing and conservation of existing supplies, new
storage facilities, and changes in to Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta. The plan for the Delta includes
construction of flow control barriers, enlargement of
channels and shifting of the pumping of water from
the Delta to winter months through use of four new
pumps. His plan attempts to appease all three of the
participants in the water issue. (Sacramento Bee,
April 7, 1992)

January 1992.

A U.S. District Judge ordered
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District prohibiting diversion
of water from the Sacramento River near Hamilton
City from July 15 to November 30 each year.
(Sacramento Bee, January 10, 1992)

January 1992. The Walnut City Council narrowly
rejected a proposal to ban the use of "greywater" to
irrigate yards. (Los Angeles Tunes, January 26,
1992)

April 18, 1992. The Chief Hydrologist for the State
Department Water Resources confirmed that the state
of California is still in the sixth year of drought
despite recent high levels of rainfall. The Sierra
(Bakersfield
runoff is below its normal level.
Californian, April 29, 1992)

January 1992. The MWD of Southern California
lost $129 million last year due to its aggressive
conservation campaign that led to decline in sales
revenue. (Orange County Register, April 19, 1992)

February 6, 1992. Central Valley Project confirmed

April 18, 1992. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
opened a new center in Sacramento to teach farmers
how to conserve water. (Fresno Bee, April 29,
1992)

that water deliveries to some farmers would be totally
cut-off this year. (Bakersfield Californian, February
11, 1992)

May 20, 1992. The state's drought Water Bank
announced allocation of 90,970 acre-feet to watershort buyers. More than two-thirds of it (66,400
acre-feet) going to agriculture in the San Joaquin
Valley. Department of Fish and Game has received
an allocation of 14,570 acre-feet. The rest of the
allocation (i.e., 10,000 acre-feet) has been given to
Contra Costa Water District.
(C-DWR News
Release, May 20, 1992)

February 27, 1992. Governor Pete Wilson will seek
negotiations with the Bush Administration for
takeover of the Federal government's Central Valley
Project irrigation system and merge it with the state's
water system. (Los Angeles limes, February 28,
1992)
March 1992. A study conducted by the Northwest
Economics Associates indicated that the San Joaquin
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Water Allocation and Deliveries

The first three years of drought did not prompt any significant cutbacks to water
allocation and deliveries in the SWP and CVP entitlements. These are two major projects that
supply water to agricultural and municipal water uses, with the SWP accounting for 704 percent
and the CVP providing 21.7 percent of California's supplies. The fourth year of drought,
however, had taken its toll on the drawdown of water in project reservoirs and led to the first
cutbacks in CVP and SWP supplies. Thus, in 1990, CVP cut most agricultural users by 50
percent, and similar reductions were made by SWP on agricultural users. Drought conditions
worsened in 1991, and by the end of February, statewide precipitation, runoff, and storage
reached the lowest levels during the ongoing four-year period. The SWP stopped agricultural
deliveries completely and cut municipal users to 35 percent of their contractual entitlements
which was further cut in 1992. CVP cutbacks left agricultural customers receiving 25 percent
of entitlements, urban users obtaining 25 to 50 percent deliveries, and Sacramento water rights
holders and San Joaquin exchange contractors getting 75 percent of their entitlements. Although
these statistics on water deliveries were available, it should be noted that statewide statistics on
water use during this drought by various water use sectors and water districts were not available
during the time of this study. These statistics are expected to be released in January 1995 when
the water management plans by various entities will be submitted.
In addition to these adjustments to water allocation and deliveries, the California
Department of Water Resources allowed the use of its facilities for wheeling water and
encouraged water exchanges. About 20 exchanges had been facilitated by November 1990
involving about 300,000 acre-feet of water (Gleick and Nash 1991). C-DWR was instrumental
in effecting transfers under the direction of state laws enacted during the 1980s. Table IVA
illustrates the individual water transfers facilitated as of December 1, 1991, using the State
Water Project (C-DWR 1991b). Many other transfers independent of the SWP also took place.
For example, about 60,000 acre-feet of water from four different agencies were transferred to
the Department of Fish and Game to help restore fish and wildlife habitat.

SWP Deliveries

State Water Project deliveries are divided into entitlement water and other deliveries
(surplus and unscheduled water, other water, and Feather River diversions). Entitlement water
to municipal and industrial users showed no significant cutback during the first four years of the
drought. However, in 1991 more than 50 percent of the 1987 SWP entitlement was cut back.
Deliveries of SWP entitlements to the agriCUltural sector remained normal for the fIrst
three years of the drought. The fourth year (1990) showed a 32 percent reduction in 1987
deliveries. However, SWP entitlements were drastically cut in 1991, and only 1 percent of the
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TABLE IV.4
1991 WATER BANK TRANSFERS
(As of December 1, 1991)

Title of
Transfer

Source Destination Amount of
Agency Tl'Bmfer (AF)

Agency

Dept. of Water
Resources
350
(C-DWR)
contracts
Water Bank
Placer County
Water Agency

SWRCB
SWP
Action? Wheeling?

Yuba County
Water Agency
(YCWA)/DFG

Status
Approx.
99% of
contracts
approved

831,4032•3

Yes'

Yes

Yes

Yes

PCWA

SF

20,000'-·2

Yes

Yes

Yes
6,000 for
DFG

No

SWRCB
Approved

PCWA

SCVWD

15,ooot.2

Yes

Yes

No

No

SWRCB
Approved

45,000

Yes

Yes

No

No

SWRCB
Approved

Kern County
Water Agency
(KCWA)lWest- KCWA
lands Water
District (WWD)
Yuba County
Water Agency
(YCWA)lFour
Agencies (N)

CVP
Wheeling?

Water
Bank

(pCWA)/San
Francisco (SF)
Placer County
(pCWA)/Santa
Clara Valley
Water District
(SCVWD)

Oroville
Storage?

WWD

YCWA

N

7,5Q02

Yes

Yes

No

No

SWRCB
Approved

YCWA

YC

30,®

Yes

No

Yes

No

SWRCB
Approved

1

Approximately 20 percent allocated to Delta carriage water.
Refill impacts.
3 Approximately 15 percent allocated to Delta carriage water.
4 137,200 acre-feet subject to State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) jurisdiction (127,200 AF YWCA; 10,000 AF
OWID).
5 For supplemental Yuba River fish flows, if necessary.
Source: C-DWR 1991h.
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1987 entitlement was delivered to the agricultural sector. Total SWP deliveries (entitlement and
other deliveries) in 1991 were 47 percent of the 1987 deliveries (Table IV.5).

CVP Deliveries

Central Valley Project water deliveries are divided into four categories: water rights water,
project agricultural water, project municipal and industrial water, and waterfowl conservation
water. The drought did not significantly affect deliveries to water rights holders. However,
agricultural project water was cut by about 36 percent in 1990 and 58 percent in 1991, in
comparison with 1987 deliveries. Municipal and industrial project water showed increased
deliveries in 1988-90. However, in 1991 deliveries were reduced by about 30 percent from
1987 deliveries. Waterfowl conservation deliveries during the drought showed an increase of
1987 project water in order to reduce drought impacts on waterfowl populations (Table IV.6).
A more detailed breakdown of CVP contractual entitlements and drought shortages (CVP
Contracts 1992) is provided in Table IV. 7. Water rights holders are not permitted to receive
more than 25 percent reductions in deliveries and therefore did not experience severe hardships
during the drought. The total annual CVP contractual entitlements are 6.7 MAF. Project water
makes up 55 percent, while water rights quantities make up 45 percent of the total.

The State Drought Emergency Water Bank of 1991

The fifth year of drought led to progressively greater water shortages, and on
February 1, 1991, the Governor signed Executive Order No. W-3-91 that established the
Drought Action Team. Besides representing the Governor, the team was to assist on a local and
state level in handling the drought. On February 15, Governor Wilson announced a four-point
drought plan. His plan can be summarized as follows:
•

Establish a State Drought Emergency Water Bank (Water Bank) to meet critical
water needs.

•

Communities should adopt rationing plans with up to 50 percent cutbacks in water
use.

•

The California Department of Fish and Game must work with the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to protect natural habitat.

•

Establish a $100 million Drought Action Fund to assist with conservation, water
supply augmentation, and other drought mitigation activities. (Howitt, Moore,
and Smith 1992).

C-DWR was responsible for operating the Water Bank, which was established to meet
four critical needs: municipal and industrial uses, agricultural uses, protection of fish and
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TABLEIV.S
TOTAL AMOUNTS OF WATER DELIVERED BY
STATE WATER PROJECT, 1962-1991
Water Delivered (Acre-feet)
Other Deliveries
Recreation
Surplus and Unscheduled
Supported
Feather
Municipal
Total
(Recreation
River
AgriOther
and
Total
Industrial
cultural Water" DiversionsC Deliveriesd days)e

Entitlement Ware.--

Year

Municipal
Agriand
Industrial cultural
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(8)

(9)

18,289
22,456
32,507
44,105

18,289
22,456
32,507
44,105

30,000
105,000
331,600
449,800
482,700
455,200
931,300
1,554,800
1,804,800

(6)

1962
1963
1964
1965

(7)

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

5,747
46,472
34,434
47,996

5,791
125,237
158,586
185,997

11,538
171,709
193,020
233,993

0
10,000
0
0

0
111,534
72,397
133,024

67,928
53,605
14,777
18,829
38,080

866,926
794,374
759,759

67,928
65,143
1,174,946
1,078,620
1,164,856

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

85,286
181,066
293,824
418,521
641,621

272,054
430,735
400,564
455,556
582,369

357,340
611,801
694,388
874,077
1,223,990

2,400
22,205
3,161
4,753
21,043

293,619
401,759
293,255
412,923
601,859

44,127
73,127
43,666
48,342
67,170

778,362
817,398
800,743
911,613
862,218

1,475,848
1,926,290
1,835,213
2,251,708
2,776,280

2,085,900
1,971,200
2,502,000
4,073,600
4,189,300

1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

818,588
280,919
742,385
690,659
730,545

554,414
293,236
710,314
969,237
799,204

1,373,002
574,155
1,452,699
1,659,896
1,529,749

32,488
0
3,566
66,081
19,722

547,622
0
13,348
582,308
384,835

116,962
390,176
122,916
189,396
48,590

946,440
581,994
786,517
882,549
875,045

3,016,514
1,546,325
2,379,046
3,380,230
2,857,941

4,239,600
3,951,900
5,773,700
5,298,700
5,701,900

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

1,057,273
928,721
483,499
725,925
992,538

852,289
821,303
701,370
862,694
1,002,915

1,909,562
1,750,024
1,184,869
1,588,619
1,995,453

12,000
0
0
3,663
9,638

896,428
215,873
13,019
259,254
298,034

283,849
159,528
189,302
388,064
408,875

838,557
776,330
602,905
832,332
870,008

3,940,396
2,901,755
1,990,095
3,071,932
3,582,008

6,017,800
6,187,700
5,838,200
6,273,100
6,639,800

1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

998,611
1,096,368
1,316,820
1,602,454
1,876,072

997,025
1,033,718
1,068,302
1,251,293
706,079

1,995,636
2,130,086
2,385,122
2,853,747 f
2,582,151

2,595
6,949
0
0
0

34,025
107,958
0
0
90

197,471
385,264
521,370
495,702
466,578

791,737
831,947
794,834
809,250
851,247

3,021,464
3,462,204
3,701,326
4,158,699
3,900,066

6,966,039
7,228,815
6,854,300
6,738,300
6,060,100

1991
1992g

536,672
1,172,800

12,444
559,135

549,116
1,731,935

3,521
4,221

0

538,987

546,931

N/A

N/A

N/A

1,638,555
1,736,156

N/A
N/A

a
b

Entitlement and advance entitlement deliveries.
Includes amounts of preconsolidation repayment, emergency relief, and regulated delivery of local supply water; non-SWP water delivered
to Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District and the city of San Francisco through SWP facilities; CVP water conveyed
(mcluding Decision 1485 and recreation and fish and wildlife water); 1990 Ground Water Demonstration Program, recreation and exchange
water; and water purchased from Yuba County Water District.
c Feather River diversions to Joint Water Districts Board and Western Canal Water District.
d Percent change in total deliveries relative to 1987: 1988 (+6.9); 1989 (+20.1); 1990 (12.6); 1991 (-52.7); 1992 (-49.9).
e A recreation day is the visit of one person to a recreation area for any part of one day.
f
Includes SWP share of generation from Hyatt-Thermalito, Gianelli, Devil Canyon, Warne, Alamo, Castaic, Reid Gardner Unit No.4, and
Bottle Rock power plants.
g
1992 data are projected and preliminary for entitlement water only.
Source: C-DWR, State Water Project 1992g.
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TABLE IV.6
CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT WATER DELIVERIES
(Historic 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, and Projected 1991)

Historic
1987

1988

1989

1990

Projected
75/100/25
1991

Water rights water
Sacramento River
Exchange Contractors
American River!All others

1,549,000
853,000
172,000

1,407,000
853,000
138,000

1,379,000
834,000
148,000

1,349,000
781,000
l36,000

1,375,000
658,000
148,000

Total water rights

2,574,000

2,398,000

2,361,000

2,266,000

2,181,000

Percent change from 1987

-8.3

-6.8

-12.0

-15.3

Project agricultural water
Sacramento River
DMC!SLC
Friant Division
TCC!Corning!All others

370,000
1,932,000
843,000
662,000

385,000
1,931,000
697,000
610,000

341,000
1,691,000
716,000
614,000

277,000
1,218,000
538,000
422,000

293,000
436,000
736,000
143,000

Total project agric.

3,807,000

3,623,000

3,362,000

2,455,000

1,608,000

Percent change from 1987

-4.8

-11.7

-35.5

-57.8

Project M&I
American River
San Felipe Division
Contra Costa
All others

80,000
21,000
142,000
100,000

109,000
75,000
126,000
88,000

90,000
112,000
122,000
78,000

79,000
65,000
125,000
77,000

14,000
32,000
97,000
98,000

TotalM&I

343,000

398,000

402,000

346,000

241,000

+16.0

+17.2

+0.9

179,000

238,000

205,000

200,000

+37.7

+83.1

+57.7

+53.8

Percent change from 1987

Waterfowl conservation

130,000

Percent change from 1987

Grand totals
Percent change from 1987

Note:
Source:

6.WI!!!!!!

6159§.~

§I~~.~

-3.7

Projected deliveries for 1992 are approximately same as 1991.
California Central Valley Project Operations Office 1992.
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-7.2

~12721000
-23.1

-29.7

41~0• •
-38.3

TABLE IV.7
CVP CONTRACTUAL ENTITLEMENTS AND DROUGHT SHORTAGES, 1992

Contractual Quantities
Water Rights
Project
Total

FacilitylDescription

\0
0'1

Sacramento River
Settlement contracts
Agriusers
M&I
City of West Sacto
City of Redding
Colusa Drain MWC
Sutter Butte MWC
Butte Slough ID

(W0187)
(5272A)
(W0693)
(W0862)
(W0863)

Feather River
Tehama-Colusa Canal
Black Butte
Corning Canal
Shasta Lake
Trinity River Division
Sacramento River total
American River
Folsom Lake
Folsom South Canal
City of Sacramento
Placer County
American River total

25%

Shortage
50%

75%

371,651
585
9,680
2,490
57,637
17,700
4,200

2,171,986
1,695
23,600
16,600
57,637
17,700
4,200

1,628,990
1,271
17,700
12,450
43,228
13,275
3,150

1,628,990
1,271
11,800
12,450
28,819
8,850
2,100

1,628,990
1,271
5,900
12,450
14,409
4,425
1,050

20,000
356,300
3,165
43,800
14,250
40,800

20,000
356,300
3,595
43,800
14,250
40,800

15,000
267,225
2,696
32,850
12,224
30,600

10,000
178,150
1,798
21,900
8,660
20,400

5,000
89,075
900
10,950

1,829,905

942,258

2,772,163

2,080,659

1,935,188

1,789,719

59,000
25,000
140,000
120,000

50,750
210,000
90,000
35,000

109,750
235,000
230,000
155,000

97,063
30,000
60,000
8,000

84,375
30,000
60,000
8,000

71,688
30,000
60,000
8,000

344,000

385,750

729,750

195,063

182,375

169,688

1,800,335
1,110
13,920
14,110

430

5,099
10,200

TABLE IV.7 (Continued)
CVP CONTRACTUAL ENTITLEMENTS AND DROUGHT SHORTAGES, 1992

Facility/Description

\0

-...J

Contractual Quantities
Water Rights
Total
Project

25%

Shortage
50%

75%

Delta
Contra Costa Canal

195,000

195,000

195,000

146,250

97,500

Delta total

195,000

195,000

195,000

146,250

97,500

128,300
453,758
279,160
1,116,500
196,300

128,300
1,341,035
279,160
1,122,500
196,300

96,226
1,026,862
209,370
845,750
147,225

64,150
910,921
139,580
566,625
98,150

32,077
793,586
69,790
287,500
49,075

893,277

2,174,018

3,067,295

2,325,433

1,779,426

1,232,028

3.061.182

3.697.026

6. 764.2OS

4.796.155

4.043.239

3.288.935

800,000
1,400,000

800,000
1,400,000
23,000
4,400

680,000

Delta export
Cross Valley Canal
Delta-Mendota Canal
Delta-Mendota/San Luis
San Luis Unit
San Felipe
Delta export total
Grand CVP total

Other not affecting CVP
Friant Unit
Class 1
Class 2
Sly Park
Sugar Pine

Note:
Source:

887,277
6,000

°

Water rights holders are not cut by more than 25 percent. Therefore figures for water rights holders in the last two columns do not reflect 50 percent and 75 percent
shortages.
cVP Contracts 1992.

wildlife, and carry-over storage for 1992 (C-DWR 1992a). C-DWR was to purchase water from
willing sellers and sell it to users with critical needs. Water for the bank was acquired from
three sources:
•

Fallowing or idling of farmland and utilizing conserved irrigation water in the
Water Bank.

•

Using groundwater instead of surface water.

•

Transferring surplus surface water from local reservoirs to the Water Bank.

Purchase agreements were activated in early April, and by early June, more than 300 contracts
were developed. Table IV.8 summarizes the 351 contracts signed by the Water Bank. A
statewide total of 820,805 acre-feet were purchased by the Water Bank, with fallowing
contributing to 51 percent; groundwater, 32 percent; and surface water, 17 percent. A detailed
list of crops fallowed, and those planted but not irrigated are provided in Table N.9. A large
percentage of the Delta corn acreage was fallowed. About one-third of the acres fallowed took
place in San Joaquin County, followed by Yolo County, which contributed to one-quarter of the
acres fallowed for the Water Bank.
The Water Bank paid $125 per acre-foot for water from all sellers. During more
favorable water supply-and-demand conditions late in the year, SWP negotiated contracts at $30
and $50 per acre-foot. Most of the Water Bank water was delivered through SWP facilities.
Water from various sources was transferred and stored in the SWP-CVP system until the time
of delivery. Water was sold at $175 per acre-foot, and this cost pertained to water delivered
as far as the SWP Delta Pumping Plant. Additional costs were charged for conveying water to
final destinations, and costs varied for SWP and non-SWP contractors purchasing water from
the Water Bank.
The Water Bank allocations as of October 10, 1991, are shown in Table IV. 10. MWD
received the largest allocation (215,000 acre-feet), followed by Kern County Water Agency
(53,979 acre-feet) and the city of San Francisco (50,000 acre-feet). A general critique of 1991
Water Bank operations and processes (Howitt, Moore, and Smith 1992) revealed that the Water
Bank was a success and a significant achievement in California water policy. The bank's
operations were handled very efficiently, and this water trading was an economic boost for both
agriculture and economy in the state. The Water Bank's operations, however, created potential
effects on the local economics of water-exporting regions. Howitt, Moore, and Smith (1992)
state that these effects were geographically diverse and small compared with overall gains. The
Water Bank has been criticized, because it was less successful in addressing the negative
environmental impacts of the ongoing drought. However, through an acquisition funded by
Assembly Bill 12 (AB 12), signed into law by Governor Wilson in mid-October 1991, C-DWR
acquired 28,000 acre-feet for the state Department of Fish and Game. In general, the direct
environmental benefits of the bank were marginal compared to the benefits received by the
buyers and sellers.
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TABLE IV.8
DROUGHT WATER BANK PURCHASE SUMMARY

Category

Acre-feet

Percent of
Total

Delta

Fallowing
Groundwater
Stored water

333,723
2,529
2,576

40.7
0.3
0.3

Sacramento River

Fallowing
Groundwater

36,652
46,787

4.5
5.7

Yolo

Fallowing
Groundwater

34,463
27,308

4.2
3.3

Yuba/Feather/elsewhere

Fallowing
Groundwater
Stored water

15,226
182,341
139,200

1.9
22.2
17.0

Region

820,805
Statewide totals

Fallowing
Groundwater
Stored water

420,064
258,965
141,776
820,805

51.2
31.5
17.3

100

Total number of contracts: 351
Source: C-DWR 1992a.

The State Drought Emergency Water Bank of 1992

In March 1992, the C-DWR initiated the 1992 Water Bank when the ongoing drought

entered its sixth consecutive year. The same guiding principles and objectives of the 1991 Water
Bank were followed in establishing the 1992 effort. However, there were some significant
modifications in the implementation of the Water Bank during the sixth year of drought.
Prior to the rain in February 1992 that filled many of the reservoirs in Southern
California, initial estimates of critical needs were about 500,000 acre-feet. However, in March
1992, critical need demands were approximately 100,000 acre-feet. Allocations from the Water
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TABLE IV.9

DROUGHT WATER BANK CROP SUMMARY BY COUNTY
(Acres Fallowed)

Crops

-

8

Alfalfa·
Asparagus
Barley·
Corn
Dichondra'"
Dry beans
Grapes•
Melons
Milo
Misc. truck

Butte
County

Colusa
County

Safflower·
Seed grass'"
Sudan·
Sugar beets
Sunflowers
Tomatoes
Turnips
Wheat·

Subtotal

Shasta
County

678.0

996.5

521.9

6,500.0

175.6
9,014.3

458.5

243.9
198.0

3,795.2
1,277.4
412.6
24,958.3

Solano
County

Sutter Tehama Yolo
County County County
3,313.6

913.8
79.2
5,471.7

959.1

Stanislaus
County

136.0

53.9
11,606.6
27.4
1,187.1
56.2

1,589.4

387.5
167.0

40.0
18.0
1,482.0

Pasture'"

Rice

Contra
Costa Sacramento San Joaquin
County
County
County

1,158.0

2,231.0

92.2
518.0

1,455.7
3,072.2

2,323.2

1,344.2
10,580.2

58.9
1,783.9
798.0
1,034.8

188.9
462.7
591.7

3,258.1
577.6

2,557.8

24.6

325.7
74.4

131.6
1,323.7
862.1
125.6

3,699.0
383.7
1,216.4

1,206.5
572.4
451.6

11,927.1
28,674.0

14,288.5
52,258.1

35.4
50.5
4,443.5

390.0

3,208.5

5,859.9
18,551.2

2,705.4
267.1
2,553.4

923.8
166.1

136.0

Several contracts were negotiated in which the method of conserving water was left to the discretion of the water district.
These contracts may represent some additional fallowing; however, the amounts cannot be quantified.
·Crops noted were planted but not irrigated, rather than fallowed.
Source: C-DWR 1992a.

55.0
5,459.1

5,473.3
857.8
3,013.2
488.1

390.0

8,602.9
40,206.0

Total
10,219.0
1,277.4
721.3
59,276.3
27.4
3,236.1
254.2
167.0
228.9
539.6
16,187.5
8,180.2
4,398.3
526.5
131.6
9,950.6
2,769.4
4,347.0
35.4
43,583.8
166,093.5

TABLE IV.I0
WATER BANK ALWCATIONS
(As of October 10, 1991)

Agency

Acre-feet

Cost

14,800

$ 2,590,000

Alameda County - Zone 7

500

87,500

American Canyon Co.
Water District

370

64,750

6,717

1,175,475

236

41,300

Dudley Ridge Water District

13,805

2,415,875

Kern Co. Water District

53,979

9,446,325

215,000

37,625,000

975

170,625

San Francisco

50,000

8,750,000

Santa Clara Valley Water District

19,750

3,456,250

Westlands Water District

13,820

2,418,500

389,952

$68,241,600

Alameda Co. Water District

Contra Costa Water District
Crestline-Lake Arrowhead

Metropolitan Water District
of Southern California
Oak Flat Water District

Total

Source: Department of Water Resources in Howitt, Moore, and Smith 1992.
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Bank, as of October 23, totaled 154,250 acre-feet (C-DWR 1992a). Agricultural purchases
represented about 62 percent of total Water Bank allocations. Although twelve agricultural water
districts participated in the 1992 Water Bank, about 87 percent of all agricultural purchases was
made up of Tulare Lake Basin Water Service District and Westlands Water District. The
remaining purchases were made up of municipal and industrial demands (25 percent) and the
state Department of Fish and Game (13 percent).
Groundwater and conservation represented about 150,000 acre-feet of the water purchased
by the Water Bank as of October 23, 1992. The balance came from direct surface water
contracts (C-DWR 1992a). About 31,000 acre-feet had to be reserved to meet Delta water
quality requirements. The 1992 Water Bank sellers and purchasers are presented in Table
IV.11. The C-DWR purchased water from the 1992 Water Bank at $50/acre-foot. The selling
price was $72/acre-foot, including the additional costs for administration purposes and Delta
requirements.
The 1992 Water Bank differed from the 1991 Water Bank in several key aspects. The
major modifications to the 1992 Water Bank were:

•

It was substantially smaller in volume and less costly to buy and sell than the
1991 Water Bank.

•

It was primarily an agricultural water supply bank.

•

The Water Bank was completely underwritten by buyers.

•

The fallowing of land as a source was not permitted in the 1992 Water Bank.

•

The Water Bank instituted a system of pools for allocating supplies.

•

It used Option and Purchase Deposits for water.

•

Water needs for wildlife interests were a key purpose of the 1992 Water Bank

LEGISLATION CONCERNING DROUGHT AND WATER CONSERVATION

Drought Legislation

During the drought, a number of agencies identified drought legislation that would assist
in managing the water shortage. An informative description of the 23 bills considered in both
the California legislature and the u.S. Congress addressing drought issues as of December 1,
1991, was prepared by C-DWR (1991b) and is contained in Appendix A. A listing of state and
federal drought legislation incorporating strategic and tactical measures as of December 1991
is provided in Table IV .12.
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TABLE IV.ll
1992 DROUGHT WATER BANK: SELLERS AND PURCHASERS
(In Acre-Feet as of October 23, 1992)
Contractor/Purchaser

Amount

Sellers to the Water Bank
Alhambra Pacific Joint Venture
Browns Valley Irrigation District
Conaway Conservancy
Davis Ranches
East Contra Costa ID
Los Rios Farms
Merced Irrigation District
Oakdale ID/South San Joaquin ID
Oroville-Wyandotte ID
Pelger Mutual Water Co.
Upper Swanston
West Sact.lRD 900
Western Canal Water District
Total

5,000
4,600
17,500
4,000
2,500
15,000
15,000
50,000
10,000
1,500
995
1,500
50,000
177,595

Percent
2.8
2.6
9.9
2.3
1.4
8.4
8.4
28.2
5.6
0.8
0.6
0.8
28.2
100.0

Purchasers from the Water Bank
Allocation to agricultural demands
Broadview Water District
Del Puerto Water District
Foothill Water District
Hospital Water District
Kern County Water Agency
Orestimba Water District
Panoche Water District
Quinto Water District
Solado Water District
Sunflower Water District
Tulare Lake Basin Water Service District
Westlands Water District
Total agricultural uses

255
300
900
200
8,170
75
2,000
100
300
400
31,550
51,000
95,250

0.2
0.2
0.6
0.1
5.3
0.05
1.3
0.05
0.2
0.3
20.4
33.0
61.7

Allocation to nsh and wildlife demands
Department of Fish and Game

20,000

13.0

Allocation to urban demands
City and County of San Francisco
19,000
Contra Costa Water District
10,000
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 10,000
Total urban uses
39,000
Total allocations for all uses
154.250

12.3
6.5
6.5
25.3
100.0

Source: C-DWR 1992f.
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TABLE IV.12
1~IDROUGHTLEG~LATION

(Refer Also to Appendix A)

Number of bills

Issues
State legislation

Water transfers
Urban water management plan
Fish and game protection
Forestry and fire protection
Water reclamation projects
Drought emergencies and drought assistance
Agriculture
Water appropriation
Water supply development projects
Safe drinking water and drought relief bonds
Total

2
2
1
1
1

6
3
1
1

..l
19

Federal legislation
1
1
1

Drought relief
Drought emergency
Drought management and assistance
Drought response
Total

1
4

Water Conservation Legislation Memorandum of Understanding

A Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Urban Water Conservation in California
(MOU) was signed on December 11, 1991. Its signers now number 150, of which 105 are
urban water suppliers who serve over 80 percent of the state population. The MOU (1991)
states a commitment by water agencies to implement 16 conservation measures known as Best
Management Practices (BMPs) over the next 10 years. The MOU also created the California
Urban Water Conservation Council which is charged with oversight and annual reporting on
implementation progress of the BMPs. This MOU focused on urban water conservation in
California and was an agreement among urban water suppliers, public advocacy organizations,
and other interested groups. The BMPs (listed in Table IV. 13) were intended to reduce longterm urban demands from what they would have been without the implementation of these urban
water conservation practices. These BMPs are in addition to short-term tactical programs that
may be instituted during water supply shortages.
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TABLE IV.13
BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (BMPs)

1. Interior and exterior water audits and incentive programs for single-family residential,
multifamily residential, and governmental/institutional customers
2. Plumbing, new and retrofit
a. Enforcement of water-conserving plumbing fixture standards including requirement for
ultralow-flush (ULF) toilets in all new construction beginning January 1, 1992
b. Support of state and federal legislation prohibiting sale of toilets using more than 1.6
gallons per flush
c. Plumbing retrofit
3. Distribution system water audits, leak detection, and repair
4. Metering with commodity rates for all new connections and retrofit of existing connections
5. Large landscape water audits and incentives
6. Landscape water conservation requirements for new and existing commercial, industrial
institutional, governmental, and multifamily development
7. Public information
8. School education
9. Commercial and industrial water conservation
10. New commercial and industrial water use review
11. Conserving pricing
12. Landscape water conservation for new and existing single-family homes
13. Water waste prohibition
14. Water conservation coordinator
15. Financial incentives
16. IDtralow-flush toilet replacement
Source: Adapted from Memorandum of Understanding 1991.
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WATER CONSERVATION DURING THE ONGOING DROUGHT

The discussion on water conservation for the state of California is based on information
gathered from newspaper articles and available publications covering the current drought. The
discussion focuses mainly on demand management measures adopted by some agencies in
California during the 1987-92 drought.
First Year (Water Year 1987)

Even before the onset of drought in 1987, the MWD sponsored ongoing annual education
programs in 1983 based on various water issues, particularly conservation targeted at fourth and
sixth grades in schools. The cost of the program was predicted to average $300,000 per year.
Second Year (Water Year 1988)

During the second year of drought, the state urged wholesalers of state-supplied water
to cut back consumption by 10 to 15 percent. According to the Sacramento Bee (April 21,
1989), reaction to the state's appeal was mixed. Urban wholesalers such as the MWD agreed
to cooperate with the request. The Director of Kern County Water Agency (KCWA) described
the request as "impractical." He contended that farmers were using water very efficiently in the
San Joaquin Valley, and a large savings in water use could not be achieved in a short period of
time without the loss of crops and money.
Examples of conservation efforts in the state among some agencies (Table IV .14) can be
summarized as follows:
•

San Francisco Water Department (SFWD) imposed 25 percent mandatory
conservation on its 2.1 million customers in the city and suburban areas.

•

MWD requested a 10 percent voluntary conservation and launched a $12 million
public information campaign featuring celebrities to get its message across to its
14 million customers.

•

San Diego Water Authority (SDWA) launched its conservation program called
"Water Conservation, a San Diego Way of Life" (San Diego Union, May 20,
1988). The agency also instituted a public information campaign of $180,000
(funded by both MWD and the city of San Diego) on conservation tips and watersaving equipment.

•

The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) introduced a 9.9
percent water rate increase with a new policy that required special low-flow
devices to be fitted to all the city's showers and toilets. Mandatory conservation
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TABLE IV.14
EXAMPLES OF CONSERVATION DURING THE SECOND YEAR OF DROUGHT

A

c

B

D

San Francisco Water
Department (SFWD)

X (10)

Los Altos Hills (San
Francisco Peninsula)

X (15) X (25)

San Diego Water
Authority (SOWA)

X (10)

G

H

I

J

K

X

x

X

East Bay Municipal
Utilities Department
(EBMUD)

X

X

X (25)

City of Haywood

X

Santa Clara Valley
Water District

X (25)

Purisima Hills District

X (45)

A
Education
B
Voluntary Conservation
C
Extreme Voluntary Conservation
D
Mandatory Conservation
E = Mandatory Metered Rationing
F
Increasing Rates or Surcharges

F

X (25)

Metropolitan Water
District (MWD)

Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power
(LADWP)

E

G
Direct Economic Incentives
H
Distribution of Water-Saving Devices
I = Public Information Campaign
J = Waste Patrols and Citations
K = Enforce by Fines and Meter Discs

Sources:

Los Angeles Tunes, April 28, 1988; San Francisco Chronicle, June 2 and June 15,1988; San Diego Union, May 20,

Note:

1988.
Figures in parentheses denote percent voluntary/mandatory conservation.
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was instituted, covering restaurants, cleaning driveways, and shutting down some
fountains.
•

East Bay Municipal Utilities District (EBMUD) imposed 25 percent mandatory
conservation and increased water rates for residents using more than 400 gallons
of water a day.

•

Other examples of mandatory conservation included Los Altos Hills (25 percent),
the city of Hayward, Santa Clara Valley Water District (25 percent), and
Purisima Hills District (45 percent).

Third Year (Water Year 1989)
The third year proved to be a wetter year than the first two years, but this did not spell
the end of the drought. Some examples of conservation efforts in the third year (fable N .15)
were as follows.
•

The Tri-Cities Municipal Water District asked construction crews to cut its water
use by 50 percent and residents and businesses by 20 percent.

•

SFWD replaced mandatory conservation with appeals for voluntary conservation.

•

MWD and Santa Clara Valley Water District continued with mandatory
conservation measures.

•

LADWP ended its mandatory conservation.

•

EBMUD reduced its mandatory conservation from 25 percent to 15 percent.

•

Marin Municipal Water District imposed water rationing on March 1 and ended
it after the spring rains.

•

Kern County Water Agency urged its residents to practice water conservation by
watering their lawns only 3 times a week.

Fourth Year (Water Year 1990)
Water conservation was firmly embedded on a statewide basis during the fourth year of
drought. Efforts were made by some local governments in Southern California in furthering
conservation and preparing for water shortages. Water conservation efforts and other programs
to cope with water shortages among local governments in Southern California were identified
based on the results of a survey of local governments in Southern California, conducted by the
Los Angeles Times (April I, 1990). Voluntary conservation programs were identified among
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TABLE IV.tS
EXAMPLES OF CONSERVATION DURING THE TIIIRD YEAR OF DROUGHT

A

B

Tri-Cities Municipal
Water District

X

San Francisco Water
Department (SFWD)

X

C

Metropolitan Water
District (MWD)
Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power
(LADWP)

D

E

X

Santa Clara Valley
Water District

X (25)

Marin Municipal Water
District

X

= Education
= Voluntary Conservation
= Extreme Voluntary Conservation
= Mandatory Conservation
Mandatory Metered Rationing
Increasing
Rates or Surcharges
=

B

X
X

X (15)

A
B
C
D
E
F

G

X

East Bay Municipal
Utilities Department
(EBMUD)

Kern County Water
Agency (KCWA)

F

X
G

= Direct Economic Incentives

H = Distribution of Water-Saving Devices
I
J
K

= Public Information Campaign
= Waste Patrols and Citations
Enforce by Fines and Meter Discs

Sources: Orange Co. Register, August 16, 1989; Balcersjield Californian, May 7, 1989.
Note: Figures in parentheses denote percent voluntary/mandatory conservation.
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I

J

K

45 local communities in the sample survey in Southern California. Mandatory conservation was
active among 17 communities in the Southern California area. Other conservation programs and
steps toward preparing for water shortages include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Direct economic incentives
Distribution of water-saving devices
Waste patrols and citations
Water monitoring
Installing meters
Water reclamation
Conservation in public uses
Drought-tolerant landscaping
Supply augmentation

The following extract compiled by the Los Angeles Times from the Public Affairs
Clipsheet, Metropolitan Water District, March 14, 1991 (Vol. 5), illustrates the "Los Angeles
March to Water Rationing" during the fourth year of drought.
•

March 21 The Metropolitan Water District warns Southland water agencies,
including the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP), to restrict
water use.

•

March 23 Mayor Tom Bradley asks the LADWP to draw up a blueprint with
tough penalties.

•

March 31 Bradley vows to seek mandatory water rationing within 60 days if
consumption is not voluntarily reduced by 10 percent during the next month.

•

April 4 Los Angeles agrees to stop pumping groundwater for a year from Owens
Valley, one of the city's three largest sources of water.

•

April 17 A MWD committee recommends paying millions of dollars in rebates
to water agencies that get customers to cut use by more than 5 percent between
June and September.

•

April 27 LADWP announces programs that include a team of roving "drought
busters" looking for water waste.

•

April 30 At a news conference, Bradley challenges Los Angeles to voluntarily cut
water use by 10 percent or face water rationing within 60 days.

•

May 3 Mayor unveils mandatory water-rationing plan.

•

May 30 The council's Commerce, Energy, and Natural Resources Committee
gives conditional approval to the mayor's plan while calling for a report on the
effectiveness of ongoing voluntary conservation.
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•

June 28 Council tentatively approves mandatory rationing plan but throws in
amendments that will delay final vote for several weeks.

•

July 10 MWD reports that water use in many Southern California cities dropped
from 8 to 16 percent under voluntary programs.

•

July 11 New figures showing a strong conservation effort by residents prompt
some lawmakers to change their minds about backing the mayor's proposed
mandatory water-rationing plan.

•

July 14 By a 10-2 vote, council votes down mandatory water cuts.

•

July 25 Council approves voluntary water rationing and includes the city's first
fines for flagrant water wasters.

•

August 3 Los Angeles residents cut water use by only 9.8 percent in July and are

warned that mandatory water rationing may be imposed.
•

September 5 Los Angeles residents cut water use by 13 percent in August and
push back the possibility of rationing at least until October.

Source: Public Affairs Clipsheet, Metropolitan Water District, March 14, 1991 (vol. 5).

Fifth Year (Water Year 1991)

As the drought progressed into the fifth year, the Miracle March rains and the success
of the Water Bank assisted most communities in coping with their water shortages. As a result,
some communities reduced their conservation goals from more than 45 percent to 25 percent and
lower. However, communities in Southern California, for example, those served by the MWD,
continued to pursue an aggressive conservation program. In May 1991, a survey was conducted
to provide California Urban Water Agencies (CUWA) with updated information on what its
eleven member agencies were doing to deal with urban water demands of the summer and fall
during the fifth year. The results of this survey are presented in Table IV .16. The conservation
programs undertaken by the member agencies vary both in terms of water use reduction goals
and measures adopted. Water use reduction goals varied from a low of 10 percent for LADWP
to a high of 31 percent for MWD. The conservation measures adopted are similar to the
demand management measures described in the earlier years of the drought.

111

TABLE IV.16
1991 CONSERVATION MEASURFS TAKEN BY CUWA MEMBER AGENCIES
TO MEET URBAN WATER DEMANDS

Percent
Reduction
Goals

A

B

C

F

G

H

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

D

E

I

Alameda Co. WD

18

Contra Costa WD

26

X

East Bay MUD

15

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

LA Dept. of W&P

10

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

MWD of Southern CA

31

X

X

MWD of Orange Co.

20

X

X

X

X

X

Orange Co. WD

20

X

X

San Diego Co.
Water Auth.

20

X

X

X

X

City of San Diego WUD

20

X

X

X

X

San Francisco PUC

25

X

X

X

X

X

X

Santa Clara Valley WD

25

X

X

X

X

X

A
B
C
D
E

= Mandatory Metered Rationing
= Mandatory Conservation
= Extreme Voluntary Conservation

Increasing Rate or Surcharges
= Direct Economic Incentives

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

F = Distribution of Water-Saving Devices
G
Media Public Information
H = Mailed Public Information
I = Waste Patrols and Citations
J = Enforcement by Fines or Meter Disks

Source: California Urban Water Agencies (CUWA), June 1991.

112

X

X

X

X

X

J

X

X
X

X

Sixth Year (Water Year 1992)

The progress of the drought into the sixth year was accompanied by continued water
conservation programs. A survey of the CUWA member agencies was completed in May 1992
in order to update the 1991 survey. The survey demonstrated that all agencies recognize the
importance of demand management measures. Southern California had above-normal local
supplies in 1992, allowing relaxation of water restrictions. Drought continued, however, in the
major Northern California import sources, thus impacting availability of supply. Accordingly,
the demand management programs pursued by the CUWA member agencies and their goals
differed according to their water supply situation. However, all eleven member agencies
continued with their mailing of public information. More than 80 percent of the agencies
pursued their media public information programs and the distribution of water-saving devices
(Table IV. 17). One important development at the end of the fifth year of drought (September
1991) was the signing of the Best Management Practices (BMPs) statewide agreement monitored
by the California Urban Water Conservation Council. The conservation program followed by
the water agencies in the sixth year included some of the 16 BMPs advocated in the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreement. For example, MWD designed its
commercial and industrial program according to the BMP requirements for those sectors.
Components of this program include publications, technical workshops, business conferences,
training courses, water use surveys, water management studies, and a telephone hotline.

ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE DROUGHT

The economic effects of the drought were not felt immediately, but the environment was
impacted since the first dry weather in 1987. Quantitative assessments of economic losses of
the six-year drought are difficult to ascertain because limited data are available regarding the
analysis of drought impacts. The discussion that follows describes the impacts of the drought
on agriculture, industry, other economic sectors, and the environment.

Economic Losses in Agriculture

Irrigated agriculture was little impacted during the first three years of the drought, as the
use of stored water was allowed. There were local water project shortages in 1988, although
water deliveries to agricultural users were not reduced until 1990. In 1990 the overall impacts
to agriculture were minimal (Cannon 1990; CDOC 1990; Gleick and Nash 1991). In contrast
to minimal impacts of irrigated agriculture early in the drought, dry-farm agriculture and native
produce were impacted the first year of the drought - 1987. Despite the onset of the drought
in 1987, cash receipts from farm marketings in California reached a record of $18.3 billion in
1990, reflecting a $0.8 billion increase from 1989 (C-DWR 1991b, Gleick and Nash 1991.)
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TABLE IV.17
1992 CONSERVATION MEASURES TAKEN BY CUWA MEMBER AGENCIES
TO MEET URBAN WATER DEMANDS

Percent
Reduction
Goals
Alameda Co. WD

15

Contra Costa WD

15

East Bay MUD

15

LA Dept. of W&P

10

MWD of Southern CA

A

B

C

D

X

X

E

F

G

H

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

10

X

X

X

X

X

MWD of Orange Co.

20

X

X

X

X

Orange Co. WD

10

X

X

San Diego Co.
Water Auth.

10

X

X

X

City of San Diego WUD

20

X

X

X

San Francisco PUC

2S

X

X

X

X

X

X

Santa Clara Valley WD

15

X

X

X

X

X

A
B
C

D
E

=
=
=
=

Mandatory Metered Rationing
Mandatory Conservation
Extreme Voluntary Conservation
Increasing Rate or Surcbarges
Direct Economic Incentives

X
X

X

X

X
X

F
G

H
I
J

=
=
=
=
=

Distribution of Water-Saving Devices
Media Public Information
Mailed Public Information
Waste Patrols and Citations
Enforcement by Fines or Meter Disks

Source: California Urban Water Agencies (CUWA), May 1992.

114

J

X

X

X

X

I

X
X
X

X

Agriculture was impacted during the fifth year of drought (1991), but the Water Bank
had a significant effect on the agricultural sector. According to Howitt et al. (1992), the Water
Bank allocations generated economic gains in the regions importing water in 1991. Howitt et
al. (1992) indicate that the importing agricultural regions gained in employment by 1,153 jobs,
and this increase exceeded the 162 estimated job losses experienced in exporting regions.
Agriculture in importing regions enjoyed an increase of $45 million in income, surpassing the
estimated loss of county income in exporting regions ($13 million).
Statewide economic impacts on agriculture during the fifth year of drought were
estimated by C-DWR (C-DWR 1992c). C-DWR estimated that the drought idled about 347,000
"net" acres with a loss of gross receipts of about $252 million in 1991. Net acres reflect not
only the decrease in acres caused by the drought, but also the increase in some crops related to
crop-shifting in response to the drought. Another estimate of drought indicated that irrigation
costs to growers in the San Joaquin Valley alone were estimated to have increased by about $160
million (Northwest Economic Associates 1992).
Agricultural impacts were concentrated in a few regions, especially the southern San
Joaquin Valley and the Central Coast region. Scarce groundwater supplies impacted the
southern San Joaquin Valley, while extensive dry land pasture and a high dependence on
groundwater made conditions difficult in the Central Coast. Irrigation districts that predicted
agricultural impacts during the fifth year include Kern County Water Agency (KCWA) and
Westlands Water District (in San Joaquin Valley) and Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District (in the
Sacramento Valley).
For example, KCWA funded a study in early 1991 to estimate economic impacts of
proposed water delivery cutbacks on five water districts depending solely on SWP entitlements.
The study estimated that gross output would decline by $221 million if no water was available
to produce annual crops (Northwest Economic Associates 1991). Furthermore, lost wages and
salaries, both direct and indirect, would amount to $113 million.
Reduced surface supplies and increased groundwater pumpage impacted planted acreage
in the Westlands Water District during the drought. The district forecast decreases of
approximately 140,000 acres in planted acreage in 1991. Subsequently, based on available data,
the district forecast a decline in income of $1400 per acre, for a total predicted income loss of
about $200 million (Westlands Water District 1991).
A summary of the estimates and forecasts (both local and statewide) of economic impacts
on the agricultural sector is shown in Table IV.18. Some farmers faced increasing costs and
declining revenues, and some local communities suffered from reduced activity (Gleick and Nash
1991).
Any prediction of drought impacts obviously reflects assumptions of surface water
supply, groundwater use, water costs, and water distribution. The 1987-1992 drought
demonstrated that the ability to shift among water users is crucial (Howitt 1991): Howitt pointed
out that if irrigation water can be readily moved from low values to high value uses within
agriculture, the total impacts on farmers, urban areas, and food consumers will be greatly
reduced.
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TABLE IV.IS
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS
ON THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN 1991

Study

Loss

Comments

Statewide

Estimated Loss

C-DWR 1992

$252 million (gross receipts)

Regional

Estimated or Predicted Loss

Northwest Economic
Associates 1991

$221 million (gross) predicted Assumed no production of annual crops and
for Kern County alone in 1991 permanent destruction of some tree crops.
(now appears an overly harsh scenario).

Westlands Water
District 1991

$200 million (gross) predicted Overestimate of fallowing and
within the Westlands Water
Overestimates of per acre value.
District for 1991

Northwest Economic
Associates 1992

$160 million estimated cost in Increases in irrigation costs to growers only
San Joaquin Valley

Drought idled about 347,000 "net" acres.

Economic Losses in Industry and Manufacturing
The California economy was worth more than $760 billion in 1992. Other than
agriculture and recreation, industries dependent on reliable water supplies in California include
refining, food processing, semiconductor manufacturing, and services. According to Spectrum
Economics (1991), seven of California's major industrial sectors increased production during
drought, although they reduced their water use by 3 to 1 percent annually. These seven
industrial sectors include fruit and vegetable processing, paperboard and box production,
refining, concrete, communications, and motor vehicle production (Gleick and Nash 1991).

°

The industries dependent on reliable water supplies have taken steps to reduce their water
requirements during the drought. The petroleum refineries that used nearly 230,000 acre-feet
in the early 1980s (C-DWR 1982) have been planning to recycle and reuse refinery process
water. The food industry, utilizing over 100,000 acre-feet of water per year (C-DWR 1982),
has also reduced its water requirements through recycling, improved equipment, and changes
in operations. As a result of this proactive planning for drought and flexible rationing programs
(exemptions granted for businesses facing serious consequences), these industries have not
suffered much economic losses during the drought.
The semiconductor industry has
implemented conservation measures, but Yamane et al. (1991) predicted that increasing industrial
cutbacks during the ongoing drought might lead to increased costs or force companies to rely
more heavily on out-of-state production facilities. A survey of 836 executives in the state,
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conducted for the California business round table, revealed that two-thirds of companies favored
increasing the state's water supply (Riverside Press-Enterprise, February 5, 1991). The housing
and construction industry has been impacted by the drought, and some communities in California
imposed interim regulations on new development. This measure required developers to apply
for a building permit for any new development, and the applicant would have to ensure that new
projects would mitigate and offset water usage. In this way existing community water resources,
already impacted by the drought, would be safeguarded from additional impacts by new users.
One positive outcome of this restriction on new development has been an increase in the use of
water-saving devices during the construction process (Gleick and Nash 1991). Other industries
have also benefited from the drought, and these include well drillers, who have prospered during
this six-year period.

Economic Impacts on Other Sectors

The impacts of the drought affected other economic sectors including municipalities,
energy, and the "green industry." The discussion of impacts on the first two sectors is based
largely on material presented by Gleick and Nash (1991). The impact on municipalities in the
state led to five counties declaring emergency drought conditions in 1990: Santa Barbara, San
Benito, Kings, Madera, and San Luis Obispo. Five other counties, Mendocino, Tulare, Sutter,
Glenn, and Colusa, declared drought emergency in the spring of 1991. Most districts, such as
MWD and Marin County, announced plans to invest capital in ongoing water conservation
programs. For example, MWD planned to spend $30 million per year for water conservation
programs and $378 million to line irrigation canals and improve aqueduct control systems. This
was in return for about 200,000 acre-feet of water from Imperial Valley irrigation projects and
the All American Canal. Residential conservation programs were widely implemented in the
state, and reductions varying from 15 to 50 percent in water use were achieved, especially
during the fourth and fifth years of the drought. For instance, Santa Clara County achieved 20
percent voluntary reduction in 1989 and 1990, and per capita use dropped 24 percent.
In addition to conservation techniques such as voluntary and mandatory rationing and
retrofit programs, the use of reclaimed water has increased in the state. During the drought, the
city of Irvine became the fIrst in the nation to use reclaimed water for toilet flushing in
commercial buildings (C-DWR 1991b). Furthermore, the cities of Santa Barbara and Montecito
used reclaimed water for public landscaping.

Another sector impacted by the drought is hydroelectric generation, which normally
provides about 20 percent of the state's total electrical energy supply and represents more than
30 percent of electricity produced by California utilities. Hydroelectric generation declined to
about 12 percent of total generation and 18 percent of in-state generation during the first four
years of the drought (Gleick and Nash 1991). This decline has been made up mainly by burning
more costly natural gas and importing power from out-of-state sources. Gleick and Nash (1991)
claim that the decline in hydroelectric generation has cost California rate payers $2.4 billion
during this period.
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There are widely varying estimates of the impact to the "green industry," owing to the
problems of defining and knowing the baseline conditions and extracting other factors.
Preliminary estimates indicate that the California "green industry" experienced drought-induced
direct losses of equivalent full-time jobs totalling about 5,630 (C-DWR 1992e). This figure
excludes job losses in the "green industry" due to recession. Additionally, drought impacts
forced some "green industry" employees to work fewer hours in 1991. Declines in revenues
suffered by the "green industry" due solely to drought were about 7 percent in 1990 (C-DWR
1992e). It should be noted that the "green industry" suffered an even greater decline in business
in 1991 due to other factors such as recession and increased water costs.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

Fish and Wildlife
According to C-DWR (1991b), it is possible that the most severe impacts of the drought
have been on the environment and the fish and wildlife that depend on the rivers for their
sustenance. The environment was impacted immediately with the onset of drought in 1987.
Impacts were pronounced on fisheries and aquatic resources, particularly species such as salmon,
which shows a good correlation to flow (USFWS 1987; Gleick and Nash 1991). This
relationship has since been rermed to show that water temperature, Delta exports, and percent
river flow diverted at the Delta Cross Channel and Georgianna Slough explain the relationship
better. The following discussion on impacts of the drought to fish is based on information
contained in C-DWR (1991b) and the Pacific Fishery Management Council publication, Review
of 1991 Ocean Salmon Fisheries (pFMC 1992). However, the extent that the environment has
been impacted by drought and low flows has not been established. There are several major
factors in addition to flow, such as toxics, introduced species, and overfishing that have
impacted the environmental resources, but these losses have not been assessed. Other important
environmental impacts include increases in upstream temperature, winter-run chinook salmon
habitat, cumulative impacts, longfin smelt, Sacramento splittail, April 1991 Delta operations,
violation of Delta standards in 1991 and 1992, and unmitigated water transfer impacts.
The fall-run chinook salmon represents the major facet of California's commercial and
sport fisheries. Figure N.3 reveals that the population of the fall-run chinook salmon had
declined to its lowest numbers in the last two decades despite consistent hatchery production.
Counts of adult salmon show a consistent decline from about 232,000 in 1986 to about 96,000
in 1990. The counts of two-year-old immature jack salmon showed a continued decline since
the outset of the drought in 1987 (from about 70 jacks in 1987 to about 11 jacks in 1990).
According to C-DWR (1991b), several generations may be needed to restore these populations
once precipitation returns to normal.
The drought also impacted the striped bass and adult populations declines to an estimated
all-time low of 515,000 in 1990 (C-DWR 1991b). Figure IV.4 illustrates the California Central
Valley striped bass young-of-the-year index, which demonstrates that the spawning success
decreased substantially during the drought. In 1986 the population level index of the 1.5-inch
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FIGURE IV.3
CALIFORNIA CENTRAL VALLEY NATURAL FALL-RUN
CEUNOOKSPA~GSAUMON

(In Thousands of Fish, 1970-1991)1
Source: C-DWR 1991b.
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FIGURE IV.4
CALIFORNIA CENTRAL VALLEY STRIPED BASS YOUNG-OF·THE-YEAR INDEX1
Source: C-DWR 1991b.
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striped bass was about 65, decreasing to about 12 in 1987 and to about 6 in 1991 (C-DWR
1991b). Besides the salmon and the striped bass, other species were also impacted, including
the Delta smelt. Figure IV.5 deficits the annual index of fall abundance of Delta smelt from
1967 to 1991. The Delta smelt index was lowest during the mid-1980s, and although it has been
increasing since 1989, the annual index was well below 1,000 in 1991 (C-DWR 1991b).
However, 1992 trends reveal that this promising increasing trend has largely reversed.
Wildlife has been impacted by the ongoing drought, as shown by drastic declines in the
wintering waterfowl in the Central Valley of California during the last decade. Most waterfowl
do not breed in California. During the 1980s, the waterfowl suffered from drought experienced
in the north. Drought affected the winter habitat and the condition of birds returning north to
breed. The 1990 population was estimated at about 2 million as compared with about 10-12
million in 1980 (testimony of Iohn Turner, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife, noted in Gleick
and Nash 1991). The authors maintained that although waterfowl populations are affected by
several factors, the water shortage has intensified these losses by reducing the quantity and
quality of wetlands habitat in the Central Valley.

Forestry
The current drought has impacted California's forests. The California Department of
Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) is responsible for the largest area of forest, about 34 million
acres, in California (Gleick and Nash 1991). The impacts of the drought on the CDF and the
citizens of California are long-term and are predicted to continue into the next generation (CDWR 1991b). By the fifth year, the drought intensified the buildup of dead fuels on 25 percent
of the lands that the CDF protects. Three years of the current drought (1987, 1988, and 1990)
were among the worst fire seasons experienced in the state. Based on acreage burned in the
1986 season, there was a six-fold increase in 1987, and acreage burned almost doubled during
the 1988 and 1990 fire seasons. Yosemite National Park for the first time in its history closed
down in 1990 (Gleick and Nash 1991). Additionally, the death rate of timber has continued to
increase during the drought. Since its onset in 1987, the drought has destroyed 18 billion board
feet of the state's merchantable timber. This is equivalent to building about 1.8 million homes
(C-DWR 1991b).

Other Sectors

Environmental impacts also impacted the recreation and tourist sector. The water
shortage led to increased operating costs in many of the state's parks. These increased costs are
due to several factors that include (C-DWR 1991b):
•

Need for new wells or deeper wells

•

Trucking of water supplies in severe cases
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•

Installation of water conservation equipment such as drip irrigation and selfclosing faucets

•

Construction of boat ramp extensions to reach lower water levels

By the fifth year of the drought, water use at state parks was about 10 gallons per capita per day
(gpcd) in comparison with 14 gallons gpcd during the 1976-77 drought (C-DWR 1991b).
In the tourist sector, the ski resort business in the state declined as the drought progressed
and snow conditions deteriorated in the mountains. Estimates from the California ski industry
indicated that "skier visits" had declined from 7.1 million in the 1988-89 season to 6.1 million
in 1989-90 and 4.1 million in 1990-91 (Gleick and Nash 1991). The authors estimated that the
ski resort industry lost about $85 million during the 1990-91 winter season, and employment
levels fell to about 50 percent of normal during this time.

SUMMARY

This chapter described the progress of the drought from its onset in 1987 to its presentday status. The story of the drought has been described in detail so as to give the reader a
summary of the precipitation and hydrological conditions during the six-year period, the actions
taken during drought, and the economic and environmental impacts of the drought.
With this established knowledge base, the research team proceeded to search for learned
lessons through interviews with representatives of agencies and organizations that control or
influence water management. The reaction of these participants to what happened during the
drought was expected to uncover prescriptive insights about what to do and what not to do
during future drought episodes. The next chapter presents the interview findings.
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v.

SURVEY RESULTS: GENERAL PERCEPTIONS

This chapter summarizes the contents of the interviews pertaining to four general aspects
of the drought: (1) critical drought impacts; (2) communication and cooperation; (3) the role
and responsibilities of the media; and (4) response of the general public and water users to the
drought.
The following opinions were presented during the interviews. They are not intended to
represent the views of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or the authors of this report. The
views have not been modified by the report authors. Participants interviewed in the study were
given the opportunity to review draft versions of this report in order to both comment on the
overall results of the study as well as to comment on perceptions specific to them. Two
workshops were also held to review the document in a communal setting. We encourage reading
of this section in the spirit of identifying a wide spectrum of varying perceptions that comprise
water and drought management philosophy in California.

PERCEPTIONS OF DROUGHT IMPACTS

Major droughts, such as the 1987-92 drought in California, may have substantial adverse
impacts on the economy, political system, environment, and society as a whole. Because less
water is available during drought, some human activities become constrained, and the objectives
possible with a plentiful water supply cannot be achieved. Also, the competition for water
among various economic activities may leave the environmental uses of water at a disadvantage
causing significant environmental impacts.
Investigations of drought usually concentrate on its adverse consequences. However,
droughts also have positive impacts as well. One such effect is the subject of this study,
namely, the lessons for water management.
The survey respondents named a large number of negative impacts of the drought but
generally were able to quantify very few. Table V.1 shows a roster of the impacts of the 198792 drought in California that were mentioned by the survey participants. These impacts are
grouped under four broad categories: environment, agriculture, urban economies, and other.
The following sections describe the most critical impacts in each category.

Environmental Impacts

Almost all survey respondents agreed that the greatest impact of the 1987-92 drought fell
on the state's environmental resources. The environmental community pointed out that the
natural ecosystems in California have been diminished and weakened because of population
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TABLE V.1

IMPACTS OF THE 1987-1992 DROUGHT IN CALIFORNIA
AS CITED BY INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS
I.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
•
Reduced abundance and harvest of freshwater and anadromous fish
•
Penetration of salt water into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
•
Forest damage from pests and fire
•
Decline in the quality of wildlife habitat due to reduced water deliveries to
California's wetlands
•
Decline in populations of threatened and endangered species of plants and animals
•
Increase of fossil fuel generation impacted air quality

ll.

IMPACTS ON AGRICULTURE
•
Drought-related idling of farmland (especially in the acreage of rice, wheat, and
cotton)
•
Reduced agricultural income
•
Increased agricultural cost
•
Reduced herd sizes in some parts of the state
•
Erosion of grazing areas due to overgrazing
•
Increased capital investment by farmers on pumps and wells
•
Overdrafting of groundwater aquifers
•
Impacted industries producing goods to farmers
•
Crop shift impact has been detrimental to the vegetable industry
•
Demonstrated ingenuity of the farmers

ill.

IMPACTS ON URBAN ECONOMIES
•
Increased expenditures on emergency water conservation programs
•
Losses of plant materials on urban landscapes
•
Increased costs of water treatment due to lower water quality
•
Positive and negative criticism from customers
•
Increased volume of work in urban water agencies

N.

OTHER IMPACTS
•
Increased costs for fossil fuel energy to replace lost hydropower
•
Income losses of the ski industry due to bad snow conditions
•
Reduced houseboating activity due to low reservoir levels
•
Increased emissions of carbon dioxide due to the burning of extra fossil fuels
•
Increased expenditures for fire protection, fire control, staffing, and operational
expenses
•
Reduced visitor attendance at parks and facilities
•
Social hardships
•
Consumer inconvenience and lifestyle changes
•
Industrial production and wage-earning-hours reduction
•
Devaluation of California as a desirable industrial location
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pressures and that their continued survival requires careful management and control.
drought has exacerbated the existing environmental problems.

The

Some environmental impacts of the drought occurred outside the water management
systems in the sense that no human actions could prevent the damages. For example, the
shortage of precipitation has caused very high tree mortality due to increased vulnerabilities to
insect infestations and other forest diseases. At the end of 1991 as mentioned earlier, the
damage assessment by the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection estimated that
since 1987, the drought has killed 18 billion board feet of merchantable timber (Le., enough
timber to build 1.8 million normal-size homes). Only a fraction of the dead timber can be
recovered.
The impacts of drought on aquatic and riparian resources were evident throughout the
water management system of the state. Respondents representing the state and federal natural
resources agencies were aware of the drought-related problems. They expressed some
frustration with the lack of understanding of the environmental needs by the public and the offstream users of water. Many of them thought that society has to decide whether environmental
uses should have priority. Some respondents suggested that there should be a referendum (or
a popular vote) on this issue. They indicated that once the society "makes up its mind" and puts
high priority on protecting ecological resources of the state, they will "gladly oblige." The
environmental managers know what needs to be done and how to do it. Actually, the society
did force water managers to give high priority to protecting the threatened and endangered
species. The protection of species in the Sacramento River has resulted in forcing the operations
of the water projects for environmental enhancement.
The participants from the environmental community believed that the operators of the
water projects are clearly to blame for some environmental impacts. Aquatic resources were
stressed because of the cumulative impact caused by minimum flows that persisted since 1987.
Agriculture and urban areas received full allocations of the stored water during the fIrst three
or even four years at the expense of carry-over storage. Then when the drought continued, the
projects wanted to have more carry-over storage by cutting down the minimum-flow
requirements for protecting the aquatic resources. (It should be noted, however, that according
to C-DWR, in 1989 it was not possible to carry over more water at Folsom and Oroville
reservoirs, as this would encroach into flood use storage.) If the cutbacks were introduced
earlier, then the SWP and CVP would be in a better position to protect the ecological resources.
There would be more water to enhance flows and mitigate high water temperature impacts.

Impacts on Agriculture
Respondents from agricultural water districts gave many examples of negative impacts
of the drought on agriculture. Because the major projects reduced water deliveries to
agriculture, the respondents seemed compelled to let everyone know that these cutbacks caused
major hardships. SignifIcant amounts of agricultural land were left idle, and the cost of water
went up. Many respondents acknowledged that the economic impacts were not great because
of the availability of groundwater, changes in cropping patterns, and on-farm water conservation
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practices. The impact of greater concern to them was the change in attitudes of the general
public toward the agricultural sector. They resented the "farmer bashing" that was present in
the media, especially during the fifth year of the drought. Some respondents viewed "farmer
bashing" as a sign of future problems for agriculture in the state. Because of the change in
public attitudes, next time it will be more difficult for agriculture to obtain water supplies or
even maintain their current supplies. On the positive side, some respondents believed that the
impacts of the drought had been mitigated tremendously on the farms by the farmers. They said
that there were a million acres of farmland surviving with only a 25 percent water supply, and
due to the ingenuity of the farmers, agriculture was not greatly impacted economically.
A majority of all other survey participants sympathized with farmers but were concerned
more with the social impacts of water shortages on the rural communities than with the statewide
impact of drought on income of the agribusiness sector of the state economy. The estimated
losses in farm sales of $0.5 billion were often viewed by the other respondents as important but
not as critical as the environmental impacts. This view was influenced, at least in part, by the
realization that total farm sales represent a very small fraction of the state gross regional product
(approximately $20 billion out of $700 billion or less than 3 percent) and that the highest farm
sales year of 1990 was the third year of drought.
Respondents from the environmental community viewed the impacts on California's
agriculture as being greatly softened because of the existing water management system, which
protected off-stream uses of water against drought. Some statements seemed to imply that this
protection comes at the expense of the environment.

Impacts on Urban Economies
The impact urban water users most frequently mentioned was conserving water and
adjusting their lifestyles in order to do it. Although all survey participants praised the
conservation effort of urban water users, their views on the level of hardship and the economic
consequences of water-rationing programs were often deeply divided.
The participants whose responsibilities involve the development and administration of
urban water demand management programs, both long-term and short-term, tended to view the
negative impacts of rationing programs as negligible or minimal. They praised the consumers
for great cooperation and quoted the achieved water savings as evidence of the success of the
rationing programs. Because these participants work diligently to promote water conservation
at all times, they viewed the drought as an opportunity to increase the public awareness of water
use and achieve significant improvements in the efficiency of water use.
Consumer
inconvenience or economic hardship of businesses and industries was less of a concern.
The participants who deal with operations of water supply systems and those who
perform long-term planning activities were concerned about the consequences of water rationing.
As one respondent put it: "When you propose a rationing plan at 45 percent of what people are
used to having, you must deal with a lot of angry people because this has a serious impact on
people's lives and businesses." Another respondent called the conservation programs "irrational
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rationing," indicating that because of strict water-rationing provisions, some electronics firms
in Silicon Valley had to spend a lot of money on water conservation to avoid large employee
layoffs. They paid up to $30,000 per acre-foot for water conserved, while farmers were very
willing to give up much of their water at $125 per acre-foot or less. However, this comparison
has to be interpreted cautiously, since the $30,000 per acre-foot is for a permanent effect (not
one-time, like the $125 per acre-foot), and was primarily expended to avoid extremely high
effluent discharge costs. Other respondents in the group often mentioned the difficulties
involved in designing, implementing, and enforcing rationing programs, as well as their negative
impacts on water utility revenue. Some saw the revenue losses caused by the rationing to be
setbacks for their long-term conservation programs. In order to balance revenues, many retail
water agencies had to increase water rates. The Los Angeles Times ran the headline "No Good
Deed Goes Unpunished" in response to the proposed rate hike in Los Angeles.
The participants representing the urban "green industry" of landscapers and nurseries
voiced numerous complaints against water-rationing programs, especially against total bans on
outdoor watering. They lost a number of business accounts for landscape maintenance, because
the owners had to let the landscapes die. Outright bans on landscaping use "until the drought
is over" often paralyzed landscape businesses in many communities. Landscapers can work with
very little water to beautify and maintain urban landscapes, but they cannot work without water.
The landscape contractors pointed out that they represent a major industry in California, with
the value of products and services that they estimate between $10 and $12 billion annually,
almost two-thirds of the total value of farm product sales in the state.

Other Impacts of the Drought
Although environment, agriculture, and urban economies account for the majority of
adverse impacts of drought, other sectors and activities also had their share of negative effects
of drought. These other impacts are characterized here under the categories of water quality,
recreation, energy, administration, and water policy.

Impacts on Water Quality
The six-year drought has impacted the state of the California water resources in terms
of both their quantity and quality. Groundwater reserves have been depleted in many areas,
causing accelerated seawater intrusion in coastal regions and subsidence in the San Joaquin
Valley. The survey respondents voiced some concerns about the impacts on water quality. The
availability of water to dilute the pollutants continues to be an important element of water quality
protection. For example, higher salinity of water in the Delta combined with higher organic
content of inflowing freshwater causes elevated levels of THMs (tribalomethanes) in public water
supplies using the Delta water.
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Impacts on Recreation and Tourism
Nearly $50 billion is spent annually in California on recreation and tourism activities
(Gleick and Nash 1991). The drought had major impacts on tourist activities such as skiing in
the Sierra Nevada, houseboating on reservoirs, and fishing for salmon and striped bass. For
example, the number of recreation days on the State Water Project lakes has dropped from 7.2
million in 1987 to about 6 million in 1990, a 17 percent decrease. Visits to urban areas also
dropped. The city of Santa Barbara estimated that they lost $30 million in tourism in 1990 due
to publicity about drought and fires (Reinhold 1991).
The respondents who mentioned the impacts of drought on tourism often acknowledged
the difficulty in estimating such impacts. Some decline in tourism and recreation was attributed
to the economic recession. Others felt that the importance of these impacts easily fades away
in comparison with the potentially irreversible impacts on the state's ecological resources.

Impacts on Energy Production
Hydroelectric power provides approximately 20 percent of the California'S total electric
energy supply and represents about one-third of the electricity produced by utilities located
within the state. Because the amount of hydroelectricity produced is directly related to the
amount of water in storage, the production of hydropower dropped to about two-thirds of normal
during the drought. The representatives of the energy industry reported that the first four years
of the drought have cost ratepayers an extra $2.4 billion because of the extra oil and natural gas
burned to replace hydroelectricity. This has also caused an estimated 25 percent increase in the
emissions of carbon dioxide.
The respondents from the energy industry voiced few complaints about the loss of
hydropower. They tended to believe that during drought, water has more important uses than
the production of hydropower. Some simply acknowledged the current situation in which their
generating stations are operated according to an "environmental dispatch," instead of the
traditional "economic dispatch." The advantages of hydropower as an inexpensive and flexible
source of power are not sufficient to give it high priority during drought.

Impacts on Administrative Management
Almost all respondents from government agencies indicated that the drought has
significantly increased their workloads as well as the level of difficulty in discharging their
responsibilities. The SWRCB had to investigate an unusually high number of complaints. Also,
there were a large number of permit applications filed by water users with critical needs for
water who waited until the last moment to make requests. In other agencies, the respondents
had to attend meetings more frequently than normal, and some had to devote considerable
amounts of time to dealing with the media.

130

Impacts on Water Policy
One of the most significant impacts of the drought occurred in the state's political arena.
The declining reservoir storage, drawdown, groundwater overdrafting, and water conservation
execution allowed the state, regional, and local water agencies to delay hard choices in shaping
new water policy. In 1991, the situation became very difficult. As one respondent stated:
"Things got too bad and politicians stepped in. For politicians everything is very simple, [they]
do not understand the complexity of the system." Thus water management moved up to the
political agenda of Governor Pete Wilson. On February 1, 1991, the Governor signed Executive
Order No. W-3-91 which established the Drought Action Team. In two weeks, the team
recommended the creation of an emergency drought Water Bank. The 1991 Drought Water
Bank was viewed by many respondents as a very positive outcome of the drought. Some praised
the leadership of Governor Wilson, stating that before he stepped in, the state's drought policy
could be characterized as mostly "doing very little and praying for rain. "
A majority of respondents indicated that the Water Bank represented an important
milestone in formulating an effective water management policy in California. The bank allowed
water to move to high-value uses simply because of the raw power of market forces in allocating
scarce resources.

Relative Importance of Drought Impacts
The information on impacts and economic costs of the drought is of critical importance
to the formulation of adequate drought response plans. By comparing the various impacts,
policymakers should be able to adjust the allocation of dwindling water resources so that the
most severe impacts are minimized. The survey respondents were well aware of the implications
of quantified impacts on water policy. Those whose water supplies were curtailed gave a
detailed description of all impacts and attached a dollar value of losses wherever possible. At
the same time, they were careful not to minimize or discount hardships and economic losses
suffered by others.
In general, the respondents were fully cognizant of the difficulties in measuring drought
impacts as well as the dangers involved in comparing the economic losses suffered by various
economic sectors. They recognized the tendency of impact evaluation studies to be focused on
impacts that can easily be quantified in dollar terms while undercounting those impacts that
cannot be easily assessed in dollar terms. Many respondents agreed that the quantifiable
economic impacts have occurred but were not critical because there was enough water to get by.
Greater economic impacts would very likely occur if the drought continued or deepened.
Although the economic impacts were of more immediate concern to people, because they often
translate into lost jobs, there was almost a common opinion that the most severe effects of the
drought fell on the ecological resources of the state. Objections to this view were raised by
representatives of the agricultural sector. Some members of the agricultural community held the
opinion that the environmental damages were exaggerated by the resources management agencies
and the environmental community in order to take away water from agriculture.

131

Conclusions Concerning Drought Impacts

The results of the interviews lend support to two general conclusions pertaining to the
impacts of drought. These conclusions can be summarized as follows:
•

Measurement and valuation of drought impacts is very diffICult. Attributing
changes in economic performance and environmental resources to drought is not
a simple task. Attaching dollar values to these changes is even more difficult and
almost impossible in the case of impacts on the environment. Because of these
difficulties, there is a tendency to focus only on impacts that can be measured and
valued in monetary terms (e.g., loss of production of hydroelectricity). Many
other impacts with potentially higher economic losses are usually described in
qualitative terms only.

•

Anecdotal evidence and speculations about drought impacts influence drought
response decisions. During drought there is insufficient time to study the
impacts carefully and make accurate predictions of potential impacts. As a result,
qualitative statements about the impacts influence drought response decisions of
water agencies. The mass media play a large role in disseminating anecdotal
evidence about various impacts, often focusing on some impacts and overlooking
others.

COOPERATION AND COMMUNICATION

The survey participants were almost unanimous in their opinion that the drought brought
about a great improvement in cooperation among the agencies at various governmental levels as
well as across the functional agencies at the same level. Also, the controllers and influencers
of water management in the state were willing to communicate and compromise for the common
purpose of coping with the drought. The drought seemed to have brought at least a partial and
temporary peace among normally opposing interests. The following are some examples of good
faith, cooperation, and communication that developed in the water management arena during
drought.
The Memorandum of Understanding

As part of the ongoing proceedings on the allocation of water rights in the San Francisco
Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Estuary, the Department of Water Resources and the State
Water Conservation Coalition (a cooperative project of the Northern California-based Committee
for Water Policy Consensus and the Southern California Water Committee) brought interested
parties together to develop a consensus on reasonable long-term conservation measures and
achievable savings for urban areas. These measures became known as Urban Water
Conservation Best Management Practices (BMPs). On December 11, 1991, the parties signed
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a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that described the BMPs and set forth the obligations
of all signatories. The participating urban water agencies agreed to aggressively implement the
BMPs and monitor the success of implementation programs through an organization called
California Urban Water Conservation Council. In return, they received assurances from the
environmental community that they would accept the projected water-savings estimates of the
BMPs and support the need to develop more reliable urban water supplies in the state.
The drought provided an impetus for signing the MOU. Some respondents pointed to
the MOU as an example of good cooperation during drought. The significance of MOU,
however, goes beyond the Bay/Delta issues. For the first time, the urban and environmental
interests in California reached a consensus and influenced the balance of power among the
urban, agricultural, and environmental sectors. The existence of such an imbalance brought
agricultural sector to the negotiating table as well.

The Three-Way Process
Some respondents pointed out the Three-Way Process as an example of good cooperation
and communication during the drought. In December 1990, representatives of the agricultural,
urban, and environmental sectors began discussion on resolving the critical issues in the existing
water management system in California to advance their common interests.
An opinion expressed during the interviews was that before the Tbree-Way Process
began, some thought that anyone of the three interest groups (Le., agricultural, urban, and
environmental) had enough political power to block any solutions to California water problems
that were seen as mostly benefiting one or both of the other two sectors. This balance of power
("veto power") created a stalemate in water development for a period of more than 20 years.

The Three-Way Process aimed at achieving a consensus in which all three sides
recognized that each sector has legitimate water needs. They sought to develop a phased
approach to solving water problems that would be linked to simultaneous benefits for all sectors.
They also agreed that the state needs an integrated package of water supply solutions to meet the
most important needs of all three sectors. The Three-Way group was composed mainly of water
professionals and activists who had a good understanding of water issues and of the views and
positions of their constituencies. The Three-Way group saw itself as a resource whose
conclusions and consensus views would be offered to the policymakers and politicians for their
actions. However, at the end of the sixth year of drought, the expectations of success of the
Three-Way Process had been lowered significantly. Apparently the willingness of the
participating parties to compromise had diminished. Several participants of the workshops held
in December 1992 expressed some doubts about the possibility of reaching a consensus.

133

Other Examples of Cooperation
The spirit of cooperation is not new to Californians. During the drought crisis of 1977,
the communities in need could count on the help of not only their neighbors but also all other
entities in the state. Long-standing animosities were put aside in order to help. For example,
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California cooperated with the SWP and several other
agencies in order to get water to Marin County and other districts in Northern and Central
California. During the 1987-92 drought, water was provided to Santa Barbara using a sequence
of exchanges and arrangements to transfer water from the north. Many other exchanges between
neighboring districts also took place.
Another example was the public and private cooperation in implementing water
conservation programs. In Southern California, Metropolitan Water District discovered a new
marketing tool for the distribution of water conservation devices whereby the local fast food
chains and grocery stores volunteered to set up device pickup points and distribute conservation
kits to their patrons. This method of device distribution saved Metropolitan a lot of money
while allowing the participating businesses to demonstrate their concern for the community and
benefit by drawing more customers to their places of business.
There were many more examples of good cooperation and communication during the
drought. One or more examples were given during each interview. Members of the
environmental community indicated they had access and could talk to anybody in the state. State
agencies could get cooperation of other agencies without any delays. Individual urban water
users were more than willing to avert the crisis and readily responded to requests for
conservation.

Conclusions Concerning Cooperation and Communication
The observations pertaining to cooperation and communication during drought are not
new. Research on natural hazards has shown that disasters bring people together. Old
animosities are abandoned in order to unite against the external forces. Water planners have
known from previous experiences with droughts that during a drought they can accomplish more
because there is more "readiness to help."
The C-DWR Drought Information Center has provided the hub of communication
regarding the current drought since its establishment in 1988. The center is staffed by a team
of public information officers and drought specialists, and it serves as the Department's
clearinghouse for all inquiries regarding the drought's statewide impact. The personnel at the
Drought Information Center responds to numerous calls and correspondence on a daily basis
from news reporters, water agencies, lawmakers, and the general public.
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Three conclusions can be drawn from the experiences of the survey participants:
•

Plans for improvements in infrastructure and efficiency of water use are
easier to sell during drought. Because the public attention is focused on water
problems during drought, it is easier to communicate to the public the needs for
long-term water conservation or improvements in reliability of supply and gain
the public approval for proposed solutions.

•

Bureaucracies give high priority to cooperation during drought. For many
water institutions the drought is a real test of their performance. Officials and
administration make extra efforts to perform well and are willing to cut "red
tape" in order to speed up the administrative process wherever possible.

•

The C-DWR Drought Information Center has stimulated communication.
The Center has stimulated communication during the drought by arranging media
interviews with various Department experts, preparing news releases and reports,
assisting water agencies with financial and technical expertise, briefing local and
foreign dignitaries, and replying to letters suggesting solutions to water shortages
or requesting information on various topics.

ROLE OF THE MEDIA

The California drought of 1987-92 has been a continuing major news story. The
newsworthiness of the drought created an opportunity to focus public attention on California'S
water issues. A majority of the survey participants recognized the importance of the mass media
in influencing the drought management decisions. Many respondents criticized the media for
not being very helpful. We summarize the views on the role of the media from the perspectives
of the media, water controllers, and water influencers.
The Media Perspective

The media saw their role during the drought as informing the public on how supply
allocations were made and on the consequences of the allocations and related decisions. In the
media's view, people care about water when it does not come out of their tap or when it comes
under their front door, that is, only during the periods of drought or flood. Although the
primary objective was to cover the breaking news on drought, some media, especially the major
newspapers, tried to bring into the picture water supply issues from a broader statewide
perspective. Reporters asked, "Why are we in this crisis?" And the answer often required an
extended inquiry and a role of a watchdog. Reporters tend to dig up reports on lessons learned
and recommendations from previous droughts and find out whether the recommendations were
implemented. They also want to see where the rhetoric is not matching reality, and whether any
laws are broken. To them newsworthiness is present "when somebody is falling down on a
job." When actions are done well and everything works as expected, there is no news.

135

The media, in their inquiries, want answers to the questions of the general public.
During drought, what people want to know is, how much water is it prudent to use? Or how
much water is it prudent to save? The public also wants to make sure that water agencies are
not asking them for unnecessary sacrifices.

The Perspective of Water Controllers
Survey participants who represented water agencies generally gave the media good marks
for their performance during the drought. They recognized that the press is probably the most
important influence on public opinion. Various respondents gave one or more examples of
things that the media should do in order to help. Accordingly, the media should:
•

Inform the public about the trade-offs between various purposes of water use

•

Play a bigger role in educating the public on water issues

•

Pay more attention to the drought impacts on agriculture

•

Give more credit to state and federal agencies for their role in the drought

•

Expose the full spectrum of impacts and not focus exclusively on environmental
impacts

•

Maintain public responsibility and objectivity

Some water managers, however, were more critical of the media than other respondents.
Most of them had to learn, on the job, how to deal with the press. Some believed that the media
are completely "out of control" and all too often "make a mountain out of a molehill. "

The Perspective of Water Influencers
Environmental community and regulatory agencies had more favorable opinion of the
media's performance than water managers. One respondent believed that the great success of
urban water conservation was primarily a result of the media constantly harping on the drought
problem. The newsworthiness of drought resulted in an unusually large amount of print space
and air time devoted to the drought. The public had no reason to doubt that they are in a
drought crisis. Also, thanks to the mass media the public now has a better overall picture of
water management than before the drought. The newspapers have good and vigorous writers
of the water subject, even though they are not always complimentary of the operations and
decisions of water management institutions. The influencers tended to agree that the criticism
of the media by water managers is mostly unjustified because the media's primary role is to
report on events and not to manage water resources. In cases where there were problems, the
blame for poor communication has to be put on water agencies themselves.
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Conclusions Concerning the Mass Media
The results of the interviews point to the following conclusions about the role of the
media during drought:

•

The role of the media is not well understood by water managers. The media
are governed by their own rules of objective reporting, newsworthiness, and their
perceptions of what the public wants to know. They cannot be managed by water
agencies. If they were they would not be able to sell news. The questions like,
Are we in a drought? or Is the drought over? are not silly questions from the
media's point of view. Reporters understand the thinking modes and perceptions
of the general public much better than water professionals. For them, once the
water supply situation is called a drought, it automatically implies that behavior
has to be changed from normal behavior to crisis behavior. Such a change is
newsworthy.

•

Media cannot improve on imprecise and ambiguous messages. Media
reporters cannot improve on the clarity of the messages that they receive from
water managers. More likely the statements will become even more confusing
after they are reported in the press. Only unambiguous and complete answers to
questions that are asked by the press can be communicated clearly to the public.

•

Media cannot explain complex water management issues. What is very
interesting to water professionals is usually "too dry" for newspapers, radio, and
television. Long feature articles on water issues do not sell newspapers, but
timely, well-written articles during a drought emergency will be read by
concerned people.

RESPONSE OF THE PUBLIC

Survey respondents were unanimously in agreement that the public response to drought,
in terms of cutting back on their water use, was very good. There were some differences of
opinion with respect to the reasons for such a good response, as well as the problem of unfair
treatment of those who conserved water by raising rates to make up for the lost revenue.

Reasons behind Public Cooperation

Some respondents expressed the view that urban users of water are the only group with
significant potential for exercising water conservation. On a short notice they can change their
water use behavior (by watering their yards less, flushing toilets less frequently, not cleaning
their sidewalks with hoses) or use water-saving technology (such as toilet inserts, low-flow
showers, and other devices). Farmers, on the other hand, have very few options for an
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instantaneous adjustment in their water use. They use water for only one purpose, which is
watering crops. Water needs are determined by weather, type of crop, and the growth stage.
Once the seeds are in the soil, the only short-term option the farmers has is to let the crop die.
Only some farmers can turn to pumping groundwater or reduce the use of water for leaching out
salt buildup. Finally, environmental uses have no options at all. Water in the stream for fish
or dilution has no substitutes. Although this reasoning had some simple appeal, the opinion that
urban dwellers should save water simply because they can was not shared by all respondents.
The cooperative public response was partially summarized by one respondent as "people
do the right thing if they have to do it." Another respondent expanded upon this statement
indicating that people will conserve water if they are convinced that the drought is serious and
when they believe that their actions matter and that what they are asked to do is fair. The public
responded so well to the appeals for water conservation because these seemingly prerequisite
conditions were present. Media's constant attention to drought convinced people that the drought
was real. Mandatory rationing with enforcement further impressed the public about the
seriousness of the situation. Rationing plans were designed with a purpose of making the
required reductions in water use fair to all residents. Finally, information on changes (Le.,
reductions) in water use provided the necessary feedback to water users to convince them that
their efforts made a difference.
The survey respondents believed that water conservation efforts tended to be uniform
throughout the state. Because the majority of urban residents share the same ultimate water
supply sources, there is a reason for distant communities to share in the conservation effort.
People in Southern California saved significant amounts of water even though one of their
sources, the Colorado River water, was not affected by the drought. In some isolated areas with
ample local supplies people did not reduce water use because they did not have to. In other
areas reductions were more than was necessary.

Response to Fiscal Problems
The success of rationing programs often translated into fiscal problems for urban water
utilities. In most water agencies, almost 80 percent of water supply cost is fixed (overhead, debt
service, etc.). Reduced water use resulted in revenue shortfalls because water rates were usually
not adjusted before rationing programs were put in place. Those customers who conserved had
their water bills reduced. Approximately 80 percent of the combined reductions in water bills
resulted in a shortfall of the agency's revenue, because of the prevailing cost structure.
Agencies with substantial revenue shortfalls caused by reduced water use as well as
increased cost of operations during drought had to increase water rates. From the public's point
of view, this was unfair. It seemed their reward for good behavior in conserving water was
higher water rates. Rate hikes meet strong public objections during periods without drought,
and there is no reason to expect public support for rate increases during or shortly after a
drought. The press was not supportive either and, as in most rate hikes they were likely to
blame the mismanagement of water utilities for cost increases. The outcome of this dilemma
is undermined confidence of the public in their water agencies and possible reluctance to
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conserve water in the future. The survey respondents described several cases of fiscal problems.
Some blamed the media and the public for not understanding their cost structure and rate setting
procedures.

Public Support for Long-Tenn Solutions
Survey participants had some difficulty in interpreting the implications of the excellent
cooperation of the residents of California during the drought, with regards to public support for
alternative solutions to the California's water supply problems. Generally, two opposing views
were present during the interviews: an optimistic proconservation view and a pessimistic
conservation outlook.
The optimistic proconservation view interpreted the public response to demand reduction
programs as demonstrated readiness to conserve during future droughts. Those who shared this
view maintained that the drought demonstrated a significant potential for water conservation in
urban areas. People can and will save water during future droughts, and urban water suppliers
can build in firm drought contingency savings of 20 percent or more into their long-term water
supply plans. Furthermore, during the drought, people learned how to conserve water and
changed their old wasteful habits to permanently use less water.
The pessimistic conservation outlook employed a very cautious interpretation of the
public behavior during the drought. Those who shared this view maintained that if the urban
public assumed the behaviors that are appropriate for crisis conditions and helped water agencies
to get out of the crisis by making the necessary sacrifices, most water savings (except those
resulting from installation of ULV toilets and low-flow showerheads) will disappear once the
crisis is over. People are not likely to look forward to having to suffer the same hardships
during future droughts. They will find out why they got into the crisis in the first place. If
there is anything they can do to avoid a similar crisis in the future, they will pursue it. In other
words, people will support additional water development and other permanent solutions. Several
examples were given to support the pessimistic conservation outlook. First, some respondents
maintained that if Californians had to vote on Proposition 9 (the construction of the Peripheral
Canal in the Delta) in 1992 as opposed to the actual vote in 1982, the proposition would pass
by a wide margin. Other respondents used the example of actions taken by the city of Santa
Barbara. According to them, the hardships suffered by water users in Santa Barbara swayed the
public's vote to approve the extension of the State Water Project Coastal Branch and the
desalination plant. There was not enough time to look for least-cost solutions. Now Santa
Barbara has the most costly source of water in the state, although SWP supplies and desalination
were the least-cost feasible supply options for the South Coast. The cost of water from the
desalting plant is about $2,000 per acre-foot if the plant operates full-time, but higher if it
generates only during water shortage periods as is likely. The cost of water from SWP Coastal
Branch will be between $1,200 and $1,300 per acre foot. In comparison, before the drought
the city of San Diego used to be mentioned as paying the highest cost for water supply in the
state. That cost was about $600 per acre-foot. The higher cost of water supply and other
drought-related expenses more than doubled normal water rates in Santa Barbara.
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Conclusions Concerning Public Response

The current drought demonstrated that urban water users can cut back on water use, and
this confirms the experiences of the 1976-77 drought. Residential and commercial users in
urban areas are willing to curtail their normal water use during a crisis. They have a number
of options for achieving water conservation because water is used for many purposes, some of
which are less essential than others and can be stopped or reduced. The following conclusions
can be drawn from the results of the interviews:
•

People are willing to conserve if certain conditions exist. The fact that urban
dwellers gm conserve water does not automatically mean that they will. Urban
households and businesses took actions to conserve water because they believed
that (1) there was a severe drought, (2) their conservation efforts helped mitigate
the adverse consequences of the drought, (3) all members of their community
were asked to conserve and made sincere conservation efforts, (4) their personal
actions furthering group welfare rather than self-interest would have desirable
long-term consequences for their community, and (5) their efforts involved only
a reasonable level of personal cost and inconvenience.

•

Drought focused public attention on water supply. When there is no drought,
people tend to get involved in water management only when there is a rate
increase. During the drought they focused on other issues related to water supply
and were more willing to support solutions and investments in improvements of
water use efficiency and water supply reliability.
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VI. SURVEY RESULTS: WATER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

This chapter summarizes the results of the interviews that pertain to four major aspects
of water management during drought: (1) new developments and innovative approaches; (2)
critical legislation; (3) timing of drought response actions; and (4) performance of water
institutions.

NEW DEVEWPMENTS AND INNOVATIVE APPROACHES
The 1987-92 drought forced Californians to look for innovative solutions to both the
immediate and long-term water supply problems. A number of new developments and
innovative approaches surfaced during the interviews. Probably the most important development
of the drought was the creation of the Water Bank. Other important developments mentioned
by the respondents included: (1) the Three-Way Process negotiations; (2) signing of
Memorandum of Understanding; (3) rescheduling of annual deliveries by CVP; (4) purchase of
water for in-stream purposes by the Department of Fish and Game; and (5) new knowledge
about the needs of aquatic life. In addition, several innovative approaches were tried in the
following areas: (1) urban water conservation; (2) agricultural water conservation; (3)
ricelands/wetlands conjunctive water use project; (4) groundwater management; and (5)
unconventional supply alternatives (desalination and off-stream storage).
The Three-Way Process and Memorandum of Understanding were described in
Chapter V under the heading of Cooperation and Communication. The opinions of the survey
participants regarding the Water Bank, rescheduling of water deliveries, purchase of water for
in-stream purposes, and new knowledge about aquatic life are described below.

Views on the 1991 Drought Water Bank

Many respondents indicated that the creation of the Water Bank during the drought was
a new development with very important implications for future water policy in the state. The
success of the bank was so great that many institutions sought to take at least partial credit for
its conception. Actually, the bank was masterminded by no more than a dozen professionals
under the direction of the Director of C-DWR, David N. Kennedy, and Deputy Director Robert
G. Potter. The impetus for bringing the bank to existence on short notice was provided by the
Governor of California, Pete Wilson.
Water transfers and banking are not necessarily new ideas in California. Some exchanges
and banks existed before the drought, and there has been a lot of discussion about the need for
a statewide Water Bank. The 1991 bank can be considered a new development, because, as one
respondent put it, "they (C-DWR) actually did it." The creators of the bank had to cut through
considerable red tape to make it happen. The C-DWR submitted to the SWRCB an operations
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plan for the Water Bank that defined the legal boundaries of water transfers. The Board gave
a tentative approval to the plan so that if the proposed transfers were within the legal permissible
boundaries, then it was fairly easy to proceed with timely approval of the Water Bank transfers.
According to the SWRCB, the transfers were well thought out and executed to meet the critical
needs of the buyers and provide extra environmental benefits.
The praises for the Water Bank and interpretation of its implications for future water
management took several forms. One respondent stated that the success of the bank exploded
the old "farmers will never sell" myth. In reality, farmers were very willing to sell, and bank
purchases had to be halted after buying 850,000 acre-feet of water from willing sellers. Other
respondents expressed similar opinions, stating that the bank taught the California's water
community that water markets, however limited by geographies and constrained by laws and
regulations, can work. It demonstrated the "raw power of market forces." Although mostly
serving as a clearinghouse for water transfers, the bank was very quick to respond to the needs
of water supply agencies. Many respondents believed that the 1991 Water Bank should also be
reinstated in 1992.
A significant fraction of California's future water needs can be met by letting water move
from lower- to higher-value uses, especially during future droughts. This is the major
implication of the success of the bank for future water policy in the state. As long as there are
adequate facilities to store and move water throughout the state, urban water agencies as well
as agricultural districts can plan for future droughts while counting on the availability of water
for purchase from a future Water Bank. Because of this option there will be less pressure by
off-stream users to develop more water. Continued use of the Water Bank is very much
dependent on available groundwater in the transferring areas. Further, it is largely a conjunctive
use program (if the necessary recharge is achieved), otherwise it is a "mining" program.
Some respondents said that to establish a properly functioning Water Bank, it would be
necessary to make improvements in water storage and transmission facilities and to change the
existing water laws in order to protect water rights of willing sellers and better deal with the
issues of third-party effects. The first requirement is mainly related to the Delta problems. The
Delta is a focal point for California plumbing. Most water exports (and exchanges) either go
through or affect the conditions in the Delta. Improvements have to be made to move water
across the Delta in a way that satisfies water purveyors and environmental groups while
protecting resources in the Delta. Additional storage for making more efficient use of the
existing canals and aqueducts will also be needed. At the receiving end, water districts will have
to build interconnections to the major distribution systems of SWP, CVP, and other aqueducts.
With respect to the legal requirements, those who sell water have to be assured that they
will not lose their water rights. For example, Yuba County Water Agency, which had supported
transfers during the drought, was sued and challenged about its water rights during hearings by
the State Board. Note that efforts to ensure in-stream flow on the Yuba River preceded the
drought. The California Department of Fish and Game has not opposed Yuba County's sales,
but has recommended mitigation. The SWRCB has not threatened their rights. Also, in case
of riparian rights, "sales" of water by one riparian may affect the rights of others. Technically,
the riparians did not "sell" their water to the Water Bank. They were paid not to use it. The
SWP was able to pick it up in the Delta by "virtue" of its obligation to meet water quality
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standards by reservoir releases during controlled flow conditions. Some participants from the
agricultural sector expressed concerns about the effects of large-scale water transfers on the
state's agriculture. Also, they were concerned that water shortages to off-stream users may be
created by allocating more water for environmental purposes and forcing the SWP contractors
to pay for water purchased through the bank in order to replace cutbacks in normal deliveries.
To make it fair, water for the bank should be bought with public funds and released for
environmental uses, while protecting the existing contracts for water delivery. As it stands now,
SWP contractors have to pay the fixed cost (some 80 percent or normal cost for water delivered)
without receiving any contract water. They pay extra for water purchased from the Water Bank.
One additional economic effect of water transfers was that farmers actually made money
by selling water and forfeiting agricultural production. Some respondents indicated that this
procedure may have long-term impacts on the food production industry and the consumer:
potential unemployment and higher prices. The extent of these losses depends upon the
frequency and magnitude of water sales.
In summary, the Water Bank was seen by survey participants as the most important new

development of the drought. Many hoped that the bank would continue until the drought ends
and would be organized again during future droughts. The economic impacts must be studied
to determine future operating rules so that the bank can avoid or minimize undesired economic
repercussions.
Other New Developments

Under California water law, one cannot hold water rights for in-stream use. During the
drought, the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG) was given permission to engage
in purchasing water for wetlands and for supplementing river flows to protect fisheries. DFG
owns a considerable amount of land. Some land has pre-1914 water rights. The Department
also has rights to develop groundwater, engage in conjunctive use of water, and generate water
credits in storage. In 1992, DFG set a precedent by purchasing water rights for in-stream use
purposes. The (Bradley) Reclamation Drought Act of 1991 and the (Seymour) Drought
Response Bill address the mitigation of drought effects and financing drought relief activities.
More will be said about these bills in the next section on critical legislation.
Another new development was welcomed by agricultural water districts. The CVP
changed its water-contracting and delivery procedures to allow "rescheduling" of water deliveries
from one year to another. This new policy introduced the element of flexibility in deliveries and
allowed users to keep water in storage to prepare for future upcoming shortages.
Finally, some new developments have altered CVP procedure to safeguard salmon
numbers, In 1992, almost 300,000 acre-feet of irrigation water were stored behind Shasta Dam
to lower the upper-river water temperature after the winter run had spawned. Salmon need cool
water, not exceeding 56°F, to spawn. A 6°F increase to 62°F represents 100 percent mortality
of incubating salmon eggs.
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Innovative Approaches

The survey participants had some difficulty deciding which approaches were innovative
in coping with drought. Most methods, devices, and practices have been known and used during
past droughts. This drought has brought about increased use of these approaches. Below are
brief summaries of new techniques used in several areas.

Urban Water Conservation

Urban water suppliers set percent water use reduction goals for each year of drought.
For 1991, these goals ranged from 15 percent in East Bay MWD to 31 percent in the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. Note, however, that with reference to
MWD's delivery cuts (which had to match supplies), the local agencies had other supplies. The
real deficiency seems to have been 15 to 20 percent and was helped a great deal by a very mild
(cool) summer. For example, between June and August 1992, usage of surface water was 38
percent greater than the same time in 1991. Goals ranging from 10 to 25 percent were set for
1992. To achieve these goals water agencies implemented one or more water demand
management programs. These included mandatory metered rationing, steeply inclined
(increasing) commodity rates, distribution of water-saving devices, and enforcement by waterwaste patrols and citations or by meter disks and fines.
Although almost all conservation techniques have been used before, some innovative
implementation methods appeared during the drought. At the retail level, water purveyors used
direct payments to customers for installing retrofit ULV toilets that would not have been
installed otherwise. For distributing and installing retrofit kits (Le., showerheads and toilet
inserts), water agencies usually had to spend large sums of money to hire contractors to conduct
home visits and deliver the devices. An innovative approach used during the drought succeeded
in Southern California, where kits were distributed free by grocery and fast food chains.
At the regional level, joint multiagency advertising campaigns took advantage of the
"news shed" phenomenon. These campaigns were designed to advise water users about
conservation and covered a large region rather than merely local entities. The campaigns
resulted in cost savings to individual agencies and resolved water users' confusion as to the
applicability of conservation requests to their service area.
Some innovative implementation methods were used by wholesale water agencies to
encourage demand reduction by retail agencies. For example, Metropolitan Water District
devised the Incremental Interruption and Conservation Plan consisting of stages of severity
reaching 90 percent of "nonfirm deliveries" and 30 percent of "fmn deliveries." The program
had incentives and penalties linked to the level of compliance. Agencies using less than their
target quantity received an incentive payment of $99 per acre-foot of extra conservation. Any
agency that did not meet its target quantity had to pay a penalty charge of $394 per acre-foot
of the excess use.
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Agricultural Water Conservation

Survey participants representing agricultural water districts gave many examples of water
conservation efforts taken both by water districts and by individual farmers. They stated that
because of drought there is more drip irrigation, more sprinkler irrigation, and more laser
leveling of fields than there used to be.
Some participants interviewed in the agricultural sector referred to irrigation efficiency
techniques and other quantitative scientific methods used in agriculture to promote water
conservation. One agricultural District (Westlands Water District) indicated that it had practiced
the Water Conservation and Drainage Reduction Program during the first two years of the
current drought. This program provided funding to advise farmers on how to improve on-farm
irrigation efficiency. To attain irrigation efficiency, the farmers were advised to improve their
existing irrigation systems and their irrigation practices (Robb and Slavin 1990).
One group of participants commented that agriculture has to communicate to the public
and policymakers the methods of water utilization on the farm. As a result of poor
communication regarding agricultural water use methods, the following criticism has been
levelled at agriculture:
•

Farmers put water on the wrong crops.

•

Agriculturalists are not good stewards of the resource.

•

Farmers do not practice good irrigation techniques.

•

Farmers could easily conserve and transfer 10 percent of their normal supplies
(the "10 percent solution").

The drought had created a greater awareness among the farming community of the need
to educate the public and policymakers about water-saving techniques used on the farm.
Ricelands/Wetiands Conjunctive Use Project

Survey respondents representing the environmental community as well as other sectors
often referred to the declining water levels in California's wetlands, particularly in the Central
Valley. The impacts of reduced deliveries of developed water to agriculture revealed that in
many areas, environmental resources are critically dependent on water deliveries to the state's
irrigated agriculture. Many wetlands in the Central Valley are maintained by return flows from
irrigation. These wetlands received very little water as farmers reduced water application rates
and irrigated acreage. The drought also highlighted to resource managers, the fact that the
flooded rice paddies in the Sacramento Valley provide a critical support to waterfowl. The
Central Valley provides winter habitat for 20 percent of all ducks counted in the United States
and 50 percent of all mid-winter water fowl in the Pacific Flyway (California Rice Industry
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Association [CRIAl 1992). Because almost 90 percent of the valley's original wetlands have
been lost, only 60,000 acres of protected wetlands support waterfowl. Additional habitat is
provided by some 600,000 acres of rice paddies that in 1991 were reduced to 300,000 acres due
to low water supplies. Therefore, the reduced rice production had an adverse effect on wildlife
habitat.
The new knowledge about the interdependence between rice production and waterfowl
habitat led the Nature Conservancy of California (established by CRIA) to the development of
a "ricelandslwetlands conjunctive use project." The project would:
•

Create upward of 100,000 acres of winter wetland habitat by flooding rice
paddies in winter

•

Provide nearly 300,000 acre-feet of off-stream storage capacity

•

Provide for aquatic biodegradation of rice stubble (rather than burning stubble
which creates air pollution problems

•

Sustain the communities and economies that have become dependent on rice
production

The proposed conjunctive use concept plans to set aside eventually possibly hundreds of
thousands of acres of winter-fallow rice grounds for managed wetlands and off-stream storage
purposes (CRIA 1992). The flooded acreage (up to a depth of six to eighteen inches) would
begin in October or early November. The project would provide abundant high quality wetland
food and habitat for migratory species of ducks and geese and also nongame wetland birds.
When waterfowl populations begin to migrate back north by mid-February, the project would
have the option of raising water levels from two to five feet on some lands for the additional
purpose of off-stream storage. The SWP, CVP, and local water districts may be interested in
utilizing this storage facility. Carry-over capacity of existing reservoirs can also be increased
by using off-stream storage. If significant off-stream capacity is made available by the project,
big mainstream reservoirs such as Shasta and Oroville could be relieved of some of their flood
control responsibilities. In other words, the project would provide an alternative means of
storing flood water which may allow for greater carry-over capacity in Shasta Dam. This would
also keep Shasta water colder for a longer period of time because the water depth would be
greater. Additionally, greater capacity and lower temperatures at Shasta would benefit spawning
and out-migrating salmon. The ricelands/wet1ands conjunctive use project represents an
innovative strategy in water resource management in California, triggered by the 1987-92
drought.

Wastewater Reclamation and Groundwater Recharge
The drought has brought increased attention to wastewater reclamation. In Southern
California there were 43 existing and/or under construction reclamation projects as of 1988.
These projects will deliver about 200,000 acre-feet/year of reclaimed water to more than 100
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sites. Some respondents have indicated that water reclamation is increasing, because the drought
created more demand for reclaimed water. A major reclamation project is being considered for
the wastewater produced in the San Francisco Bay area and its recharge into the overdrafted
aquifer in the San Jose area.

Unconventional Supply Alternatives

Desalination is the extraction of potable water from seawater or brackish groundwater.
Desalination of seawater became a more viable alternative during the drought. The city of Santa
Barbara has completed the first half of a 7.5 mgd reverse osmosis (RO) plant. The city of Moro
Bay completed the construction of a 300,000 gpd plant in 1991. Several cities and water
districts actively pursue desalination projects. Because the cost of desalinated seawater is very
high (up to $2,500 per acre-foot for base supply operation), in most cases this water cannot be
used as a base urban water supply or agricultural supply. The desalination plants are likely to
be used as insurance against water shortages and operated intermittently. Costs for brackish
groundwater desalination are dependent on the capacity of the extraction system as well as the
feedwater quality (range of total dissolved solids [TDS] level in saline brackish groundwater).
Systems can be designed for individual wells or combined flows from several wells. Generally,
desalination of brackish groundwater is a very reliable source of water supply unless the
feedwater contains specific constituents causing problems in the desalination process. There was
also an increase in weather modification projects operating in the state. Finally, unconventional
water development, such as off-stream storage, received support from the environmental
community.
Overall, the survey participants seemed to pay very little attention to unconventional
supply alternatives. A better management of the existing supply and water allocation issues
seemed by far more important to them than technological innovations.

Conclusions Concerning New Developments

The drought forced water agencies and water professionals to seek creative solutions to
water shortage problems. However, very few radical solutions were implemented. Instead,
there was a greater diffusion of known technologies, and only solutions that were judged to have
a fair chance of succeeding have been implemented. The Water Bank is a good example of the
latter. Water transfers had been tried before, and there was a very good chance that the bank
would work. Untried solutions, such as bringing water by tankers to Santa Barbara, were less
likely to be implemented. Therefore, the conclusions pertaining to new developments and
innovative approaches can be summarized as follows:
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•

Known and tried solutions prevailed over innovative but untested approaches.
Development of technological innovations takes time, and more innovations are
likely to be developed in the wake of the California drought. However, known
and tried technologies and solutions were likely to be implemented by more water
users and agencies during drought.

•

New approaches to water management were more important than
technological innovations. The Water Bank and water transfers were at the
forefront of new developments during the drought. New knowledge about
physical systems and environmental response was gained because of the transfers.
Also, new knowledge about the linkages between some agricultural water uses
(e.g., rice production) and environmental resources revealed opportunities for
improved management of environmental resources.

CRITICAL LEGISLATION
The present drought in California revealed various inadequacies of the existing legal
system and stimulated more activity in the legal process. During the interviews, participants
voiced their opinions on existing legislation, invariably expressing the critical need for legislation
to open up the water management process in the state. Critical legislation pertaining to water
management had been introduced during the drought at federal and state levels of government.
The environmental sector influenced additional legislative action. The drought also brought
issues such as water reclamation and groundwater management into focus.

Federal Legislation

Many interviewed water professionals indicated a need for flexibility in the water
management process. The infamous Warren Act was referred to by many interviewees when
they commented on the restrictive nature of certain federal legislation. As a result of the Warren
Act, the Bureau of Reclamation could not transfer nonproject water through their facilities. In
a time when the Water Bank had made its mark in meeting the water needs of the state, it
seemed ironic that the Warren Act was still in existence. One respondent described it as a
"shameful hypocrisy." The restrictions of the Warren Act were clearly demonstrated by its
effect on the San Francisco Water Department (SFWD). A respondent indicated that almost all
the water bought from the Water Bank gets stored in the San Luis Reservoir, and conditions in
the Delta determine the releases from the San Luis Reservoir. The Santa Clara Water District
could take its state project water through the federal aqueduct directly from San Luis. Then the
South Bay would have extra capacity, and water coming in from the Delta could be diverted to
San Francisco, thus facilitating the exchange. At the time of the interview, there were
restrictions on making these transfers viable. Recently the Warren Act has been repealed
bringing operational compatibility to the SWP and CVP.
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The drought also spurred some flexibility in the USBR policy concerning CVP deliveries
to water districts. At the beginning of the drought, the "use it or lose it" policy prevailed.
According to this old policy, the district had to use the water within 12 months. Participants
from one agricultural district stated that the USBR has allowed rescheduling of water since 1989.
This policy allows the district to use water that was stored from the previous year. During times
of drought this "extra" water becomes most useful especially during times of excessive shortage.

Most respondents referred to the Miller, Seymour (S. 711) and Bradley (S. 586) bills as
critical legislation. These bills were initiated because of the present drought and had been
referred to the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The Seymour Bill would
provide the Secretary of the Interior with authorization to respond to the drought. For example,
the Secretary would be able to make loans to water users for drought response activities--to
study measures for water conservation, augmentation and efficient use and to prepare cooperative
drought contingency plans. Additionally, this bill would authorize the Secretary of the Interior
to establish a $10 million "Reclamation Drought Response Fund" to finance drought relief
activities authorized by the act. With regard to the (Bradley) Reclamation Drought Act of 1991,
the USBR, after consulting with governors of affected states, would be authorized:
•

To alleviate temporary drought conditions through management and conservation
activities

•

To provide assistance to willing buyers and sellers of water

•

To prepare drought contingency plans for federal reclamation projects

•

To contract for storage and conveyance of project and nonproject water

There was much negotiation and consolidation of these parallel pieces of legislation,
which were eventually incorporated into the Miller-Bradley Bill. This bill, previously referred
to as H.R. 429, contains 40 separate titles providing for water resource projects throughout the
West. It is known as the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (Title 34 of Public Law 102575) and was signed by the President on October 30, 1992. This bill protects, restores, and
enhances fish, wildlife, and associated habitats in the Central Valley and Trinity River basins
of California. The provisions of this bill are summarized in Appendix A (p. A-8).

State Legislation

The drought provided a stimulus for a number of state legislative proposals dealing with
water management. One respondent stated that during the sixth year of the drought, there were
about 60 or more proposed state laws that were "out of control." More specifically, by the fifth
year (December 1, 1991), there were 19 state bills introduced dealing with drought. These bills
focused on issues such as drought contingency plans, drought management activities affecting
the environment, water appropriation, development projects, safe drinking water, and drought
relief and assistance.
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Assembly Bill llx (AB llx) was a most significant piece of drought legislation
introduced in the California State Legislature on March 21, 1991. It required all urban agencies
in California (serving more than 3,000 customers or 3,000 acre-feet) to submit drought
contingency plans to C-DWR by January 31, 1992. Some respondents stated that AB llx should
have been implemented earlier, by the second year of the drought and not during the sixth year.
Drought contingency planning should be introduced at all levels in California and should
become a part of the state and federal system. Some respondents perceived that AB 797 (Urban
Water Management Planning Act of 1983) and AB llx had increased the ability for public
participation. They stated that agricultural communities have to do this too, since some water
agencies in rural areas were unprepared to cope with the drought. However, in 1986, the
legislature passed the Agricultural Water Management Planning Act. It requires "every
agricultural water retailer supplying more than 50,000 acre-feet of water, if not covered by water
conservation requirements of state and federal agencies, to report to C-DWR by December 31,
1989, how its water is managed" (C-DWR 1987).
The most critical form of state legislation involved water transfers and marketing that
helped facilitate the operation of the Water Bank. Although there were differing points of view
regarding "emergency legislation," most respondents agreed that new legislation and cooperation
were essential ingredients to facilitate water transfers and marketing. Although none of the
Water Bank transfers were disapproved, the drought revealed that there are too many
institutional barriers to water transfers. Others stated that the normal process of water transfers
is hindered by the impact of bureaucracy, which has too many agencies administratively involved
in anyone transfer and this makes the transfer process difficult. Most respondents complained
about the amount of "red tape" involved in transfers. Various pieces of legislation were
referenced by interviewees pertaining to water transfers: Katz Bill, Seymour Bill, Johnston Bill,
and the Bradley Bill. Some respondents stated that the Katz Bill was good for the sale and
transfer of water, and in terms of economics future legislative action should pass this bill.
Others commented that the Katz Bill authorized the transfer of riparian water rights, and that it
was progressive, since it allowed an individual to transfer water.
One respondent believed that the normal process of water transfers will not work and
added that the Water Bank worked by going around the system. It was stated that the ability to
transfer water was limited by the Delta, since there are restraints placed by the California
Environmental Protection Act. Reference was made to the Yuba County Water Agency, which
had supported transfers during the drought, and was sued and challenged about its water rights
at State Board hearings. This county was not going to sell anymore water in the future. One
respondent stated that there is a 60 percent tax on the transfer per acre-foot of water delivered
from Northern to Southern California. This 60 percent was made up of 30 percent of carriage
water loss in the Delta and 30 percent extortion loss to operate the river in local basins.
Therefore, water marketing is not a solution for the future. Further comments indicated that this
process ignores water infrastructure and third-party problems, exposes the seller to great risks,
makes it expensive for the buyer, and is not a realistic policy. It was added that if water
marketing was going to work, many institutional barriers would have to be removed. However,
it was pointed out that these barriers were necessary to protect interests, to protect water rights,
to protect third parties, and to protect competitors.
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A number of respondents referred to the question of water rights and stated that if the
Water Bank was going to continue, then someone had to have more control over it. Other
respondents referred to the disputes that occurred during the drought over water rights issues and
control of water. For example, certain agricultural users contested the rights that the district has
over the water apportioned to farmers.

Environmental Legislation
The drought highlighted the fact that California needs a more equitable system for
recognizing beneficial uses of water. In the view of the environmental community, while
protracted debates over water transfers took place during the period, no environmental legislation
(or other executive or administrative action for environmental protection) was implemented in
California in response to the drought. Indeed, this is a very significant lesson of the
drought-the impacts of the drought have fallen most heavily on the environment. These
impacts are largely a function of water management policies and actions before and during the
drought as opposed to the drought itself. The dramatic declines in water-dependent ecosystems
and species during the drought graphically demonstrate the need for fundamental policy and
management reforms to improve both equity and efficiency among all water use sectors,
including the environment.
The perceptions and insights shared by environmental groups interviewed, regarding the
need for critical environmental legislation, are summarized in the discussion that follows. They
stressed that the environment does not have a fallback position, and that baseline standards were
inadequate to mitigate environmental impacts. The environmental sector was always low in
allocation priorities, and the environmentalists wanted equity and fairness. Some participants
stated that the drought proved to be a refreshing change, because the bureaucratic top-down
approach for sharing water among in-stream and off-stream users was being reexamined.
Water law should allow in-stream water rights that are not present now. One can work
within the existing system of laws, but they are not sufficient, because the laws were developed
as the western frontier developed for the use of water out of the river. In-stream water uses (in
the river) were never part of this development, and this bias cannot be justified. It would help
to develop the proposed water fund to purchase water for the environment and also help to have
water rights associated with it. Furthermore, there is a need for new water laws. Changes in
existing laws were critical because there is a need to fix the institutions in the long term.
Otherwise, the benefits of improvement in the water management system, structural and
nonstructural , may not be realized. The Department of Fish and Game was most enthusiastic
about the legislation that would recognize in-stream water rights, thus allowing the department
to become a participant in water allocation and management of water for fish and wildlife. One
of the stated keynotes for the 199Os, in addition to goodwill and professionalism, was supportive
legislation to enhance environmental quality. As mentioned, important pending legislation
related to fish and wildlife during the drought included the Seymour Bill, the Bradley Bill, the
Miller Bill, and the Dooley Bill. These were consolidated into the Central Valley Project
Improvement Act.
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The Endangered Species Act (ESA) evoked varying points of view among respondents
interviewed. Some stated that the ESA was instituted to protect the endangered aquatic and
other species. On the other hand, most respondents echoed frustration when referring to the
ESA. Some perceived the ESA as the "most significant problem that the state faces, It one that
has to be modified. The act approaches the problem species by species. It needs to look at the
environment as a whole. Some participants believed that the ESA will magnify and extend the
current drought. Through the ESA, some agriculturalists stated that not only were fisheries
equated to farmers, but agriculturalists were told how to control their operations, whether or not
it benefits the fish. They felt that certain amendments and changes were needed in the ESA to
allow for better management for water supplies. Some questioned why fishing was being
permitted off the coast and in the Sacramento River when the numbers of fish were so greatly
diminished. It was also mentioned that environmental acts such as ESA, the Wild and Scenic
Act, and forestry acts inhibit water development in mountain areas where the good water is.
This water needed to be utilized in order to build up reliable supplies.

Groundwater Management

The drought had increased groundwater pumpage in the state, and it was generally
perceived that groundwater had to be managed carefully. Some respondents indicated that within
the CVP service area, groundwater overdrafts of 1.5 MAF took place during the fifth year of
the drought. They stated that it was difficult to control water use in the San Joaquin Valley,
since the situation differs from one region to another. Some have surface supply, others have
groundwater supply, and effects fall unevenly on various areas. The respondents said that state
legislation has been proposed to construct a plan that affects only critically overdrafted areas.
Another group stated that there was a need for the large groundwater basins in the San Joaquin
Valley to have mandatory groundwater management plans, with water use being monitored. The
group indicated that only political action could avoid lengthy adjudication. Respondents
generally perceived that statewide groundwater management was not a viable solution. At that
time, water rights holders were permitted to pump water out of the basin for beneficial use.
However, groundwater mining and degradation of groundwater quality could not continue
indefinitely. One group indicated that the Katz Bill and Bill 486 had put restrictions on waste
disposal. The legislation process would have to consider a groundwater protection policy that
will include such programs as groundwater mapping, groundwater recharge, and conjunctive use.

Other Legislative Issues

The interviews also identified legislation addressing other issues. Many respondents
stated that water reclamation projects were increasing in California. The legislative process had
introduced AB 15x (Kelley) reclamation projects appropriating emergency state financial
assistance of $10 million from the General Fund to the SWRCB. These loans and grants were
to assist local water suppliers for water reclamation projects that could be completed and provide
reclaimed water by June 30, 1992. Besides reclamation, respondents also mentioned other
legislation related to various plumbing codes (e.g., BMPs) and water quality.
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Conclusions Concerning Critical Legislation
•

Drought provided a test of the adequacy of existing laws and regulations.
The drought has demonstrated how the existing laws and regulations really work.
Inadequacies were revealed, especially those pertaining to the legality of certain
drought response actions. The drought precipitated the resolution of longstanding
efforts to pass environmental legislation.

•

Drought brought a danger for passing bad laws. Although drought emergency
legislation was critical to the ability of water agencies and individuals to cope
with water shortages, some permanent laws can be passed without sufficient
public debate. Hearings on new laws also can be very contentious and can
polarize major sectors of users, thus adversely affecting their cooperation in
dealing with the crisis at hand.

TIMING OF DROUGHT RESPONSE ACTIONS
The success of coping with drought is critically dependent on the timing of drought
response actions. Water controllers do not want to make unwarranted changes in normal
operations of water supplies. At the same time, they may take some risks and postpone the
declaration of shortages and thus the hardships of water rationing as far into the future as
possible.
The survey participants were asked their opinions about the timing of actions taken in
response to the drought. The participants' views indicate that the timing of response actions of
the majority of water agencies throughout the state is geared to the declarations and
announcements made by the Department of Water Resources and the Central Valley Project.
The first important decision involves the answer to the question, Are we in a drought? The
answer is important to the public because they will eventually carry the burden and costs of
dealing with water shortages.
During the second year of drought, Director Kennedy of C-DWR stated that if there are
two consecutive critically dry years in the Sacramento River basin (as measured by Sacramento
River Index), then one may call the situation a drought. Both 1987 and 1988 water years were
critical, and the drought became official. This criterion for declaring drought suggests that SWP
is confident about its ability to withstand two consecutive critically dry years. This drought
indicator is derived from the experience of the 1976-77 drought, which represented two
consecutive critically dry water years.
Calling a given weather anomaly a drought is not as difficult as determining whether the
drought is over. The response actions must rely more on the expectation about the continuation
of the drought during the next water year (as well as subsequent years) than on the water in
storage and the severity of drought during previous years. In hindsight, the Director's prediction
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was accurate in the sense that the two dry years signaled a sustained multiyear drought in the
state.
Once a drought is recognized, the response actions are tied to the February 15 report on
water supply outlook. Around the first of February SWP and CVP take first snow surveys and
prepare estimates of water supply in the coming year. The estimate of water supply is the
trigger for deciding whether any reductions in water delivery will be made. Actually, it takes
more than one estimate to make final decisions. Again, what is known is the amount of water
at hand. Expectations about precipitation in the following year must be taken into account as
well. However, once the announcement about reductions in water deliveries is made, it triggers
actions for all affected districts and greatly influences the decisions of suppliers outside the SWP
and CVP systems.
The survey participants devoted significant amount of time to criticizing or supporting
the timing of the actions made by the major water agencies. In the following sections we
summarize the views on timing under the headings "too late," "too soon," and "right timing."
Criticism of Actions Being Too Late
Environmental groups criticized the actions of C-DWR to curtail deliveries as being too
late. They maintained that while ecological resources began suffering during the first year of
drought, SWP made full deliveries during the first three years of drought. The major cuts in
water deliveries came too late. The SWP elected taking a higher risk decision to lower the
reservoirs to take out water for urban and agriCUltural users. By doing so, it exacerbated the
environmental impacts of the drought. By the fifth year, there was not much water left for
agricultural and urban users and not enough to protect aquatic resources.
Another type of complaint about the actions of SWP and CVP being too late was voiced
by agricultural users. Farmers need to know well in advance how much water they will have
next year. A large number of farmers are "farm operators" who lease land to grow crops.
They have to make leasing arrangements and secure bank loans for seed, fertilizer, water and
other costs no later than in December of the previous calendar year. Announcements about
water availability made in March are too late for them. Also, increases beyond planned
deliveries made in May only increase their frustration, because they may not have more use for
that water.
Very few participants representing urban water suppliers criticized SWP for delays in
instituting cutbacks in deliveries. The late arrival of the Water Bank was more likely the subject
of their criticism.
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Criticism of Response Actions Being Too Soon

No criticisms of drought response actions taken too soon were brought up during the
interviews. The timing of the actions taken clearly indicates that the California water controllers
did not plan for a dry water year in 1989 to follow the previous two critically dry years.
Remember, however, that C-DWR did anticipate the possibility since the Drought Center opened
in 1988. Also, reports and public meetings were held in the fall of 1989 to examine the status
of supplies and develop plans for handling drought needs.

Support for Right Timing

In terms of the right timing of response actions, urban agencies clearly won. Both
controllers and influencers praised urban water districts for their timely response to drought.
The majority of urban areas called for voluntary conservation or introduced rationing programs
as early as the spring of 1988. Most of the districts maintained restrictions throughout the entire
period of drought, adjusting their conservation targets to fit the conditions in local and external
supply sources. It seems that urban agencies worried very little about prematurely calling the
situation a drought. They knew they had to declare drought in order to get the cooperation of
their customers, and they also seemed to remember well the lessons of the 1976-77 drought.

While there was universal support for the timing of urban response actions, the SWP
decisions were supported only by participants from the state agencies (both controllers and
influencers). In their opinion C-DWR Director Kennedy "did what he had to do and when he
had to do it." He should be commended for being able to maintain full deliveries during the
first three years of the drought and using the Water Bank to make up for deficits during the
latter years. Some participants resented the interference in C-DWR decisions by the politicians.

Monitoring of Drought Conditions

Many survey participants praised C-DWR for their monitoring and timely dissemination
of information on drought conditions. Publication of bimonthly reports on the status of water
supply conditions and forecast updates was seen as very useful. Local water districts could
supplement this information with data on their local conditions and make informed decisions
about the need for action.

Conclusions Regarding Timing of Response Actions

Several conclusions can be drawn from the discussions on the timing of drought response
actions. These can be summarized as follows:
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•

Early actions were justified. The 1987-92 drought demonstrated that droughts
in California are truly unpredictable. In hindsight, taking earlier actions would
have been warranted during both California droughts. The lesson of the 1976-77
drought was not lost on urban water providers. They made no bets on the
drought to be over soon.

•

Timing of cutbacks in water exports affected user sectors differently. No
timing of cutbacks would satisfy all users of the CVP and SWP water at the same
time. Early cutbacks to agriculture translate to certain economic impacts. Late
cutbacks increase the risks to urban areas and preempt future options for
protecting against environmental damages. Farmers want maximum delivery
during a given drought year, and some are willing to receive no supplies next
year. Urban areas would like to leave more water in storage to prevent deep
cutbacks in deliveries at later, more critical, stages of drought.

•

Timely information on water supply conditions was invaluable to aU. Timely
publication of the California Cooperative Snow Surveys Bulletin 120-91 was one
of the best investments among all drought-coping measures. It allowed water
districts to use their own discretion in making the timely and necessary
adjustments.

PERFORMANCE OF WATER INSTITUTIONS
The institutions who control and influence water management in California are the main
component of the state's water management system. During the interviews, opinions were
collected from the respondents on the performance of federal, state, regional, and local
institutions--both those who control water supplies and those who influence the decisions of
controllers. Again, the aim was to identify lessons of the drought regarding the institutions.
Below are summaries of the views of survey participants directed at specific organizations.

California Department of Water Resources
C-DWR criticisms came primarily from the environmental community. The criticisms
pertaining to the delayed cutbacks in water deliveries were described in the previous section.
Additional critical comments pertaining to the C-DWR decision making process came from the
media and the SWP contractors.

Decision-Making Process

C-DWR (together with other mammoth agencies like CVP) was accused of "playing God"
in deciding on who will suffer and how much. The Department was perceived to have a lot of
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autonomy because it does not have to consult with the public in making important decisions.
Such decisions are made behind closed doors, and only a filtered version of the debate and
ultimate decisions are given to the public. One respondent wondered how it could be that if an
individual wants to put a grocery store in a lot, his/her permit application is subject to public
debate, but when decisions of the superagencies are affecting most of the state population, they
are made behind closed doors. By the fifth year of drought, the public was beginning to
understand the role and the power of the superagencies.
State Water Project contractors also criticized C-DWR for excluding them from the
debate about the allocation of deficiencies and many other decisions that affected them. They
would like to have some say in establishing charges for water reallocated for environmental
purposes and other decisions.

Organizational Structure
Another criticism of C-DWR pertained to its mission as the steward of the state's water
resources. Environmental community criticized C-DWR for having confusing and contradictory
roles. They maintained that the State Water Project overwhelmed the functions of C-DWR,
pulling more staff and fmancial resources to SWP operations at the expense of taking care of all
water resources in California. It is difficult to understand how good stewards of the state's
water resources can have their loyalties with the SWP contractors and be astute water
developers. The SWP operations take care of the contractors first, and the function of C-DWR
in the area of managing water resources for all purposes (including protection of in-stream uses)
is lost.
Several participants suggested that SWP should be managed separately. At least the CDWR should be divided into two subagencies (or two parts): one would be a water supply
agency overlooking operations of the State Water Project, the other would be a state water
resources agency planning and managing water resources allover California. Some suggested
that SWP should be separated from the state government altogether and transformed into a quasigovernmental agency (or a corporation) to clarify its water policy and achieve more efficient
management of the SWP water. If SWP were an independent agency, the state budget problems
would not affect water delivery. Also, the state's lengthy procurement process would go away,
and the necessary work could be done much faster.

C-DWR Perspective
Participants representing C-DWR tended to have a balanced view of their performance
during drought. Some conveyed an impression that their hands were tied, and some decisions
were taken away by politicians. Others felt that given that their long-term plans have not been
fully implemented (Le., the SWP facilities are not completed), they had to perform miracles to
keep the state economy afloat during the drought. The C-DWR provided a liaison or a vital link
in the water management hierarchy and among controllers and influencers of water in California.
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The C-DWR could only perform this task by adopting an objective and independent stance in
handling water shortages. The C-DWR was the controlling factor in the successful operation
of the Water Bank, although the process of water transfer had to go through the SWRCB.

Conclusions Regarding the Performance of C-DWR
Given the complexity of the decision-making process faced by C-DWR, it is difficult to
sort out any management errors. Many of the criticisms described above could be expected and
in all likelihood must have been expected by the Department. Yet the drought experience clearly
offers some suggestions for improvement:

•

A clearly defined mission during the drought would have been very helpful
for C-DWR. The Department cannot resolve all water conflicts in California.
During a drought C-DWR has to make more controversial decisions and must be
prepared for criticism. Californians, and especially the state's environmental
community, expect the C-DWR to be much more than a body representing the
interest of SWP contractors.

•

C-DWR expertise proved invaluable. Judging from the quality of C-DWR
publications and the high professional quality of its staff, there is not a single
other organization in the country that would have more expertise in hydrology,
planning, water conservation, engineering, and other areas of water resource
management than C-DWR. However, the role of the Department in assisting
water districts and other governmental bodies in coping with the drought was not
appreciated. Some changes are needed to rectify and clarify the situation.

•

More control, more means, and more openness would strengthen C-DWR
performance. More control over the state's water resources, and adequate
facilities to meet the state's water needs seem to be prerequisites for improving
the C-DWR to do more. However, some controversial decisions can be defused
by opening them to a public debate and obtaining a clear mandate to meet the
state's water management objectives.

Bureau of Reclamation and CVP
The criticism of superagency behavior was also meant to apply to the Bureau of
Reclamation and its operation of the Central Valley Project. The CVP controls more than twice
as much storage as SWP and can deliver three times as much water. In addition, the Bureau
controls the deliveries of the California's basic apportionment of 4.4 MAF of Colorado River
supplies plus any surplus water. In fact, the presence of federal control in California's water
management by far surpasses the role of SWP, MWD/SC, and other large agencies. Several
issues related to CVP surfaced during the interviews. They are summarized below.
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Takeover of CVP by the State
Many respondents thought that the California water management system cannot be
optimized to balance all important water needs in the state, because there is not a single agency
controlling all developed water. Some even suggested that the Governor should appoint a water
czar to coordinate all water operations. There were also proposals that the C-DWR assume
operational control of the CVP, thus moving the CVP from federal to state control.
The agricultural users of CVP water did not object to the contemplated takeover. They
would support it as long as they would have a say in how the project would be operated and
maintained. One respondent feared that CVP could become a state environmental project. The
CVP is the most complex project among all the Bureau of Reclamation Projects in the nation,
and its transfer would have to be thought out very well. The existing uses, including
environmental and recreational benefits, would have to be preserved.
At the time of the interviews, the Bureau of Reclamation and the State Resources Agency
were working diligently on the feasibility of the takeover. The CVP takeover was a key point
in the Governor's April 6 water plan. During the time of the interviews, participants indicated
that negotiations were actively proceeding in designing an MOU by the end of the calendar year.
Representatives of the CVP water contractors believed that in the final analysis the C-DWR and
the Bureau will spend a lot of time and money only to find out that there is not much to be
gained in the long run by the takeover. One respondent remembered that during the past 40
years, this is either the third or fourth attempt by the state to take over the CVP, so chances are
it will fail like all previous attempts.
Environmental groups were not sure if a takeover would further their objectives.
Although all CVP supplies affect water flows in the Delta, an environmentally sound operation
of both projects would be required to benefit the resources in the Delta. Currently the CVP and
SWP operations in the Delta are coordinated according to the Coordinated Operation Agreement
COA) between the two projects.

Departures from &tablisbed Rule Curves
Respondents from the agricultural sector complained that the CVP did not really have a
good concept of what would happen during a drought. During its existence, the project
experienced only one year of drought, in 1977. The operating rule set during the 1960s defined
firm supply as the amount of water that would be delivered (through a period like the 1928-34
drought), with a maximum of 25 percent reduction in four out of seven years. Furthermore,
there was to be not more than 100 percent deficiency in water deliveries in any ten-year period.
These firm yield provisions of the CVP contracts were not followed during the fourth and fifth
years of drought. For example, prior to the Miracle March rains in 1991, the depleted reservoir
storage in the fifth year of the drought led to the announcement of cutbacks in CVP entitlements.
The reduction in deliveries included:
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•

25 percent supply to agricultural contractors

•

75 percent supply for Sacramento River water rights holders and San Joaquin
River exchange contractors

•

25 to 50 percent supply to urban contractors, depending on their contracts (CDWR 1991b)

Thus, the cutbacks in agriculture during the fourth and fifth years of the drought were about 5075 percent of normal deliveries.
Some respondents maintained that the departure from the old rules was a result of shifting
the CVP operations to a greater protection of urban and environmental uses. In 1977, the CVP
storage was drawn down to 1 MAF. For 1992, CVP plans to retain 2 MAF in storage. They
pointed out that 2 MAF of carry-over storage would support irrigation needs on 600,000 acres,
generating in San Joaquin Valley $4 billion worth of economic activity.

Warren Act Controversy

Water districts not served by CVP and districts receiving both CVP and SWP water were
very critical of the provision of the federal legislation, known as the Warren Act, which
prohibits the use of the Bureau facilities to move nonproject water. One respondent
characterized the act as a "shameful hypocrisy." The act was revoked in 1991 under the
Reclamation States Drought Relief Act (H.R. 355).

Rescheduling of Annual Deliveries

The CVP was praised by some participants from the agriCUltural sector for changing its
rules for making contract deliveries. Before 1991, the districts and farmers had to take all
contract deliveries in one year or lose the unused amounts. The balance did not carry over to
the next year. The Bureau changed the rules during the critical period of the drought and
allowed "rescheduling" of deliveries by keeping the balance in carry-over storage. This added
flexibility greatly assisted farmers in crop planning.

Conclusions Regarding the Performance of CVP and USBR

In comparison with SWP, the Bureau of Reclamation and CVP seemed to have kept a

"low profile" during the drought, but they maintained that posture only because of overriding
law. They accommodated water needs in the state, if possible, but were not very forthcoming.
The criticisms of CVP, which emerged during the interviews, could be summarized as follows:
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•

Authorizing federal legislation has to be reviewed to give CVP more
flexibility. All reclamation projects are operated according to authorized project
purposes. Those purposes constrain the options for managing the projects to meet
critical water needs during a major drought.

•

Environmental pressures may diminish the protection of CVP supplies offered
by senior water rights. New developments in the environmental sector, such as
the ESA, equates members of the agricultural and fishing community with regard
to water allocation. This added dimension could place constraints on future
deliveries of CVP supplies to agriculture.

ENVIRONMENTAL AND REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS

State Water Resources Control Board
The SWRC played an important role during the drought by acting on requests for water
transfers and by monitoring compliance with, and enforcement of, water laws. The survey
results testified to the difficult role of SWRCB. Survey participants representing various sectors
were critical of the Board's performance.

Critical Comments
The Board was criticized for its "lack of role" and its constant lamenting about what its
role was. That role could not be determined to the satisfaction of all interested parties. The
Board held hearings in order to put together a plan on how and when water management
institutions should change their operations and make allocation decisions. However, the plan
that was developed as a result of those hearings was very controversial and was not
implemented.
Both urban and agricultural users of water become very nervous when their water rights
are under review. The Board was under pressure by the environmental community to look at
water rights in order to determine whether the public trust values are being preserved. During
the ongoing process of developing interim standards for the Delta, the Board asked the water
users to explain how they are putting water to beneficial use. They also wanted to know what
can be done to improve declining public trust values. Agricultural water rights holders suspected
that the Board was actually trying to improve the reliability of urban water supplies and satisfy
environmental needs at the expense of agricultural supplies.
Finally, the Board was also characterized as an "impediment" to water transfers because
current staffing could not handle the amount of requests for transfers and the work associated
with facilitating them. It should be noted that no transfer proposals failed.
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The SWRCB View
The SWRCB is well aware of its difficult role in administering water rights in California.
Water transfers are one tool used in dealing with the effects of the drought. However, by no
means are they the answer to water management. During the drought, all transfers that came
before the SWRCB were approved, and with very minor exceptions, all of the water approved
was actually transferred and put to beneficial use. As expected, not everyone was happy with
the provisions of all the transfer approvals. The SWRCB must balance the competing needs for
limited water supplies and act on transfers in a way that protects holders of water rights as well
as in-stream beneficial uses.

Conclusions Concerning the Criticism of SWRCB
It seems fair to say that the drought and especially the large number of water transfers
created extreme demands for Board decisions. Ensuring the compliance with the complex
system of water laws to allow water transfers is not an easy matter. One conclusion is:

•

The Review Process has to be accelerated without compromising the
requirements of the law. Some improvements have already been accomplished
by passing state legislation (AB lOx) in 1991 that declares that no temporary
transfer of water under any provision of law for drought relief in 1991 or 1992
will affect any water rights. The drought focused attention on the Board's
difficult role of the protector of public trust values, thus increasing the sensitivity
of the Board's decision-making process.

Environmental Community
A considerable amount of time during the interviews was given to allow participants to
voice concerns and anxieties pertaining to the environmental community and environmental laws
and regulations. The intensity of the discussions was the highest among the participants
representing agricultural interests. Urban suppliers seemed to have moderated their initial
reactions and no criticisms were made by governmental resources agencies (both state and
federal).

Complaints against the Environmental Community
Many participants made statements that environmental interests and environmental
institutions stopped or slowed down a number of water projects throughout the state. The
drought crisis is a direct result of not being able to build enough water storage and conveyance
facilities because of that opposition.
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One respondent representing agriculture stated that environmental groups can generally
be separated into a "reasonable" faction and the "unreasonable" faction. While the reasonable
faction seems to understand the needs of agriculture, the unreasonable component aims at
shutting down the California agriculture at any cost. The unreasonable faction holds the farmers
hostage and gradually puts them out of business, resulting in more water and land for the
environment. The respondent noted that the unreasonable faction in the environmental
community is making a stand against the farmers although the environmentalists have no relevant
constituency and no economic accountability.
Some respondents complained that the environmentalists advocating water transfers were
putting constraints on pumping and on the export systems.
They stated that the
environmentalists express the need for more outflows through the San Francisco Bay facilities
for fisheries. This can be achieved by putting constraints on the export pumping from the Delta
on both the SWP and the CVP. However, some respondents believed limited water amounts
could be transferred from north to south with current restrictions put on the Delta and the export
systems by Interim Standards Decision for the Delta by SWRCB.

Complaints against Environmental Legislation
The federal Endangered Species Act and the state Threatened and Endangered Species
Act received complaints and criticisms coming primarily from the agricultural sector. Several
respondents stated that these laws had been enforced in a piecemeal manner, with the result that
water development in California was stopped. Furthermore, they viewed these laws as being
flawed because they provided no balance; one species can be preserved at the expense of others.
The law should consider all species at the same time.

The Point of View of the Environmental Community
One of the main objectives of the environmental community in California is to reform
water laws and water institutions so that there is no discrimination against environmental uses
of water. The existing water law requirements were developed, along with the development of
the western frontier, for the use of water out of the streams and rivers. In-stream water uses
were never a part of this development. This neglect cannot be justified, and a water law reform
will be needed to allow in-stream water rights.
There is a need for equity and fairness in water allocation. Environmental respondents
agreed that this drought provided a long-awaited opportunity for the environmental sector to
become part of the allocation process.
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Conclusions Regarding the Criticism of the Environmental Community
During the drought, the environmental community seemed to have gained significantly
more attention and a greater degree of consultation on water management issues. Environmental
interest groups are now an active player at the negotiating table and have a profound influence
on water management in California. The influence of the environmental group has already
impacted the agricultural and urban sectors through the Three-Way Process. Therefore the
conclusions are:

•

The drought permitted the environmental community to influence water
management decisions in the state. Although the environmental community has
demonstrated its ability to block water development projects before the 1987-92
drought, they were able to enter into negotiations and consensus building with the
urban and agricultural sectors during the drought.
For example, Mono Lake Committee has been actively involved in the protection
of environmental interests related to water issues during the drought. In addition,
this organization is involved with water-marketing proposals and public
conservation education. During the fifth year of the drought, Mono Lake
Committee was active in helping to execute the replacement of 15,000 acre-feet
of water from the Los Angeles groundwater basin with water purchased from
MWD at seasonal rates. This water, which would help create a park, was to be
injected into the ground as part of the conjunctive management scheme. The
group stated that this will be a recreation and flood control project for the city of
Pasadena. This example illustrates the spirit of consensus between the
environmental and urban communities in the transfer of water.
Aside from drought-related developments, the environmental community will
likely continue to have an active and powerful role in California water
management.

•

Governmental agencies responsible for environmental resources played an
important role in water management. The California Department of Fish and
Game (DFG) played a pivotal role in leading the state efforts to preserve the
state's aquatic resources. DFG played an important advisory role to water
agencies (including SWRCB, C-DWR, USBR, Department of Energy [DOE], the
Department of Parks and Recreation, and the u.s. Army Corps of Engineers)
pertaining to the movement of water and need for releases to protect aquatic life.
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Vll. INITIATIVES AND REFORMS

This chapter summarizes the views of the survey participants on actions that should be
taken to enhance the ability of the state's water management system to cope with future
droughts. We asked the interviewees and group interview participants for their opinions on what
should be done to improve water management in California. We counted more than 170
suggestions of initiatives and reforms that need to be considered. A listing of various
suggestions is included in Appendix D. A majority of them stem directly from the experiences
of participants (and others) during the 1987-92 drought.
The suggestions for changes are presented under four broad categories: (1) water policy
initiatives at the state level (including federal involvement); (2) agriCUltural initiatives and needs;
(3) urban water management; and (4) environmental protection. Each category addresses the
needed changes to those who are expected to implement them.

SUGGESTED STATE POLICIES AND INITIATIVES

For the most part, the suggestions were directed at the Department of Water Resources,
the state government, and the u.s. Bureau of Reclamation. The suggested changes and
improvements revolve around several key issues which are described below.

Solving the Delta Problem

In almost every interview, the respondents indicated that some of the issues surrounding
the Delta must be resolved. Generally, respondents agreed that physical improvements in the
Delta are needed to achieve more efficiency in moving water stored in the Sacramento-San
Joaquin basin to the south. During low flows, only a portion of water released from the
upstream reservoirs can be pumped out for exports because the pumping operations cause
migration of salt water from the San Francisco Bay toward the pumps. This reverse flow results
in the increase in salinity of the exported water and affects the freshwater supplies for most offstream users in the Delta and water quality for urban uses and for aquatic life.
Generally, the survey participants agreed that the Delta problem has to be resolved using
a balanced approach in which the additional facilities are built and operated. The facilities
would not only allow more exports to the south, but also enhance and maintain water quality in
the Delta. There is a need for a "socially accepted" water quality control plan for the estuary.
The hydrology of the Delta is very complex, and the current operations are not supported by any
scientific models. Instead, they are based on experience with reverse flows. Interviews revealed
that water professionals (engineers, hydrologists, biologists, and others) know how to solve the
problem on the technical level, but political will is needed to approve the necessary construction.
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There were many other suggestions on how to approach the planning. Several
respondents also suggested that the long-term planning for drought protection cannot be isolated
from policies aimed at controlling population growth in the state, especially the policies aimed
at in-migration. As one respondent put it, "there should be some way for the federal
government to realize that unlimited immigration into the United States is playing havoc with
California because 75 percent of foreign immigrants wind up in California or Florida." By
2010, the state population is projected to increase by approximately 8 million people. This is
a critical concern in preparing long-term water supply plans.

Water Management and Allocations

Many suggestions of survey participants pertained to the allocation of the state water
resources for various uses and for various activities. Selected suggestions within the
management category are listed below:
•

A holistic approach to the management of state water resources is needed to
increase the availability of water through all possible means. This includes
weather modification, reclamation, groundwater recharge and conjunctive use,
desalination, and optimization of all operations.

•

Water management should combine resource values with economic principles to
satisfy water needs in the state by following the example of the electric energy
industry. A rigorous analytical process should be employed in water management
decisions.

•

The state should cut down on the amount of firm hydroelectricity production
during drought to make water available for environmental uses. Investments
should be made in bulk energy transfer facilities to take advantage of imported
power.

•

The state should look into groundwater regulation. Large groundwater basins in
San Joaquin Valley should be managed possibly by self-regulation of users. More
work on groundwater storage and mapping of aquifers is needed.

•

Water management in the state should be centrally coordinated. At the minimum,
the communication and cooperation between state and federal agencies should be
improved.
More preferable would be a transfer of CVP operational
responsibilities to the state. The Governor should appoint a water czar to manage
resources with enough power to cut through unproductive water politics.

•

General policy reform and consensual solutions should be emphasized in trying
to change water management in the state. The Governor needs to "twist some
arms" in the agricultural sector in order to make the Three-Way Process more
productive.
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•

A massive public information and education program is needed to educate
Californians about water issues and drought in order to gain public support for
the proposed reforms in water management.

•

The state should develop a computerized data bank containing comprehensive
water-planning and management information. The database should be continually
updated and made available to water agencies.

In addition to these management approaches, the respondents made numerous comments
pertaining to water allocation in the state. Most of these suggested that more water should be
allocated to environmental uses and that allocation should be fair (or equitable) to all sectors.
Some respondents advocated prioritizing water uses in the state and using the system of priorities
in allocation decisions. Environmental resources agencies want water allocation on "more
equitable basis" so that in-stream flows for fisheries, water deliveries to wetlands, and other
environmental purposes are brought into the allocation process. They want to be given the same
consideration as the urban and agricultural users of developed water.

Institutional Change
The environmental community called for institutional change, including the reform of
existing agencies as well as water laws and regulations. Their major points pertaining to the
reform of water institutions can be summarized as follows:
•

Water law in California should be revised to allow for in-stream water rights.
One participant who represented environmental interest believed that above-theminimum natural flows in many California rivers will exist only as long as the
urban or agricultural users do not need them. They will develop more storage
and perfect water rights to capture these flows. In-stream water rights would
protect some natural flows. The existing system of water law protects off-stream
uses.

•

Water quality and minimum-flow standards established by EPA and SWRCB are
not adequate for restoring and protecting environmental resources.
The
environmental community proposes that the existing standards be considered as
"baseline" only and should be supplemented by mitigation of impacts on aquatic
resources with water set aside for that purpose.

•

It concerns the environmental community a great deal that the existing water

management institutions such as SWP and CVP are loyal simply to their clients
(Le., water districts with contracts) and not to protecting public trust values.
Because of this loyalty, these institutions will discriminate against environmental
uses of water because the latter impede their ability to serve their clients. State
water management institutions should be given a clear mandate to manage all
water resources in the state in a well-balanced way without discriminating against
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specific uses. A greater role of these institutions in protecting public trust values
is needed.
Participants representing the state and federal agencies shared some suggestions for
institutional change but were less demanding with respect to "equal treatment" of all uses.
However, they also would like to have a clear mandate from California voters to protect public
trust values. As one respondent put it, "more good will, professionalism, and supportive
legislation could go a long way toward enhancing environmental quality in the state."
On December 9, 1992, the SWRCB released a draft Interim Water Rights Decision,
"Decision 1630, Water Quality Objectives and Flow Requirements" (0-1630), for public review,
to complement their 1991 Salinity Control plan. In many respects, this proposed action is the
epitome of a lesson learned because it addresses the many environmental concerns heretofore
not addressed. The Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) and the C-DWR shall maintain water quality
conditions and flow rates in the channels of the Delta and Suisun Marsh equal to or better than
the standards set forth in D-1630. This task may be accomplished by:
•

Reduction of diversion at the pumps in the southern Delta

•

Release of natural flow or water in storage

•

Operation of the Delta Cross Channel gates

•

Other measures or combinations of the above and other measures

The USBR shall maintain the standards set in Decision 1630 for pulse flows in the San Joaquin
River at Vernallis.
The draft Interim Decision 1630 laid down guidelines governing water use.
include:

These

•

Diversion and use of water from the watershed of the San Joaquin River by
specified water rights holders

•

Reservoir releases by water rights holders on the Mokelumne and Calveras rivers
and their tributaries

•

Repayment for pulse flows on the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers

•

Diversion and use of water for urban uses by specified water rights holders

•

Using runoff forecasts with no less than 9O-percent and 95-percent probabilities
of exceedence by C-DWR and USBR, respectively, for determining initial water
delivery commitments
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•

Establishment of the Bay/Delta Estuary Water Project Mitigation Fund for the
purpose of improving fish and wildlife conditions in the Bay/Delta Estuary and
in its watershed

•

Monitoring in the Bay/Delta Estuary to be conducted by the C-DWR and USBR

•

Role of Executive Director in determining additional information requirements
from specified water rights holders

•

Granting of variances by the Executive Director to the C-DWR and USBR
regarding fishery standards laid down in D-1630

•

Ensuring the continuous real-time monitoring (from February through June) by
C-DWR and USBR to detect the presence of salmon smolts and striped bass eggs
and larvae in the Sacramento River upstream of the Delta Cross Channel gates

•

Terms and conditions in Decision 1485 that are rescinded or shall remain in effect

Since the release of D-1630, several natural and regulatory events have occurred which
diminish the urgency of adopting an interim water rights decision. Additionally, the SWRCB
has received feedback and comments on D-1630 which it has carefully considered. Many of the
comments recommended changes and also that the SWRCB prepare an Environmental Impact
Report (EIR) and conduct further hearings before adopting a decision. "The comments include
a letter from Governor Wilson asking the State Water Board to return to the effort of
establishing permanent standards for protection of the Delta. Consequently, the State Water
Board will not consider adopting D-1630 as an interim measure, nor will it consider any
alternative water right decision until it has prepared environmental documentation under Public
Resources Code Section 21000 et seq. and has conducted further hearings" (SWRCB 1993).
Generally, many respondents called for more state action in reforming the existing water
management system in California. Greater attention to environmental issues, management of
groundwater resources, and more state control over the developed water were among the most
important needs for change.

AGRICULTURAL INITIATIVFS

Many suggestions for improvements in water management were directed specifically
toward the agricultural sector. The suggestions that came from governmental institutions and
statewide associations representing agricultural interest are listed below. The suggestions
furnished by governmental institutions focused on drought impacts on the district financial
situations and the hardships suffered by farmers.
•

More conservation know-how and technology should be infused into California
agriculture. Research and development in improving the efficiency of irrigation
water use should be continued. Farmers should be advised and educated on how
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to use less water, what kinds of machinery to use, and how to manage labor in
order to produce efficiently.
•

Agricultural water districts should be more flexible and should adjust their water
delivery schedules (frequency and duration) according to the requirements for
optimal water application on the irrigated crops. They should also improve their
public relations by clearly communicating the purposes for which water is used
in their districts and the degree of efficiency they were able to achieve (in water
distribution and crop application).

•

Other agriCUltural water districts should learn from Westlands Water District how
to manage water supplies efficiently. All water should be metered and the
districts should pursue conjunctive use and groundwater recharge programs to
eliminate groundwater overdraft.

•

The state or other governmental entities should develop a system of adequate
economic incentives to encourage more farmers to adopt innovative and efficient
irrigation technologies.

The agricultural organizations interviewed praised the farmers and certain agricultural
districts for their ingenuity and initiative demonstrated during the drought. Some of the
innovative efforts demonstrated by Westlands Water District included the following:
•

All canals were lined.

•

District utilized underground piped delivery.

•

Deliveries are through allotment.

•

Water was metered.

•

District utilized sophisticated computer systems to maximize water use in the
district.

•

District had analogous practices to BMPs in urban areas.

•

District has co-funded farmers to do studies on irrigation and water efficiency
techniques.

URBAN WATER MANAGEMENT

A number of general and specific suggestions were made regarding the management of
water in urban areas. We grouped these suggestions under the general categories: (1) reliability
of urban water supplies and long-term planning; (2) design, implementation, and enforcement
of demand reduction programs; and (3) growth control.
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Long-Tenn Planning and Reliability

Respondents who represented urban water controllers often emphasized the need for longterm planning for drought protection and the need for overall improvement of reliability of urban
water supplies. The term reliability is used in California to describe the continuity of water
supply at adequate levels during periods of drought and other situations such as an earthquake.
Urban areas do not want to risk large shortages in their water supplies that would paralyze urban
economies. In practice, the reliability means that if SWP contracted with a district for a certain
quantity of water to be delivered on a firm basis, then SWP should deliver this amount during
drought years. If the deliveries are not reliable, then urban water suppliers do not know where
they stand and how much effort and money they should devote to fmding and developing local
sources and other supply- and demand-side alternatives.
Several other suggestions of the participants for better planning for protection against
future droughts include:
•

Water agencies should develop very clearly defined carry-over storage goals and
adhere to them. They should utilize emergency supplies, for example, if the
projected storage falls below the goal.

•

Water districts should build interconnections with neighboring districts and tie
into the California "plumbing system. "

•

Preparations should be made for an extreme-drought scenario, and standby
supplies such as desalination should be considered as a part of such preparations.
Also, a resiliency to drought should be built into long-term plans to prepare for
a sustained drought lasting more than seven years.

•

Long-term plans should be more sophisticated and should place more emphasis
on alternatives with supply flexibility such as water marketing and water transfer
agreements.

•

Urban water providers should adopt criteria for the allowable levels of shortage
during droughts and then plan and conduct their water resources programs to
meet the adopted reliability criteria.

•

Some degree of political involvement is needed in formulating water supply
policies at the county and city levels and local water district boards.

These suggestions can simply be summarized by saying that urban water suppliers should
do significantly more planning for dealing with future droughts and enhance their preparedness
to respond to water shortages. Environmental community is calling for including "planned
shortages" into urban long-term water supply plans. Urban suppliers are reluctant to agree to
this concept because an "arbitrary level" of supply deficit may not be optimal in terms of the
long-term cost of coping with droughts. The deficit planning also nullifies the "extra cushion"
always present in supply plans that may be seen as part of supply reliability.
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Significant progress toward better planning has already been made in California, thanks
to state legislation that requires many urban water providers to prepare and submit urban water
management plans every five years to C-DWR (AB 797). This legislation has been amended
by AB llx to include a detailed drought contingency plan for meeting various deficit levels up
to 50 percent.

Demand Reduction Programs
Urban water supply agencies have learned many valuable lessons from their efforts to
reduce water demands during the drought. Two examples:
•

Water rationing should be done through pricing because it is the best way of
achieving reductions in demands without causing revenue shortfalls. Rationing
without price increases undermines customer confidence when rates have to be
increased to balance revenues.

•

Local agencies should join in sponsoring mass media public information

programs. The messages and announcements of rationing requirements should
be made jointly, using common definitions so that the confusion of water users
is minimized. Such cooperation will also save money on purchasing "air time."
The respondents offered a number of suggestions on "how to do it right." Selected suggestions
of demand reduction programs are listed below:
•

Water district representatives should improve methods to communicate water
supply situations in the district to the media. They should communicate clearly
what their water needs are, how much supply is available, what the expected
shortages are, and what they want to accomplish through their demand reduction
program. They should also specifically inform civic leaders, their large
customers, and all customers as often as possible.

•

The general public should be educated to stop believing that unlimited water is
their God-given right, and also that a drought is not a sufficient excuse for water
shortages affecting their lifestyles.

Several participants were very critical of the demand reduction programs used by water
supply agencies. One respondent believed that urban suppliers should free themselves from the
"psychosis of irrational rationing." Urban users could afford, and should be able to buy, all
water they needed at prices much below the cost of severe mandatory rationing in urban areas.
The "green industry" was also very critical of the inability of urban water supply agencies
to design rationing programs that would not automatically put all landscape contractors out of
business. The participants from the "green industry" suggested that rationing plans should be
based on an allocation of reasonable water amounts in combination with inverted block rate
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structures to force urban users to use water very efficiently. They were strongly opposed to
outright bans on landscaping or irrigation through overhead watering "until the drought is over. "
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

The 1987-92 drought pushed already degraded ecosystems and populations to the brink
of collapse in California. Actions taken to ameliorate these conditions were transfers by the
Department of Fish and Game via the Water Bank and much discussion of environmental
problems. A simple message that "water is not free because it has tremendous value in the
stream or river" seems to have been accepted by the majority of Californians. The interviews
revealed great support for allocation of water supplies for environmental protection. Urban and
agricultural interests recognized environmental needs for water supplies. However, the most
important development during the drought was that the three sides were willing to talk and
compromise using the Three-Way Process. The three major water-user groups in California
(agriculture, urban, and environment) formed the Three-Way Process to address the issue of
water shortage in the state. All three groups have recognized the need to work together in
meeting their own water needs as well as satisfying common interests of all major groups.
The Three-Way Process

Several suggestions were made during the interviews on how the Three-Way Process
should be expedited and on what is causing holdups in the negotiations.
•

People who sit at the negotiating table and make decisions should devote more
energy to convincing their constituencies to accept their decisions.

•

The three sides should make an extra effort to reach a consensus and stop
blocking the actions of each other (which, as history shows, they can do very
effectively).

•

Urban and agricultural sides should address environmental problems and improve
the conditions of aquatic resources, because it will serve their interests.

•

Agricultural negotiators have to convince the farmers to deal with environmental
and urban sectors through consensual ways.

•

All three sectors should make more efficient use of water resources that they
currently have.

•

The Three-Way Process is important to all sides for finding solutions to the Delta
problem and other issues, because the political process has failed in this task.
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The Governor's proposed Delta decision-making process can lead to a recommendation which
can be politically salable.

Completion of SWP

The current users of SWP water and the SWP operators indicated that the ability of SWP
to satisfy water needs is dependent on the completion of SWP facilities as planned, including
more water development in the Sacramento-San Joaquin basin. The solutions in the Delta will
increase fmn SWP supplies, but additional storage will be needed to reach the planned firm
supply of 4.2 MAF. The present dependable supplies of SWP are 2.3 MAF.
Some participants representing agricultural users of SWP water indicated that the
completion of SWP facilities may not be possible. This is because they do not have the funds
and would be unwilling to invest in SWP. During the drought, the users found that SWP
supplies were not reliable and were unlikely to become more reliable for them in the future.
They maintained that SWP water is becoming too expensive to be used by agriculture.
Although, in part, this is political rhetoric and resentment caused by the deep cutbacks of
deliveries to agriculture, the fiscal difficulties of agricultural water districts are real.

Water Bank and Transfers
Almost all respondents considered the Water Bank an important and very useful
development of the drought. The following suggestions pertaining to the Water Bank and water
transfers were made by the participants:
•

A state Water Bank should be institutionalized and become a permanent part of
the water management system, including normal supply year operations.

•

All institutional barriers to water transfers should be removed during drought
(such as the issue of water rights held by water districts or users, federal
subsidies, restrictions on movement of water through federal facilities) except for
those that protect against third-party impacts and negative environmental
externalities.

•

A Water Bank office should be established as a broker for water transfers
independent of the C-DWR and SWP.

•

A streamlined approval process for all water transfers should be developed.

•

Water marketing and transfers should be developed as a viable alternative through
new legislation and more institutional cooperation.
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Some respondents representing agricultural districts were concerned about losing their
water supplies to the environment and urban areas because of the Water Bank. However, others
believed that if "enough money is put on the table," agriculture can find significant amounts of
water for sale. As long as the effects of water transfers on water rights holders are safeguarded
or compensated and the transfers are not made at the expense of environmental degradation, the
Water Bank is a viable alternative for many water shortage problems in the state. However, it
must be noted that the frequency and duration of bank operations will affect the amount of water
it can make available.

Long-Term Drought Planning
Many respondents expressed the opinion that water management in California should
move away from crisis management to long-term planning. Various suggestions on the
important elements of the planning process were made. Selected suggestions are listed below:
•

Californians should establish priorities for alternative uses of water during
droughts and be prepared to sacrifice some uses during times of water supply
shortages.

•

The state should look at pricing of developed water and eliminate the existing
large differences in the cost of water in order to create greater conservation
incentives for all users. Marginal cost pricing should be incorporated into longterm water plans.

•

The cost of water supplies for environmental resources has to be determined, and
these supplies have to be acquired at taxpayer expense.

•

The state should develop a mechanism that triggers drought response actions
automatically without a lengthy and contentious legislative process.

•

Long-term planning should focus on alternatives such as water banking and
marketing, off-stream storage, conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater,
water reclamation and desalination, and long-term water conservation in
agriculture and urban uses.

•

Equitable long-term ways of protecting environmental resources in the state must
be found.

•

Long-term water supply plans should have an optimal level of drought protection
(supply reliability) built into them.

•

The Three-Way Process and other such consensus processes should be relied upon
in building a consensus behind the long-term plan.
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•

The Three-Way Process should use professional leadership and seek help in
employing the techniques of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).

It is difficult to predict whether the Three-Way Process will be successful. At the time
when the interviews were conducted, the environmental and urban sides tended to be optimistic
about the process, while the agricultural side was somewhat reluctant and often frustrated.

Environmental Needs

Participants affiliated with the environmental community offered suggestions for an
improved water management system and environmental qUality. These are:
•

A flexible system of water management is needed with more fairness toward
environmental uses of water so that the environment does not suffer the most
during future droughts.

•

Environmental impacts need greater public recognition and some equitable ways
of protecting the environment must be found.

•

Environmental quality standards must be revised in order to better protect aquatic
resources during periods of extended drought.

•

The quality of water in tributaries in the upstream portions of major rivers needs
to be improved.

•

Firm supplies of water are needed for the existing wetlands.

•

A water fund should be established to purchase water for environmental purposes.

•

Water institutions should not discriminate against the environment.

•

In the Delta, along with the improved reliability of urban supplies, environment
should be brought along, and all water use purposes should be optimized.

In summary, the environmental community would like to achieve a better position for
negotiating environmental needs for water. The environmental interests coupled with existing
environmental regulations were able to effectively stop almost all water development in the state.
Apparently the drought has convinced all sides that future stalemates in solving water problems
will hurt all sides.
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SUMMARY OF NEEDS AND SOLUTIONS: THE GOVERNOR'S THREE-YEAR PLAN

The most important and immediate need is, according to one respondent, that "the state
of California needs to talk, do some thinking ahead, and look at water issues collectively."
Once the three sides reach a consensus on future water policy in the state, most problems can
be solved quickly. On April 6, 1992, the Governor unveiled a plan for "Ending California
Water Wars." The following is a summary of the major points of the Governor's plan.
The Governor envisioned a comprehensive, balanced, long-term water policy supported
by interim short-term measures. The drought demonstrated that creative solutions are possible
to handle water shortages, and these solutions should be continued and enhanced in the future.
Examples of these developments include the following:
•

The Governor was confident that mutual cooperation among the urban,
agricultural, and environmental groups through the Three-Way Process would
help meet the following objectives by 2010: (1) safe and reliable water supplies
for municipal and industrial uses in urban areas, (2) sufficient long-term water
supplies at a reasonable cost for agricultural areas, with dry-year groundwater
reserves where feasible, and (3) protection of threatened and endangered species
in the environmental sector as well as the restoration and protection of fish and
wildlife resources and aquatic habitat.

•

There is an urgent need to fix the Delta. The Governor indicated that a council
comprising members from the urban, agricultural, and environmental sectors
would be responsible for providing guidance to the planning and decision making
in future water management. This committee would be assisted by a separate
technical advisory panel to ensure that equity and fairness prevail in meeting the
needs of the urban, agricultural, and environmental sectors. The overall intention
was the development of a scientific long-term solution to ensure the protection for
the Bay-Delta Estuary. Certain immediate short-term actions were necessary in
the south Delta for restoration of the environment and improvement of water
supply. The Governor called for the California Environmental Protection Agency
(CAL-EPA) and the SWRCB to continue working in coordination with the federal
EPA in developing interim water quality standards by the end of 1992. These
interim actions included (1) construction offlow-control barriers, (2) enlargement
of some channels, and (3) utilizing new pumps to shift pumping to winter months.
The SWRCB held hearings and studies during the summer and fall and issued a
draft Interim Standards decision on November 24, 1992.

•

Off-stream storage should be pursued, since it does not conflict with the
environmental goals and offers a more viable proposition than conventional dams.
Additionally, other forms of storage were being evaluated. These include using
rice fields for storage in wetlands in the Sacramento Valley and using islands as
storage reservoirs and possible waterfowl habitat in the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta.
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•

The CVP should come under state control, and the Governor identified a
negotiating team to work out a transfer plan over six months.

•

The Water Bank: demonstrated the power of market forces. Water marketing
should be expanded in future water management. However, water transfers
should not adversely affect groundwater resources, fish and wildlife, and rural
communities. The Water Bank concept should be extended on a regional role to
develop an interstate Water Bank. The Governor pledged his support of
legislation regarding water transfers provided it met the following criteria: (1)
water transfers must be voluntary; (2) water transfers must not be harmful to fish
and wildlife resources and their habitats; (3) water transfers must not cause
overdraft or degradation of groundwater basins; (4) entities receiving transferred
water should prove that they are using water efficiently such as, carrying out
BMPs and water efficiency practices; and (5) water rights holders of contracted
water should play a decisive role in determining what is done.

•

Water recycling and reclamation should be increasingly utilized in the future,
since it provides reliable supplies for agriculture, greenbelts, recreation, and
industrial uses.

•

Desalination of brackish groundwater is cost-effective in certain parts of the state,
including some areas in the San Joaquin Valley and Southern California.

The Governor's plan confirms most of the points of view expressed by the survey
participants on actions that should be taken to cope with future droughts. The Governor's plan
focuses on a long-term comprehensive water policy supported by interim short-term measures.
The Governor also emphasized mutual cooperation through the Tbree-Way Process and the need
to fix the Delta. His plan addressed off-stream storage, the future controlling body of the CVP
and expanding water transfers in the future. Finally, his plan emphasized other viable
alternatives for increasing future water supply, and including water recycling and reclamation
and desalination of brackish water.
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vm.

SYNTHESIS OF LESSONS LEARNED

The first part of this report provided background information on the economy and water
resources of California and a detailed description of the events of the 1987-92 drought. The
views of survey participants on drought management were summarized in the preceding three
chapters. This chapter presents the conclusions of this study together with relevant background
information. It also includes a description of the management and decision-making environment
for drought planning and policy in California prior to the drought. Important lessons for water
management and planning stem from relevant experiences of individuals who control or influence
water management in the state. These experiences and lessons were identified by analyzing the
contents of 34 field interviews with 101 individuals representing 57 organizations. Our synthesis
of lessons learned includes information from the previous chapters as well as additional
observations of survey participants on the relevant lessons of the drought.

DEFINITION OF LESSONS LEARNED

The study was designed with a broad definition of "lesson learned" in mind. We
encouraged study participants to look retrospectively on their experiences during the drought and
provide us with answers to such questions as "What worked and what did not work?" and "What
needs to be changed, preserved, or done in the future?" We also asked the participants to focus
on several aspects of the drought including critical impacts, performance of water institutions,
public response, communication and cooperation, role of the media, critical legislation, timing
of response actions and innovative drought management approaches. Background information
was located and examined in order to place the information gathered by the interviews within
the context of documented drought actions and to compare expectations to the reality of drought.
The new knowledge that has been brought forth by the drought represents the important
lessons learned. In general, such incremental knowledge would be identified by (1) contrasting
"expectations" and "what actually happened, II (2) analyzing the basis for decision making during
the various stages of the drought, and (3) examining the overall performance of the California
water management system. However, the existing system of water management consists of
complex physical and institutional arrangements. It cannot easily be addressed by a unified and
comprehensive statewide management plan consisting of strategic, tactical, and emergency
measures. This means that a formal statewide drought response plan does not exist. There is
no sequence of predetermined actions for all eventualities that would constitute an official
statewide drought contingency plan. Federal, state, and local water institutions share the
responsibility of coping with adverse impacts of drought. For example, during a drought, the
state formulates a plan for dealing with another dry or critically dry year. However, the lack
of a formal drought contingency plan does not indicate that California is unprepared for
droughts. Major water providers have provisions for curtailing water deliveries during dry and
critically dry years. Local and regional water supply agencies also have plans for dealing with
water shortages. An unwritten plan for water management during drought emerged from the
experiences of the 1976-77 drought in California. We characterized this plan in order to provide
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the reader with a baseline (Le., pre-1987) approach to drought management in the state. This
plan is described below. In the sections that follow, the performance of this plan and other
outcomes of the 1987-92 drought are summarized in terms of lessons learned. We view these
lessons as useful pieces of practical wisdom acquired by drought experience. We invite the
readers to examine the evidence and opinions presented in this report in order to draw their own
conclusions and identify other relevant lessons for water management during drought.

PRE-1987 CALIFORNIA'S DROUGHT MANAGEMENT PLAN

The Institute for Water Resources of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has devised a
planning framework for studying the performance of water management systems and developing
a better way to manage water during drought. According to this framework, responses to water
shortages can be categorized as strategic, tactical, or emergency. Strategic (or long-term)
measures involve modification of existing infrastructure, laws, and institutional arrangements to
achieve an optimal level of protection against droughts in the long term. Tactical (or short-term)
measures can be implemented within the framework of existing laws, institutional arrangements,
and infrastructure. Such measures constitute a drought contingency plan and must be set into
place before drought occurs. Finally, emergency measures are those that are necessary when
the long-term protection involving strategic preparations and short-term tactical measures prove
to be insufficient because of low-probability events or unexpected outcomes. Sections that
follow summarize the strategies and tactical measures that existed prior to the 1987-92 drought.
An expanded discussion of these measures together with a description of strategic, tactical and
emergency measures in drought management are presented in Chapter ill.

Pre-1987 Strategic (Long-Term) Measures

The water management system in California has been established in order to provide
"dependable supplies" to the major population centers and agricultural areas in the state. The
dependability of supplies relates to drought. Therefore, the major water development projects,
such as the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project, were designed and operated to
provide adequate protection to water users against periodic droughts. The degree of drought
protection is a function of the amount of "carry-over" storage in the major reservoirs. In
addition to surface-water storage, the drought management plan that existed in California prior
to the six-year drought of 1987-92 included other features. The overall strategic drought
protection features found at all levels of water management (L e., local, state, regional, and
federal) included:
•

Provision of extra storage in surface-water reservoirs and maintenance of the
stored water as carry-over water to be used during dry years

•

Conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater to maximize the quantity of
groundwater in storage by relying on plentiful surface water during wet years
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•

Development of a statewide water distribution system to move water from supply
surplus areas to areas with inadequate local supplies or drought-affected areas

•

Permanent improvements in the balance of supply and demand (statewide and
locally) and supply reliability by increases in efficiency of water use and
development of additional supplies

The above features of the existing water management system do not "drought proof"
California. As the experience of the 1976-77 drought demonstrated, tactical restrictions on
water use must be used if there are two critically dry years in order to reduce the risk of
experiencing severe environmental and economic impacts. Unlike the severe drought events in
other parts of the country, the California drought of 1976-77 did not result in major additions
to the supply base (i.e., developed water). Between 1977 and 1986, only four major reservoirs
were completed. Subsequently there was less supply-side surplus, since growth in supply did
not keep up with growth in demand. Also, the success of water conservation efforts during the
1976-77 drought was publicized worldwide. As a result, the emphasis in drought management
was shifted from water development to a greater reliance on temporary reductions of water
demand.

Tactical (Short-Term) Measures

In general, the short-term drought response measures used in the state prior to the 19871992 drought included the following tactical actions:

•

Curtailment of surface-water deliveries by SWP and CVP to urban and
agricultural users in order to maintain adequate carry-over storage for possible
subsequent dry years

•

Curtailment of water flows and deliveries for environmental uses including
relaxation of minimum flows and water quality standards

•

Temporary increases in the use of groundwater in order to replace the surfacewater supply shortages or to replace the water retained in carry-over storage

•

Transfers of water within the state from sources with surplus supplies (e.g.,
Colorado River) to water-short areas (e.g., North Marin County)

•

Reduction of water use through voluntary conservation and rationing in urban
areas and by agriculture through crop shifting and land fallowing to make up for
the reduced deliveries and protect to the remaining supplies

•

Activation of standby supply alternatives such as reclamation of brackish or saline
water and municipal wastewater, cloud seeding, and other emergency supplies.
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The use of these measures depends on actual drought conditions and the local feasibility
of each action. For some areas, the use of groundwater or standby supplies is not feasible.
Large-scale transfers of water depend on the availability of interconnections to the major state
distribution network and the availability of water that can be transferred. Some options also
exist for transfers of water within individual regions. The two short-term response options that
are always available are protection of the remaining supplies and reduction in water use. This
is actually a single option if viewed from the perspective of a local self-contained water supply
system. At the local level, reduced deliveries of the CVP or SWP water can be met (Le.,
replaced) using local sources, water conservation, or cessation of some uses. The success of
the drought response plan is critically dependent on the timing of drought response actions.
Normally, significant shortages in precipitation and runoff in the Sacramento River basin will
not translate to automatic proportionate reductions in water deliveries. The large amount of
water storage affords the operators of the SWP and CVP and some local projects some response
lag time. However, generally speaking, two consecutive critically dry years will most likely
trigger tactical response actions. Once the drought conditions are in effect, the decisions on
water deliveries and the amount of carry-over storage are made for one water year in advance
and can be changed from year to year.

Emergency Measures

Federal, state, and local water supply agencies use emergency measures primarily to deal
with the interruptions of water deliveries caused by earthquakes. However, a state of emergency
can also be declared by the governor in cases where drought-related water shortages require
extraordinary actions. Federal and state drought assistance programs are available to an
individual or community, provided the entity meets the following criteria:
•

The entity is located in a county designated as a disaster or emergency area.

•

The entity is designated as an Emergency Drought Impact Area by an appropriate
agency (C-DWR 1978).

In the first case, designations are made by the President at the request of the Governor. In the
second case, designations are made by the Interagency Drought Emergency Coordinating
Committee (lDECC). Water shortage emergencies are governed by Sections 350-58 of the
California Water Code, and these appear in Appendix C.

LESSONS OF THE 1987-1992 DROUGHT

The 1987-92 drought put long-term strategies of drought protection and short-term
drought management approaches to a severe test. During six years of drought, state water
controllers implemented a number of drought measures in order to maintain about 60 percent
of the statewide reservoir storage. This level of carry-over storage has been maintained since
1990 for three consecutive water years which have been designated as critical, based on the
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Sacramento River Index. For comparison, during the 1976-77 drought, with two consecutive
critically dry years, the statewide reservoir storage was depleted to 35 percent. This suggests
that the experience of the 1976-77 drought resulted in a more conservative operation of the
major water supply projects. However, this security of held-back water reserves was not free.
There were some economic, social, and environmental costs of coping with shortages.
Nevertheless, one should not overlook the fact that California was in a better posture in 1993
following six years of drought than it was entering 1978 after only two years of drought.
Although it is easy to criticize water management for not reacting to the drought fast enough or
allowing certain environmental and economic impacts to occur, those impacts could have been
much greater and the current situation much worse if the operations mirrored those of the 197677 period.
These and other outcomes of the drought point to several lessons both for long-term
planning for drought protection and for tactical preparedness to respond to future droughts. In
this section, we present those lessons of the drought which stem directly from the experiences
of the 1987-92 drought. The factual information on the outcomes of the drought is presented
in Chapter N. The views of survey participants on the issues of drought planning and response
are described in Chapters VI and VII. After stating each lesson, we explain its meaning and
support it with relevant background information.

1.

The nature of social, environmental, and economic impacts of a sustained drought
points to a need for careful and more realistic drought planning.

The 1987-92 drought has revealed more about the nature of the adverse impacts of
drought than any previous drought. It showed that the impacts of drought can go beyond the
"fIrst order" consequences of not having enough water to support the established off-stream and
in-stream uses. Some social, environmental, and economic impacts of this multiyear drought
have exhibited some unexpected cumulative and propagating effects.
First, some impacts of the drought propagated and intensified because the affected
systems are complex and interrelated in the process. For example, because of drought, less
hydroelectricity was produced. This had a direct economic impact because a higher cost
replacement energy had to be produced to meet the demands. Furthermore, the demand for
electricity increased significantly during the drought (because of more cooling and more
groundwater pumping), so that the economic impacts were further intensified.
A parallel path of impacts stemming from reduced hydropower production rippled
through the environment. Because most releases of water for hydropower are not diverted to
off-stream uses they serve to maintain minimum streamflow and water quality. Additional
environmental effects occurred as replacement thermopower was produced. Large thermal plants
are located in urban areas of Southern California and San Francisco Bay area. These plants
increased air pollution in places where air quality is already low. At the same time, more
production of thermal power also contributed to deterioration of water quality. Some thermal
plants are located in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and use the Delta water for cooling.
Because of higher generation, more thermal pollution entered the Delta and caused further
deterioration of water quality.
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A similar tracing of environmental and economic impacts can be made for reduced water
deliveries to agricultural users. Less irrigation water translated into less return flows that
support wetlands. Reduced agricultural water deliveries also meant that irrigation districts
received less revenue, but they had to pay a fixed cost to SWP (or CVP), regional agricultural
agencies and others selling water regardless of whether they received contracted amounts or not.
This means that they had to spread more or less the same cost (or debt) over a smaller volume
of water sold and fewer farmers. As reduced water deliveries persist from year to year, the
price of water continues to go up, so that fewer farmers can afford it, and more land goes out
of production and farmers out of business. A continuing drought could lead to an acceleration
of this "debt spiral" effect.
Furthermore, some impacts occurred because of the length of the drought. For example,
during the drought, minimum-level streamflows persisted year after year for six years. As a
result, their impacts on fish populations accumulated, threatening to destroy entire populations
because of the short life-cycle time of anadromous species. The cumulative effects became
clearly visible during the 1987-92 drought. They were not so apparent during the 1976-77
drought. The winter-run chinook salmon, which is already classified as a threatened species,
had dropped to very small numbers. Similar cumulative impacts could be found in other areas
as well. However, identifying and quantifying impacts, cumulative or otherwise, is difficult.
Other factors besides the long drought could have impacted the number of returning spawners.
For example, the salmon catch off the coast of California was higher during the 1987-92 period
than during the wetter years of 1983-85. How much of the response of salmon population is
owed to drought? How much to the increased catches?
The drought impacts can be moderated by temporarily reducing water demands.
However, one of the greatest difficulties in employing the demand-side options arises from the
issue of equity. Almost any rationing scheme (either ad hoc or through contractual conditions)
will introduce unfair distribution of the burden. Equity effects probably are the most important
social impact of drought. The impacts may become exaggerated when we try to flX them by
laws and regulations. Water managers trained in civil engineering or hydrology may have little
experience and understanding of social behaviors. Poorly designed rationing schemes will
quickly polarize society into interest groups and destroy the sense of community in local areas
as well as in the entire state. Some water users will be treated, or will feel they are treated,
unfairly. For example, farmers may ask "Why should irrigation districts be cut 75 percent when
urban areas are cut only 25 percent?" Farmers feel that they need water to grow food, while
urban areas "waste" it on lawns. Urban dwellers may wonder why farmers should "grow
subsidized crops with subsidized water, while they have to risk losing their jobs because of
strict rationing provisions. Furthermore, unfair distribution of burdens will also crop up within
the farming community. Some farmers have wells on their land, others do not. Also, those
who invested in high-efficiency irrigation systems may receive no water while others who
continue to "waste" water receive their full deliveries. Irrigation districts experience fiscal
impacts since they are exposed to greater costs and emergency programs and in return they are
faced with less revenue and the fiscal "lag" effects of conservation.
H

The above recognition of the nature of drought impacts demonstrates the complexity of
the relationship between water availability and the functioning of human and environmental
systems. The long-term planning for drought protection and preparedness must more
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realistically reflect this complexity. For example, the cumulative environmental impacts of a
sustained drought revealed the need to reexamine our current approaches to the protection of
environmental resources. The long-standing practice of developing ambient water quality
standards to protect the aquatic resources may not be adequate. The impacts of the ongoing
drought brought the "environmental standards" approach into question. The aquatic ecology is
very complex, and the drought has demonstrated that just maintaining water quality standards
for several years did not prevent devastating effects on some aquatic populations. Monitoring
the conditions of aquatic life and taking appropriate preplanned measures to protect their survival
during a sustained drought may be necessary. There is a definite need to understand the aquatic
ecology better. On December 9, 1992, the State Water Resources Control Board published a
draft of Water Rights Decision (D-1630) which would require the SWP and CVP to maintain
stricter water quality standards in the channels of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun
Marsh. However, the adoption of this decision has been delayed until the Board prepares an
Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and conducts further hearings. Another important
development related to the protection of environmental resources is the current ongoing process
of establishing a new federal agency, the United States Biological Survey within the Department
of Interior.

2.

Severe drought can change longstanding relationships and balances of power in the
competition for water.

The drought crisis and grim outlooks for the future brought about some changes in
California's water politics. These included: (1) realignment of alliances, (2) attempts at
negotiation, (3) public relations, and (4) new environmental legislation.

ReaIi&J1lllent of alliances. In the past, the divisions in California's water politics ran
between those who diverted water (agriculture and urban water providers) and those who wanted
to keep water in the streams (environmental community). The urban community was further
divided between north and south. The debates were fueled by entrenched beliefs often having
very little relationship to reality. The drought focused public opinion on water issues and shifted
the division lines among the warring factions. Urban users began to gravitate away from
agriculture to reach some agreements with the environmental community even before the
drought. The Memorandum of Understanding on urban water conservation Best Management
Practices was signed in December 1991, and it brought together the northern and southern urban
users with the environmental community. About the same time, the media began "farmer
bashing," which added to the strength of the urban-environmental alliance and pushed the
agricultural sector into a losing position.
Public relations lap. Farmers and irrigation districts have also learned to recognize the
importance of communicating their needs, conditions, and irrigation techniques to the urban
public and environmental community. The farmers have been actively involved during the
drought in critically examining water use and water efficiency techniques in farms, talking about
the timing of deliveries, looking at transfers, and promoting conservation. However, agriCUltural
districts have to identify an appropriate forum to communicate to the public and the
policymakers about water utilization and problems experienced on the farm. Participants
indicated that it was this lack of communication that has resulted in adverse public opinion
regarding agriculture and its efforts to use water efficiently.
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Attempts at ne&otiation. The drought crisis created a need for negotiations involving
all three sectors. The Three-Way Process was established to work toward a consensus on water
policy among the urban, agricultural, and environmental interests. Although the drought was
not a major factor in the origins of the process, the drought crisis helped to bring the sides
together in developing short-term emergency measures. The state government, while not being
a party during the earlier stages of the negotiations, embraced the Three-Way Process. The
Governor used some of the initial agreements of the Three-Way Process to formulate a new
water plan for California. However, the situation is still volatile, and more work on reaching
the consensus is needed.
The negotiations of the Three-Way Process showed that consensual approaches to solving
the most urgent environmental problems offer some hope for the future, but reaching a
compromise is very difficult. The difficulties encountered lend support to one of the axioms of
negotiations theory which states that a party will not engage in negotiations if it perceives that
it will lose regardless of the outcome (Le., it is better for a dominant party not to begin
negotiation). The Three-Way Process became bogged down at the end of the drought and had
little effect on the new legislation which imparted some fundamental changes into California's
water management.

Newenvironmentailecisiation. The Central Valley Project Improvement Act of 1992
has been called one of the most important pieces of environmental legislation ever passed. It
reallocates an estimated 800,000 acre-feet of California's developed water from off-stream to
in-stream uses. Had the long drought not engaged the media and the public in debate on the
equity of California water allocations, it is unlikely that the bill would have passed, since it was
vigorously opposed by the agricultural community. The law changes the longstanding balance
of power in California water politics, and raises an important thought for water experts
elsewhere in the U. S. The passage of the CVP act after six years of drought headlines suggests
that dominant parties should reconsider the premise that no negotiation means no loss.
3.

Irrigation can provide complementary environmental benefits.

The impacts of the reduced agricultural deliveries of developed water to agriculture
revealed that in many areas environmental resources are critically dependent on water deliveries
to the state's irrigated agriculture. Many wetlands in the Central Valley are maintained by
return flows from irrigation. These wetlands received very little water during the drought as
farmers reduced water application rates and irrigated acreage. The drought also brought to the
attention of resource managers the fact that the flooded rice paddies in the Sacramento Valley
provided a critical support to waterfowl. The Central Valley provides winter habitat for 20
percent of all ducks counted in the United States and 50 percent of all mid-winter waterfowl in
the Pacific Flyway (California Rice Industry Association, 1992). Because almost 90 percent of
the Valley's original wetlands have been lost, only 60,000 acres of protected wetlands support
waterfowl. Additional habitat is provided by some 600,000 acres of ricelands, which in 1991
were reduced to 300,000 acres due to low water supplies. Therefore, the reduced rice
production during the drought had an adverse effect on wildlife habitat.
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The new knowledge about the interdependence between rice production and waterfowl
habitat led the Nature Conservancy of California (established by the California Rice Industry
Association) to the development of a ricelands/wetlands multipurpose use project. The project
would: (1) create upward of 100,000 acres of winter wetland habitat by flooding rice paddies
in winter, (2) provide nearly 300,000 acre-feet of off-stream storage capacity, (3) provide for
aquatic biodegradation of the rice stubble (rather than burning stubble that creates air pollution
problems), and (4) sustain the communities and economies that have become dependent on rice
production. This project demonstrates that the irrigated agriculture in California can avoid the
loss of its water supplies to satisfy environmental needs by expanding its water management into
multipurpose uses. California's 30 million acres of farmland (of which almost one-third is
irrigated) not only produce agricultural products but also serve as an important wildlife habitat
in agricultural regions. Farmers and irrigation districts have opportunities for enhancing the
environmental benefits of their lands and become a leader in the stewardship of environmental
resources. Agriculturalists are in a position to recognize the environmental needs for water and
adjust their operations to satisfy such needs. Flood protection and groundwater recharge are
examples of other purposes that can be satisfied in conjunction with irrigation.

4.

Land use regulation must be the mechanism for urban growth management policies
which accept Umited water supply.

The drought provided some new evidence for a longstanding debate on whether or not
constrained water supplies fail to prevent or slow down growth in urban areas. The city of
Santa Barbara has been viewed by many survey respondents as an example of an urban entity
which put constraints on the expansion of water supply sources in order to slow down urban
growth. However, the urban area continued to grow, although a major portion of new growth
occurred outside Santa Barbara in the Goleta area. The city of Santa Barbara sought to expand
its storage in the Gibraltar and Cachuma reservoirs prior to the drought, but its efforts failed.
Because increases in water supplies did not keep pace with the growing water demand, the area
suffered severe shortages during drought. Severe rationing of water had to be imposed, reaching
a cutback of 45 percent during the most critical year. The rationing imposed significant
hardships on the residents for an extended period of time. As part of the rationing plan, the city
implemented a total ban of overhead watering of urban landscapes of any kind, thus causing
brownouts and some loss of landscaping. The damaged landscapes and related loss of income
from tourism were considered by survey respondents as significant economic impacts on the
Santa Barbara area.
The drought-related water shortages and the hardships suffered by the residents seem to
have turned the policy of constrained supplies around. The area had to scramble for water and
acquire very expensive supplies. The voters approved two expensive alternatives: the
connection to the Coastal Branch of the State Water Project and a desalting plant. The cost of
water from these sources was 2 to 3 times higher than the cost of most expensive water
elsewhere in the state. The Santa Barbara City Council also approved a "critical period planning
approach," according to which the city will have enough water to survive the worst drought on
record (Le., 1946-51 period) and in addition will have a 10 percent extra supply as a safety
margin.
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The experiences in the Santa Barbara area during the earlier years of the drought and in
other urban areas of the state are interpreted by the water professionals in California as proof
that water supply (or more specifically, restricting the planning for water supply) cannot be used
to control urban growth. Limited capacity of local water supply sources can be used as a
legitimate reason to constrain urban growth, but land use decisions must be the vehicle and
mechanism for growth control. Water supply planning must keep pace with projected increases
in consumptive use which may occur under any growth scenario. This is so that it will not
cause the development of a supply/demand imbalance. Such imbalances have occurred locally
due to "slow" demand growth with no corresponding augmentation of water supplies or longterm management of demand. The practical effect is to cut into prudent supply reserves, thus
assuring recurrent drought emergencies.

s.

The success of drought response plans should be measured in terms of the
minimization and equitable redistribution of actual impacts (as opposed to water
shortages), but there is much to be learned about the best ways of accomplishing it.

Information on environmental and economic impacts of the drought is of critical
importance to the formulation and implementation of adequate drought response measures. By
comparing the various impacts, water controllers should be able to adjust the allocation of
dwindling water supplies so that the most severe impacts are minimized. However, the shortterm mitigation of environmental and economic impacts during the 1987-92 drought often relied
on judgment and anecdotal evidence. Measurement and valuation of drought impacts for
selecting water management options must be enhanced.
The survey participants were well aware of the implications of quantified impacts on
water management decisions. Those whose water supplies were curtailed gave a detailed
description of all impacts and attached a dollar value of losses wherever possible. They were
fully cognizant of the difficulties in measuring drought impacts, as well as the dangers involved
in comparing the economic losses suffered by various economic sectors. They recognized the
tendency of impact evaluation studies to be focused on impacts that can easily be quantified in
dollar terms, while undercounting those impacts that cannot be easily assigned dollar values.
Although the economic impacts are of immediate concern to people because they often translate
into lost jobs, there was almost a unanimous opinion that the most severe effects of the drought
fell on the ecological resources of the state. Objections to this view were raised by
representatives of the agricultural sector. Some agriculturists felt that the environmental
damages were exaggerated by the resources management agencies and the environmental
community in order to take away water from agriculture.
Attributing changes in economic performance and environmental resources to drought is
not a simple task. Attaching dollar values to these changes is even more difficult and almost
impossible in the case of impacts on the environment. Because of these difficulties, there is a
tendency to focus only on impacts that can be measured and valued in monetary terms (e.g., loss
of production of hydroelectricity). Many other impacts with potentially higher economic losses
(e.g., degradation of fisheries or urban lifestyles) are usually described in qualitative terms only.
Anecdotal evidence and speculations about drought impacts have to be used in making drought
response decisions. During drought there is insufficient time to study the impacts carefully and
make accurate predictions of potential consequences. As a result, qualitative statements about
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the impacts influence drought response decisions of water agencies. The mass media play a
large role in disseminating anecdotal evidence about various impacts, often focusing on some
impacts and overlooking others. The lesson here is that the assessment of potential impacts of
water shortages must be conducted prior to drought. This allows selection of the best strategic
and tactical measures for coping with drought through a systematic drought planning process.

6.

Severe droughts can expose some inadequacies in the performance and role of state
and federal water institutions.

The state government regulates the use of natural water resources in California. In
addition, SWP and CVP, the state and federal water agencies, respectively, also control a major
portion of developed water. Therefore, the success of coping with the shortages of precipitation
and runoff depends on how well the SWP and CVP systems are operated. The drought revealed
some inadequacies in the state and federal water institutions which pertain to their roles and
responsibilities in drought management.
Many survey respondents said the drought showed that California water needs one water
boss to manage all water resources in order to meet the state's water needs and to protect public
trust values. Although there were many positive opinions about the performance of California
Department of Water Resources (its expertise compares well to any agency in the country, and
it proved invaluable during the drought), respondents had three types of suggestions about the
current state organization.
First, they complained that there is insufficient differentiation between C-DWR and the
State Water Project (SWP). Although its mission is much broader, during the first four years
of the drought, the role of the C-DWR was mainly limited to the operation of the SWP. During
those years, SWP tried to satisfy the demands of its customers for water within the limits of its
rules, as one would expect of a water supplier. C-DWR did have to provide for greater
protection of environmental resources, a water use in competition with SWP deliveries, but only
when the evidence of cumulative impacts on fisheries came to public attention around the fourth
year of the drought. Some respondents called for an organizational division that would reflect
the fact that the interests of SWP customers are narrower than the interests of California
generally.
Second, respondents believed that the State Water Resources Control Board (the Board)
was asked to do too much. The Board was created to allocate surface water rights and to
regulate water qUality. During the drought, the Board had to assure that the available water
supply was allocated according to established water rights; the rush of water transfers created
an unprecedented load. In 1991, emergency legislation (referred to as AB 16x) was passed to
remove statutory time limits for Board actions on water rights applications and petitions during
droughts. The law also authorized the Board to adopt drought emergency regulations (effective
for 270 days), without review or approval by the Office of Administrative Law. The state
legislature also charged the Board with administering state financial assistance for water
reclamation projects (AB 15x).
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Finally, some respondents said the C-DWR should do more to share the benefits of their
expertise. Several respondents indicated that timely information on water supply conditions
should be given high priority because it is invaluable to all water providers and resource
agencies (timely publication of the California Cooperative Snow Surveys Bulletin 120-91 was
regarded as one of the best investments among all drought-coping mechanisms).
The CVP of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's ability to respond to California's needs
was severely hampered until Federal law was changed in 1991. While the SWP was scrambling
for water and needed federal conveyance facilities to move water around, it could not do so in
several instances. This was due to the Warren Act, which prohibited the use of CVP facilities
for moving nonproject water while allowing to use them for bringing nonproject water for its
own uses. This law was repealed during the fifth year of drought by Reclamation States
Drought Relief Act of 1991 (H.R. 355). Because the CVP "sits on the biggest chunk" of
developed water in the state, the Bureau is a likely target for often unfair accusations stating that
the federal projects "sit back and let the state suffer while they take care of their own." Because
differences in deliveries put some neighboring farmers under very different water supply
conditions on their farms, the curtailments in water deliveries imposed by SWP and CVP should
be agreed upon and made more uniform. The Coordinated Operation Agreement of 1986 made
great progress in the direction of increased cooperation in maintaining water quality in the Delta,
but it did not cover all the contentious issues. The Bureau has also learned the value of being
more flexible in their operations with their own customers. During the last three years of the
drought, CVP allowed farmers to leave water in storage for the next year water deliveries, thus
changing the previous "use it or lose it" policy. This allowed the farmers to plan ahead better
and maximize the benefits from available deliveries. This makes the operations of CVP more
difficult, but pays off in terms improved relations and water conservation. These experiences
indicate that resolution of the federal-state institutional issues would enhance the effective
management of water supplies during drought.
In general the state and federal bureaucracies can be expected to give high priority to
cooperation during drought. For many water institutions, the drought is a real test of their
performance. Officials and administration make an extra effort to perform well and are willing
to cut "red tape" in order to speed up the administrative process wherever possible. This
behavior of water institutions and other entities should not be overlooked in resolving some longstanding contentious issues and setting forth a framework for better cooperation during future
droughts.
Recently, the State of California and the U.S. Department of the Interior have signed a
Memorandum of Understanding which outlines the conditions for a possible takeover of CVP
by the State. However, the memorandum is neither specific or binding.

7.

The overall success of water rationing plans depends on their design and reliance on
increases in water rates.

By the second year of drought, most residents of California had no doubt that the state
was experiencing a major drought. The media were constantly reporting on the drought
problem, which focused public attention on water. When there is no drought, most people
become interested in water management only when there is a rate increase. As the drought
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continued the public focused on other issues related to water supply. Some areas were ready
to support solutions and investments in long-term water conservation and improvements of water
supply reliability. The publicity of the impacts of drought on fish populations convinced urban
users that their conservation efforts were important for saving the environment. Survey
participants unanimously agreed that the public response to drought (Le., cutting back on their
water use) was very good. There were some differences of opinion among respondents on the
reasons for such a good response and the apparent unfairness of raising water rates of users who
had reduced water use.
The 1987-1992 drought confirmed the lesson of previous droughts that urban households
and businesses will cut back on water use. It also enhanced understanding that certain conditions
that must exist in order to achieve cooperation. Urban users gn conserve water on a short-term
basis; however, the more important lesson is that people will conserve if they are convinced that:
(1) there is a real crisis; (2) water conservation plan is fair; (3) hardships are manageable; and
(4) their conservation efforts really matter. In communities where all these conditions were
present, the customers proved extremely cooperative and exceeded rationing goals. In those
communities where some conditions were not met, the response of water users was not so good,
and the number of complaints was often unmanageable.
During the 1987-92 drought, several water agencies were reminded that water-rationing
plans can be very controversial. Some rationing plans can be worse than others. Sometimes,
while achieving the same intended water savings, the plans may hurt more people, cause greater
burdens on some groups of users than others, and cause greater economic losses in the urban
economy. All plans are unfair to some users, but those that rely solely on fixed allotments,
percent cutbacks, or total bans on certain uses may be perceived as unfair to a significant portion
of urban water users.
An important new lesson of the 1987-92 drought is that increases in water rates should
precede or accompany rationing plans. When rationing plans are not accompanied by an
increase in water rates on account of drought, it causes problems for the water agency, in
addition to imposing burdens on water customers. These problems occur, because they lead to
revenue shortfalls when the drought continues for several years. To balance the revenue, usually
water rates are increased after the crisis is over, which may be viewed by customers as a sign
of inefficient management of the district. Pure price rationing was not used during the drought;
however, those water districts that raised rates and instituted rationing plans fared very well,
both in terms of achieving conservation targets and balancing their revenues during the rationing
period. However, not all water districts and local governments are convinced that pure price
rationing is the best and least costly form of rationing. Pure price rationing involves raising the
price of water to the level where the customer response to the price increase will achieve the
desired conservation target. Prices would be decreased if conditions improve or increased if the
drought intensified. The pure price rationing could also be used at the most critical stages of
the drought crisis, where the level of prices would be linked to the amount of the remaining
supply. Water suppliers who experienced revenue shortfalls became strong supporters of the
price rationing. The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power was trying to convince the
City Council to allow the Department to impose a drought surcharge before the rationing
program was called for. However, many agencies consider pure price rationing as impractical
because of problems in identifying the water price/demand relationships.
191

8.

Mass media can playa positive role in drought response, especially if some

guidelines are followed.
The California drought of 1987-92 was a major news story. The newsworthiness of the
drought created an opportunity to focus public attention on California's water issues. The media
saw their role during the drought as informing the public on how supply allocations are made
and what the consequences of the allocations and related decisions are. Although the primary
objective was to cover the breaking news on drought, some media, especially the major
newspapers, tried to look at water supply issues from a broader statewide perspective.
Reporters, in their inquiries, usually wanted answers to the questions of the general public.
During drought, what people wanted to know is "How much water is it prudent to use']" or
"How much water is it prudent to save']" The public also wanted to make sure that water
agencies were not asking them for unnecessary sacrifices.
The media are governed by the rules of objective reporting, newsworthiness, and their
perceptions of what the public wants to know. They cannot be managed by water agencies. If
they were, they would not be able to sell news fairly. The questions "Are we in a drought']"
or "Is the drought over']" are not silly questions from the media's point of view. Reporters
understand the thinking modes and perceptions of the general public much better than water
professionals. For them, once the water supply situation is called a drought, it automatically
implies that behavior has to be changed from normal behavior to crisis behavior. Such a change
is newsworthy. In general, the media can be very useful in promoting water conservation,
especially if water agencies follow some guidelines.
Many participants in this study agreed that press releases must be very precise and
complete in order to avoid confusing the media. Water managers must be prepared to give
straightforward answers to questions asked by the press. Media reporters cannot improve on
the clarity of the message. More likely the statements will become even more confusing after
they are repeated in the press. Media cannot explain complex water management issues. What
is very interesting to water professionals is usually "too dry" for newspapers, radio, and
television. Long feature articles on water issues do not sell newspapers and, if included, are
read by very few. However, those who read them may become well informed.
It is difficult for water agencies to publicly admit that they are in trouble. The drought
showed that if they did not fear a negative response from their customers and were candid in
their public remarks, they could always count on public cooperation without losing their jobs.
Some conditions, however, have to be met. First, the managers must make sure that their
response actions are easily defendable so that the public knows what they are trying to achieve
and why. They must have some rules, or tactical response measures, established. Second, the
water shortage situation, the response decisions, and objectives have to be clearly communicated
to the media, civic leaders, and the public. Media cannot be expected to develop explanations
of difficult decisions for the public. They have to get a clear message from the source of those
decisions.
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9.

Market forces are an effective way of reallocating restricted water suppUes.

The drought forced water agencies and water professionals to seek creative solutions to
water shortage problems. However, very few radical solutions were implemented. Rather,
there was a greater diffusion of known technologies. Development of technological innovations
takes time and more innovations are likely to be developed in the wake of the California
drought.
The six-year California drought did provide an opportunity for water controllers to test
one idea they had toyed with for a long time. The drought helped them to cut the red tape and
they actually did it. It even worked much better than expected. This successful experiment was
the 1991 Drought Emergency Water Bank. The Water Bank offered California a way of
obtaining "more water, even after four years of drought, at a price that was readily paid by
urban users, some farmers, as well as environmental resources agencies. The bank worked
exceptionally well to the satisfaction of most interests although some counties expressed serious
concern over possible depletion of local groundwater. The difficulties encountered offered
additional lessons on how to organize the bank to work even better in the future.
It

The 1991 Emergency Water Bank demonstrated a number of important lessons: (1) water
markets, even when severely controlled and constrained, will work; (2) water has high value for
many buyers, and there are willing sellers; (3) very significant amounts of water can be found
if money is put on the table; and (4) third-party interests in market transactions can be protected.
The respondents voiced concerns regarding restrictions in the Water Bank rules, especially those
pertaining to the conditions imposed on water buyers.
The Water Bank and other water transfer mechanisms were at the forefront of new
developments during the drought. New knowledge about physical systems and environmental
response was gained because of the transfers. The experiences with the Water Bank and other
transfer mechanisms are likely to have profound implications on California's future water policy.
Although water transfers may not obviate the need for more water development, the new
development likely will proceed with water transfers in mind. In other words, more water
storage and transmission facilities may have to be built to facilitate water transfers throughout
the state. Some additional water development may also be needed to increase the ability of
water supply agencies to capture high flows for recharging groundwater.

CONFIRMED LFSSONS OF PREVIOUS DROUGHTS

In addition to the new knowledge in the form of "useful pieces of practical wisdom,"
described in the previous section, the 1987-92 California drought also has confirmed several
important lessons of previous droughts. These confirmed lessons are presented below.
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1.

Water in the aquifers continues to be the most effective strategic weapon against
drought.

While short-term water conservation, temporary water transfers, and Miracle March rains
in 1991 helped California water users get through the six years of drought, the state's urban and
agricultural economies were really saved from a disaster by the availability of groundwater
reserves. This can easily be verified using some crude numbers. Total water withdrawals in
the state during a normal year are approximately 40 MAF of which 24 MAF come from surface
water and the balance of 16 MAF comes from groundwater. In the 1991 water year, water
rationing in urban areas saved about 1 MAF. The 1991 Water Bank shifted 0.8 MAP from
agriculture to urban and environmental uses (many of the temporary transfers in 1991 depended
upon groundwater and at least one-third of the 0.8 MAP was substituted through increased
groundwater withdrawals). The March rains added 10 percent to the statewide reservoir storage,
or about 4 MAP. Estimates of increased groundwater pumping indicate that some additional 8
MAF were pumped from groundwater aquifers. Because the statewide carry-over storage did
not change between 1990 and 1991, the conservation and groundwater pumpage made up the
shortfall caused by the estimated 57 percent deficit in statewide water year runoff. Total SWP
deliveries (entitlement and other deliveries) were 47 percent of 1987 deliveries. Additionally,
CVP deliveries in 1991 were 38 percent of 1987 deliveries.
Therefore, if we were to "give credit" for saving California's economy from a disaster,
we need to acknowledge that, statewide, increased groundwater pumping was eight times as
important as urban water conservation or water transfers. It was even twice as important as the
Miracle March rains. This is not to say that water managers had very little to do with keeping
the state out of a total disaster. Groundwater supplies would have been depleted had it not been
for the large amounts of developed surface water that, during wet years, substitute surface water
for groundwater use by farmers. Without CVP and SWP, a majority of the state's groundwater
basins would likely be mined and the groundwater storage would be greatly diminished due to
subsidence. At the same time, much of the remaining water in storage would be too deep or
too saline to be recovered usefully or economically.
The realization of the role of groundwater reserves in drought protection is an old but
nevertheless very important lesson. Almost 60 years ago, White (1935) had documented the
value of groundwater supplies during the drought of 1928-1934. Overdrafting the aquifers
during droughts is effective in the short-term, as long as they are recharged when surface-water
supply becomes available. According to this lesson, the state should put more emphasis on
groundwater management in its long-term (strategic) water plan. During this drought,
groundwater storage in the San Joaquin Valley was depleted by some 11 MAP. This depletion
has to be replaced as soon as surface supplies become available; until the aquifers are refilled,
the state remains much more vulnerable. The same must be done with all other aquifers for
California to survive similar droughts in the future. Increased reliance of off-stream uses on
groundwater should also enhance the protection of environmental uses against droughts by
preserving in-stream flows.
California is blessed with many groundwater aquifers holding some 250 MAF of usable
water. These aquifers are a great asset for drought protection, but only if their long-term
overdrafting can be controlled. There is a need for more coordinated management of
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groundwater on the regional level. Southern California has long recognized the value of
groundwater supplies, and several major groundwater basins in that region have been
adjudicated. The state can help in passing laws to expedite the adoption of groundwater
management plans or other forms of self-regulation by local and regional entities. The local
regulation of groundwater might reduce overdrafting in the future, since people are getting
concerned about exporting groundwater. Even more important, the state agencies can help with
hydrogeologic research to identify groundwater basins in terms of total and usable storage, safe
yields, recharge areas, water quality problems, and other necessary data for groundwater
management. Finally, more groundwater recharge and conjunctive use of surface water and
groundwater are among the best ways of keeping the groundwater reserves viable. Natural
recharge proceeds almost at capacity during wet years, and it will not significantly increase
because of lowering of groundwater tables. Artificial recharge and conjunctive use of surface
water and groundwater will help maintain adequate banks of groundwater. California has plenty
of overdrafted aquifers to provide very large storage for future droughts.

2.

The surest way to mitigate the adverse social, environmental, and economic impacts
of a sustained drought is to obtain more water.

What we learned about the cumulative and propagating nature of impacts from the 198792 drought suggests that the surest way of mitigating them is to provide more water from
groundwater basins or surface storage reservoirs and use it to replace the deficiencies of
precipitation and runoff. Both environmental and economic impacts of a sustained drought could
be greatly moderated if more water could be found and delivered.
Obtaining more water includes long-term programs aimed at reducing demand by
improving efficiency of water use. Demand management can produce "inore water" and thus
make a significant difference in urban and agricultural sectors. Obviously, the environment does
not have such an option. There is little delay in impacts on environmental resources. They
began with the first year of drought and accumulated as the drought continued. Agriculture is
in a somewhat better position to modify water demand than environment, but quick gains in
efficiency can only be made at a cost. The costs stem from managing irrigation more
intensively, moving away from marginal soils, and postponing the leaching of salt accumulations
in the soil. Finally, urban water-rationing programs also carry a price tag, but urban households
and businesses use water for diverse purposes and, if given justification, can cut back on some
less essential uses. However, their ability to reduce water use may be somewhat preempted by
long-term efficiency improvement programs.
The "more water" option eliminates the need to distribute the burden of shortages among
off-stream water users. It may also benefit the environment if the additional water can be
obtained without high environmental costs (e.g., those often associated with the construction of
large-scale in-stream water storage reservoirs). The drought has shown that environmental
quality standards are necessary but not sufficient to protect fish and wildlife from cumulative
impacts of a sustained drought. Again, more water is the only remedy for protecting some
species from extinction. However, if there is no water held behind dams or in the ground, more
water for one sector must come from another sector. Water controllers who operate major
storage reservoirs must face the difficult task of taking water from one sector and giving it to
another and be accused of "playing God." Water institutions are well aware of these problems
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and see the development of adequate supplies to keep pace with growth of consumptive use as
their most important option. However, they believe this option has been taken away from them
during the last two or three decades because of two factors: (1) a belief that limiting water
supply could control growth and (2) environmental laws and regulations that made it possible
for environmental interests to stop water development projects.
The drought has shown, however, that water management in California does not have to
be a "zero sum game," where gains of one sector are achieved at the expense of other sectors.
There are other options for obtaining more water. More water can come not only from new
storage but also from reallocation of existing supplies and voluntary transfers among off-stream
users as well as from long-term improvements in the efficiency of water use. The results of our
survey indicate that the urban, agricultural, and environmental interests are not strongly
polarized with respect to all these "more water" options. All three sectors support further
improvements in water use efficiency. Irrigators are not opposed to voluntary transfers on a
temporary basis if their long-term interests are protected. Finally, the environmental community
would support the development of new water storage, especially off-stream storage, if the
agencies who operate the storage facilities do not discriminate against environmental uses of
water. Their main objective is not to stop all water development but to reform the existing
water institutions (both bureaucracies and water law) so that environmental uses of water are
given equal standing with urban and agricultural sectors in water management decisions.

3.

Early drought response actions and proper timing of tactical measures are essential
in short-term management of droughts.

The 1987-92 drought has confirmed an earlier belief that droughts in California are truly
unpredictable. In hindsight, taking earlier actions would have been warranted during both
California droughts. The lesson of the 1976-77 drought was not lost on urban water providers.
They made no bets on the drought to be over soon and maintained aggressive demand reduction
programs through the most critical year of 1991. The 1987-1992 drought confirmed the earlier
lesson on the importance of early drought response.
The timing of cutbacks in water deliveries from the major projects must be examined
carefully because it affects user sectors differently. No timing of cutbacks would satisfy all
users of the CVP and SWP water at the same time. Early cutbacks to agriculture translate to
economic impacts that become certain. Late cutbacks increase the risks to urban areas and also
preempt future options for protecting against environmental damages. Generally speaking, urban
areas would like to leave more water in storage to prevent deep cutbacks in deliveries at later,
more critical stages of drought. The drought experiences indicate that farmers want maximum
delivery during a given drought year and are willing to receive no supplies next year. However,
in testimony at the SWRCB's Interim Water Rights Hearing, an agricultural economist testified
that some studies show farmers can achieve greater profits with slightly reduced quantities of
supply but increased certainty of supply.
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4.

Local and regional interconnections among water supply systems proved to be a
good insurance policy against severe water shortages.

Historically, urban and rural communities throughout the U.S. made strong efforts to
develop their own water supplies and have control over their own fate. The desire for such local
autonomy is also present in California. The 1987-92 drought demonstrated in several California
communities that the self-reliance and self-sufficiency in terms of their "owned and operated"
sources of water supply may not be an effective strategy for protection against multiyear
droughts in the future. Actually, this strategy of local "self-sufficiency" in water supply can
have disastrous consequences during drought. Examples of difficulties caused by guarded selfsufficiency were found in the San Francisco Bay area and in Santa Barbara. Santa Barbara is
a good example of a closed system. The city did not have any connections to other neighboring
systems, and it was very difficult to bring water to them. The only short-term alternative
available to them was a tanker bringing water through the sea. Later, a complex system of
transfers and exchange arrangements by a number of districts was devised and implemented to
bring some supplies to Santa Barbara.
The confrrmed lesson here is that water districts should be encouraged to share their
supplies with their neighbors and may also have to learn to rely more on external sources of
supply over which they will have very limited control. This lesson does not apply to all water
suppliers in the state. Some communities have abundant sources of supply and do not have to
tum to water imports for many years. However, the number of districts that have to hook up
to the statewide "plumbing system" is increasing. Unfortunately, this lesson may be lost on both
the districts relying on the SWP water as well as some districts using the CVP water. Their
experience is that the project supplies are not reliable, because they have been cut back. They
feel they cannot count on SWP (or CVP) to keep their supplies uninterrupted and must develop
more local or independent supplies, even if costs of such development are very high. Although
a lesson on the importance of interconnections has been recognized during previous drought
experiences, it has not been acted upon by many local providers of water.

SUGGESTED WATER MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES AND REFORMS

The experiences and lessons of the 1987-92 drought were translated by survey
participants into specific actions that should be taken in order to enhance the capability of
California's water management system to cope with future droughts. Below we present some
of the participants' suggestions under the categories of strategic (long-term) and tactical (shortterm) measures. The sequence of these suggestions does not follow any particular order and the
specific suggestions were not selected to form a coherent set of recommendations. Rather they
represent our reporting of those suggestions which were voiced by survey respondents most
frequently. Complete listings of these suggestions are included in Appendix D.
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Strategic Measures Suggested by Survey Participants

The strategic (long-term) measures listed below represent the views, perceptions, and
opinions which were offered by survey participants.
1. The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta problem has to be resolved. Physical improvements in
the Delta are needed to improve the efficiency of moving water stored in the upriver reservoirs
to the south and to enhance and maintain water quality in the Delta.
2. Swp facilities have to be completed. The present dependable supplies of SWP are 2.3 MAF
per year. The improvements in the Delta will increase fmn SWP supplies, but additional storage
will be needed to reach the originally planned firm supply of 4.2 MAF per year.
3. A permanent Water Bank should be established. A Water Bank Office should be established
as a broker of water transfers at any time. The office should be independent of C-DWR and
SWP. The institutional barriers to water transfers should be removed except for those that
protect against third-party impacts and negative environmental externalities.
4. The state should move away from "crisis management" and focus more on "long-term
planning." Long-term planning for drought protection should focus on alternatives such as water
banking and marketing, conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater, water reclamation
and desalination, as well as water conservation in agriculture and urban uses.
5. Marginal cost pricing should be incorporated into long-term water plans. Pricing of
developed water should be revised in order to eliminate the existing large differences in the
prices paid per acre-foot of water, thus creating greater incentives to use water efficiently.
6. Groundwater management should be improved. The state should look into groundwater
regulation. More work on groundwater storage and mapping of aquifers is needed. Large
groundwater basins in the Central Valley should be managed, possibly, by self-regulation of
users.
7. Water management should be centralJy coordinated. The operations of CVP should be
transferred to the state, and the Governor should appoint a water czar to manage all State Water
Projects.
8. The state should develQP a computerized data bank. The bank should contain regularly
updated comprehensive water-planning and management information and should be made readily
accessible to all water agencies.
9. California water law should be revised to allow for in-stream water rights. The existing
system of water law protects off-stream uses. In-stream water rights would afford some
protection of natural flows.
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10. Enforced mitigation of impacts on 3.Qllatic resources should be undertaken in order to
enhance water quality and minimum-flow standards. The standards established by EPA and
SWRCB are not adequate for restoring and protecting environmental resources.
11. More conservation technology and know-how should be infused into California's
agriculture. Farmers should be educated on how to use less water, what kind of machinery to
use, and how to manage labor in order to increase water use efficiency. A system of economic
incentives should be developed to encourage more farmers to adopt innovative and efficient
irrigation technologies.
12. Improved reliability of urban water stmplies is needed. Water districts should develop more
sophisticated long-term water plans with adequate protection against a sustained drought lasting
10 to 15 years. The districts that are isolated and face supply limitations should also build
interconnections with neighboring districts and tie into the California system of aqueducts where
feasible.
13. Long-term water management plan should take environmental needs into account.
Environment should be brought along, and all water use purposes should be optimized by
combining resource values with economic principles.
14. Environmental needs for water should be met. A water fund should be established to
purchase water for environmental purposes. Firm supplies of water for existing wetlands should
be obtained.
15. A better management of fish and wildlife under normal conditions is needed. The impacts
of drought on fish and wildlife depend on the overall health of these environmental resources
prior to drought. Better normal and wet year protection for fish and wildlife is needed in order
to provide some additional elasticity during drought.

Tactical Measures Suggested by Survey Participants
The tactical (short-term) measures provided below represent the views suggested by
survey participants.
1. State should develop and adopt clear triggering mechanisms for drought remonse. State
drought response actions should be triggered automatically without a lengthy and contentious
process of passing drought emergency legislation.
2. Californians should establish water use priorities. During periods of shortage, priorities in
water use should be invoked and low-priority uses should be sacrificed if necessary.
3. A streamlined approval process for all water transfers should be deyelqped. Drought Water
Bank should be expanded, and exchanges and transfers outside the state bank should be
facilitated.
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4. A massive public information and education program is needed. Californians need to be
better educated about water issues and droughts in order to gain public support for reforming
the existing water management system.
5. The state should cut down on the amount of frrm hydroelectricity production during drought.
Stored water should be made available for environmental uses. Investments should be made in
bulk energy transfer facilities to enhance the capability for importing power during droughts.
6. Agricultural water districts should be more flexible. They should adjust their water delivery
schedules (frequency and duration) according to the requirements for optimal water application
on the irrigated crops.
7. A better accountability in 3,&ricultural water use must be achieved. All irrigation water
should be metered, and the districts should communicate to the public the degree of efficiency
they were able to achieve.
8. Urban water suppliers should develQP very clearly defined carry-over stQrage goals and
adhere to them during drQught. Tactical short-term measures should be implemented whenever
the carry-over storage goals are not expected to be maintained by the end of the water year.
9. Urban water agencies should plan for water deficits. They should lessen the pressure on
water development by planning for a 25 percent shortage during droughts and then only develop
or obtain firm supplies to meet 75 percent of normal water demand.
10. Water rationing should be done through pricing. Increasing the price of water during
drought is the best way of achieving reductions in demand without causing revenue shortfalls.
11. Water agenc.y rmresentatives should improve the communication of their water sypply
situation. They should clearly communicate to the media, civic leaders, and customers what
their water needs are, how much supply is available, what the expected shortages are, and what
they want to accomplish through their demand reduction program.
12. Environmental impacts must be given greater attention. Some equitable ways of protecting
the environment must be found. Water institutions should not discriminate against environmental
uses of water.
CONCLUSION

The six-year California drought of 1987-92 focused the attention of the public as well as
water controllers and influencers on the shortcomings of the existing water management system
in the state as defined by its water infrastructure, institutional arrangements, and the system of
water rights. This management system is becoming increasingly inadequate in protecting the
established in-stream and off-stream water uses against multiyear droughts.
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Some of the lessons contained in this report point to specific changes that Californians
should consider. More generally, however, the drought experiences merely demonstrated the
shortcomings of the system, and water managers and citizens must now begin the work of
designing new systems that will perform better in future droughts.
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APPENDIX A
WATER POLICY LEGISLATION, LITIGATION, AGREEMENTS AND
DROUGHT LEGISLATION SINCE 1991

WATER POlley LEGISLATION, 1980-1987
Water Transfer

drainage and brackish water with the objective of
desalting 400,000 acre-feet by the year 2000. The
Executive Order also urged the SWRCB to require
water conservation plans in exercising its authority on
water rights.

AD 178 (N. Waters), Chap. 16S5 of 1984: Extends
the law protecting areas of water origin to all future
exporters from a number of Northern California
watersheds.

Wa~

Code SecOOD; 375-377: These sections allow

AD 2010 (Isenberg), Chap. 1384 of 1986:
Authorizes Director, C-DWR, to negotiate with the
Bureau of Reclamation for State to own or operate
part or all of federal CVP.

public retail water suppliers to, by ordinance or
resolution, adopt a water conservation program, and
require the installation of water-saving devices,
except for agricultural users.

AD 2746 (Katz), Chap. 918 of 1986: Requires a
State or local agency owning a water conveyance
facility to let another local agency transfer water to a
purchaser by unused capacity; transferor must pay
fair compensation.

Wa~

Code SectiOD; 10610-10656: These sections

require every urban water supplier providing water
for municipal purposes to more than 3,000 customers
or supplying more than 3,000 acre-feet of water
annually to prepare and adopt, in accordance with
prescribed requirements, an urban water management
plan containing prescribed elements.

AD 3427 (Kelley), Chap. 364 of 1986: Permits a
water transfer agreement to exist more that 7 years,
if mutually agreed to by agency and transferee.

Wa~

Code SecOOD 1009 and 71610.5:

These
sections authorize municipal private water companies
to prepare water conservation plans to reduce water
use which can require water conservation retrofit
devices.

AD 3722 (Costa), Chap. 970 of 1986: Requires CDWR to set up a program to facilitate the voluntary
exchange or transfer of water.
SD 1700 (Torres), Chap. 1241 of 1986: Requires
C-DWR to negotiate with the Bureau of Reclamation
for purchase and transfer of water.

Public Utilities Code SectiOD 761 and 770: These
sections give the California Public Utilities
Commission board authority over water utilities it
regulates (private) which would allow it to require
water utilities to adopt programs for water
conservation.

Wa~Co~atioD

Executive Order D-62-80 of 1980: This executive
order directed all state agencies, department, boards,
and commissions to continue to seek ways to
implement water conservation practices in connection
with their programs and activities.

AD 797 (Klehs), Chap. 1009 of 1983: Establishes
the Urban Water Management Planning Act to
require water conservation and management plans by
urban water suppliers.

Executive Order D-68-80 of 1980: This executive

AD 1732 (Costa), Chap. 377 of 1984: Authorizes
sale of general obligation bonds to cover the State's
share of waste water projects; for waste water
reclamation projects and water conservation loans.

order directed (1) C-DWR to prepare a plan of water
conservation, reclamation, and management for the
State Water Project to recommend actions that could
be taken by the State and its water contractors to
reduce demand for water and, (2) C-DWR to
implement a program of recycling agricultural

AD 2542 (peace), Chap. 429 of 1984: Provides that
use of Colorado River water reduced by water
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conservation measures will not cause the loss of
water rights.

the Department of Health Services and local health
departments to evaluate public water systems for
potential contamination.

AB 1029 (Kelley), Chap. 938 of 1985: Authorizes
any water supplier or water user to finance water
conservation or reclamation and sell the conserved or
reclaimed water to another water supplier or water

AB 2013 (Cortese), Chap. 1045 of 1983: Requires
persons storing hazardous substances in underground
containers to file a hazardous substance statement

user.

withSWRCB.

AB 1658 (Isenberg), Chap. 954 of 1986: Requires
agricultural water suppliers to determine whether they
have significant opportunities to save water.
Existence of such opportunity requires that supplier
prepare and adopt an Agricultural Water Management
Plan.

AB 2183 (O'Connell), Chap. 378 of 1984:
Authorized an additional $75 million for the Safe
Drinking Water Program.
AB 3566 (Katz), Chap. 1543 of 1984: Requires
regulation of toxic pits in order to prevent
contamination of groundwater.

AB 1982 (Costa), Chap. 6 of 1986: Provides $150
million in low-interest loans to local agencies for
water conservation, groundwater recharge, and
agricultural drainage projects. (Approved by voters
in June 1986.)

AB 3781 (Sher), Chap. 1584 of 1984: Requires
testing of underground tanks before and after
installation to protect groundwater from leaks.
AB 1156 (Areias), Chap. 1034 of 1985: Enacts the
Groundwater Recharge Facilities Financing Act,

AB 325, Chap. 1145 of 1990: Requires California
cities and counties to adopt a water-efficient
landscape ordinance by January I, 1993 (unless they
can prove that such ordinance is unnecessary). AB
325 also directed C-DWR to draft a Model WaterEfficient Landscape Ordinance, recently completed.
Cities and counties must adopt this Model Ordinance
by January I, if they have not adopted their own by
then.

authorizing C-DWR to make grants to local agencies
for groundwater recharge facilities.
SB 187 (Ayala), Chap. 268 of 1985: Confirms
authority of C-DWR to build groundwater storage
facilities south of the Delta as part of SWP; requires
C-DWR to contract with local agencies in such
programs.

Off-stream Storage

AB 2668 (O'Connell), Chap. 410 of 1986:
Authorized an additional $100 million for the Safe
Drinking Water Program.

AB 3792 (Isenberg), Chap. 1656 of 1984:
Authorizes the Los Banos Grandes Reservoir, south
of the Delta, as part of the SWP.

AB 3127 (Areias), Chap. 1152 of 1986: Requires
counties and cities to adopt water well abandonment
ordinances that meet or exceed standards in C-DWR
Bulletin 74-81.

Ground Water and Water Quality
AB 1362 (Sher), Chap. 1046 of 1983: Establishes
regulatory provisions to prevent groundwater
contamination from hazardous substances stored in
underground tanks.

Fish and Wildlife (State)
SB 512 (Hart), Chap. 6 of 1984: Enacts the Fish
and Wildlife Habitat Enhancement Act of 1984,
authorizing issuance of $85 million in bonds for fish

AB 1803 (Connolly), Chap. 881 of 1983 and
AB 1803 (Connolly), Chap. 818 of 1985: Requires
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(Approved by

Management Program to restore and maintain fish
and wildlife populations in the basin.

AD 723 (Campbell), Chap. 1259 of 1985:

DR 3113 (Miller, Coelho, Lehman), PL 99-546:

Authorizes SWRCB to consider streamflow
requirements in applications to appropriate water.

Authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to enter into
agreements for coordinated operation of the federal
CVP and SWP and to preserve Suisun Marsh.

and wildlife habitat enhancement.
voters in June 1984.)

SB 400 (Keene), Chap. 1236 of 1985: Enacts the
Fisheries Restoration Act of 1985 for restoration of
fishery resources and habitat damaged by water
diversions and projects.

DR 4712 (Bosco), PL 99-552:

Establishes the
Klamath River Basin Conservation Area Restoration
Program to restore anadromous fishery in the river.

SB 1086 (Nielsen), Chap. 88S of 1986: Requires
the Wildlife Conservation Board, by January 1, 1988,
to inventory land along the upper Sacramento River
and determine priority of land valuable to fish and
wildlife.
Creates an Upper Sacramento River
Fisheries and Riparian Habitat Council to develop,
for submission to the Legislature, the Upper
Sacramento River Fisheries and Riparian Habitat
Management Plan to provide for the protection,
restoration, and enhancement of fish and riparian and
associated wildlife for the area between the Feather
River and Keswick Dam.

Delta Levees
AD 955 (Peace), Chap. 1271 of 1985: Requires CDWR to plan for continued water exports, should
Delta levees fail.
AB 3473 (Johnston), Chap. 824 of 1986: Requires
C-DWR to inspect local agencies' nonproject levees
to ascertain degree of compliance with maintenance
standards.

SB 2224 (Garamendi) , Chap. 1357 of 1986:
Authorizes C-DWR and The Reclamation Board to
determine the need for State financial aid to Delta
reclamation and levee districts to maintain levees that
protect State highways.

Fish and Wildlife (Federal)
DR 1438 (Chappie, Bosco, Shumway), PL 98-541:
Establishes the Trinity River Basin Fish and Wildlife

SIGNIFICANT WATER POLICY LmGATION
congressional directives (United States v. State of
California, State Water Resources Control Board,
694 F.2d 1171 (1982»).

U.S. Supreme Court Cases
California v. United States (1978)
The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, in operating New
Melones Reservoir, must comply with State water
rights law, unless it is inconsistent with congressional
directives to do so. This is the leading Supreme
Court decision requiring the United States, in most
instances, to comply with the substance and
procedures of State water rights law. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeal later held that the conditions
imposed by the State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB) on New Melones were consistent with

(438 U.S. 645, 98 S.CT. 2985)

United States v. New Mexico (1978)
This case limited the amount of water the U.S. Forest
Service could claim under the "reserved rights
doctrine" to water necessary for the primary purposes
for which the National Forests were reserved; that is,
preservation of timber and securing favorable flows
for private and public uses under state law. Water
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United States v. State Water Resources Control
Board (1986)
[The Consolidated Delta Cases]

for secondary purposes -- for example, stock
watering and environmental, recreational, or scenic
purposes -- could be acquired only in the same
manner as any other public or private appropriator
under state law. The California v. United States and
the New Mexico cases both emphasize Congress'
historic deference to state water law.

This decision (Racanelli) covers eight cases
challenging SWRCB's Decision No. 1485, issued in
1978, and its Water Quality Control Plan for the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and Suisun Marsh.
The decision recognizes SWRCB's broad authority
and discretion over water rights and water quality
issues, including jurisdiction over the federal CVP.

(438 U.S. 696, 98 S.Ct. 3012)
California Cases

(182 Cal.App.3d 82, 227 Cal.Rptr. 161)

National Audubon Society v. Superior Court

(1983)
Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Board

(1979)

The public trust doctrine applies to the City of Los
Angeles' rights to divert water from streams tributary
to Mono Lake. The State retains supervisory control
over its navigable waters under the public trust to
protect such uses as navigation, fisheries, commerce,
recreation, and scenic and environmental values.
This prevents any person from obtaining a vested
right to appropriate water in a manner harmful to the
public trust. As a matter of necessity, SWRCB may
grant rights to take water needed in distant parts of
the State, even if public trust uses are harmed, but it
must take public trust into account and protect public
trust values wherever feasible. SWRCB retains
continuing supervision and may reconsider allocation
decisions, even if the decisions were made after
consideration of public trust values. SWRCB and
California courts have concurrent jurisdiction to
consider and protect public trust values.

(90 Cal.App.3d 590, 153 Cal.Rptr. 518)
California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources
Control Board (1979)
(90 Ca1.App.3d 816, 153 Cal.Rptr. 672)
These two cases hold that an appropriation of water
cannot be made for in-stream flows because some
physical control over the water is a necessary element
of the doctrine of appropriation.

1991 DROUGHT LEGISLATION
State Legislation
The following bills were introduced in Extraordinary
Session.

(33 Cal.3d 419, 189 Cal.Rptr. 346)
Imperial Irrigation District v.
Resources Control Board (1986)

AB9x (Cortese) Water transfers: This bill gives the

State Water

governing body of a water supplier explicit authority
to enter into contracts, either with the Department of
Water Resources' water bank or with other water
suppliers, for transfer of water outside the service
area of the water supplier. An urgency measure.
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter 191).

After an adjudicatory hearing, SWRCB found that
failure to undertake additional water conservation
measures was unreasonable under Article X, Section
2, of the California Constitution. The Court affirmed
SWRCB's authority under the Constitution and Water
Code Section 275 to conduct such a hearing and to
enforce its order.
(186 Cal.App.3d 1160, 231 Cal.Rptr. 283)

A-4

effects of the drought on fish and wildlife trust
resources and protect populations of fish and wildlife.
An urgency measure.
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter
11-91).

AD lOx (Costa) Water transfers:

This bill
explicitly declares that no temporary transfer of water
under any provision of law for drought relief in 1991
or 1992 will affect any water rights. An urgency

measures.
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter 291).

AD 14x (Jones) Department of Forestry and Fire
Protection: funding: This bill would appropriate
$20.4 million from the General Fund to the
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection for Fiscal
year 1991-92 for increased fire protection activities
and for capital outlay involving installation or
rehabilitation of wells and installation of pipelines as
needed to restore adequate water supplies to fire
stations and conservation camps.
An urgency

AD 11x (Filante) Urban Water Management Plans:
This bill requires every urban water supplier to
prepare an urban water shortage contingency plan.
It requires the plan to include data on water usage, an
estimate of water supply at yearly intervals (assuming
worst-case shortages), stages of action to respond to
possible water supply shortages of up to 50 percent,
mandatory prohibitions on wasteful practices,
consumption limits that would apply in the more
restrictive stages of shortages, penalties for excessive
use, an analysis of the financial effect of the plan on
the supplier, a draft resolution or ordinance to
implement the plan, and a mechanism to determine
actual reduction in water use pursuant to the plan.
This bill requires suppliers to include these
contingency plans in their urban water management
plans, and it requires suppliers to forward their plans
to C-DWR by January 31, 1992. The bill requires
water suppliers providing water indirectly to retail
customers to prepare plans, and it requires suppliers
to coordinate with other suppliers in their area in
preparation of shortage contingency plans. The bill
exempts implementation of water shortage
contingency plans from the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA), provided the project would not
significantly affect water supplies for fish and
wildlife. After January 31, 1992, the bill disqualifies
noncomplying urban water suppliers from State
drought assistance until the suppliers submit water
shortage contingency plans.
STATUS: This bill became law without the
Governor's signature (Extraordinary Session
Chapter 13-91).

measure.
STATUS: This bill was passed by the
Assembly. It failed passage in the Senate
Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review.
AD 15x (Kelley) Reclamation projects: emergency
assistance: This bill would appropriate $10 million
from the General Fund to the State Water Resources
Control Board for State financial assistance (loans
and grants) to local water suppliers for water
reclamation projects that can be completed and
provide reclaimed water by June 30, 1992. An
urgency measure.
STATUS:
This bill is before the full
Assembly.
AD 16x (Mays) Water resources: This bill removes
statutory maximum time limits for action by the State
Water Resources Control Board on water rights
applications and petitions during drought emergencies
or critically dry years. It autho~ the State Water
Resources Control Board to adopt drought-response
emergency regulations, effective for 270 days,
without review and approval by the Office of
Administrative Law. An urgency measure
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter
12-91).

AD 12x (Costa) Department or Fish and Game:
drought management activities:
This bill
appropriates $15.277 million from the General Fund
to the Department of Fish and Game to minimi~ the
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AB 18K (Areias) Property taxation: deferral: This

"long-term, reliable supply of water" to mean water
availability consistent with water purveyor plans,
programs, and policies, and it would declare that the
existence of a long-term, reliable supply of water
does not create entitlement to or a permanent right to
water and does not include a guarantee concerning
the ability of a water retailer to serve its customers.
The bill would authorize public agencies to charge
fees to cover costs of services required by the bill.
The bill would limit its requirements to projects of
sufficient statewide, regional,
or areawide
environmental significance.
STATUS:
This bill is before the full
Assembly.

bill would authorize counties to permit owners of
agricultural land to defer payment of fiscal year
1991-92 property taxes, but it would restrict their
deferral to owners whose land has been damaged as
a result of drought. An urgency measure.
STATUS: This bill has been passed by the
Assembly and the Senate; it has been
returned to the Assembly for concurrence in
Senate amendments.
SD 9x (Bergeson) Water appropriation: water
suppliers: This bill explicitly authorizes water
suppliers to contract with customers for water when
customers voluntarily reduce or eliminates use of
water. An urgency measure.
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter

AD 1357 (Cortese) water shortage emergencies:
This bill would enact the Drought Response Act of
1991 and would authorize the Governor to declare a
drought emergency if, by February IS the current
year is dry or critically dry and if the two previous
years have been dry or critically dry. The bill would
require the director of the Department of Water
Resources, prior to the Governor's declaration, to
prepare and submit to the Legislature a report on the
geographic extent of the water shortage and on
drought mitigation measures that could be
implemented on an emergency basis. The bill would
authorize the director, prior to issuing the report, to
begin planning and developing facilities and
technology to assist in the mitigation of the effects of
the drought, and it would authorize the director to
undertake specified actions to provide water supplies
The bill would create a
to water-short areas.
Drought Response Account in the Reserve for
Economic Uncertainties and would express legislative
intent that this account have a balance of $1 million
at the beginning of each fiscal year. An urgency

SB 12x (Ayala) Drought relief and assistance: This
bill secures legislative approval for projects
potentially eligible for funding under the 1988 Water
Conservation Bond Law and the 1986 Water
Conservation and Water Quality Bond Law. An
urgency measure.
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the
Governor (Extraordinary Session Chapter
10-91).
The following legislation was introduced during the
Regular Session.

AB 455 (Cortese) Development projects: water
supply: In response to drought conditions, this bill
would require each urban water supplier to submit a
copy of its urban water management plan and a copy
of its capital improvement plan to each city and
county within its service area and would require lead
agencies under CEQA to consult with water suppliers
on the aVailability of a "long-term, reliable supply of
water" for proposed development projects. The bill
would require water suppliers to make written
determinations on the aVailability of this water supply
and would require lead agencies, relying on the water
suppliers' written determinations, to make written
findings on the availability of water supply for the
proposed development project. The bill would define

measure.
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the
Assembly Committee on Water, Parks and
Wildlife.
AD 1387 (O'Connell) Safe drinking water and
drought relief bonds: This bill would place a $200
million General Obligation bond act (the California
Safe Drinking Water and Drought Relief Bond Law
of 1992) on the June 1992 primary election ballot and
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would use bond revenues to finance a safe drinking
water program ($150 million) and drought relief
program ($50 million). This bill would revise the
method of calculating the rate of interest on loans
under the California Safe Drinking Water Bond Law
of 1976. An urgency measure. (The substance of
this bill has been amended into AD 2112, Polanco).
STATUS: This bill is being held in
Assembly Committee on Banking, Finance
and Bonded Indebtedness.

funds in the lending institution at reduced interest

rates for deposits and the lending institutions agrees
to lend the equivalent amount of money to eligible

borrowers at reduced interest rates for loans). The
bill would authorize the Treasurer to allocate up to 3
percent of the Pooled Money Investment Account to
this program. An urgency measure,
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the
Assembly Committee on Ways and Means.

SD 436 (Davis) Drought emergencies: liability for
precipitation: This bill would create an exemption
for public entities from civil liability for ordinary
negligence based on occurrence or quantity of
precipitation.
The bill would include in the
exemption any liability based on precipitation
allegedly caused by cloud seeding, but it would limit
this exemption to those places and time periods
covered by a Governor's proclamation of emergency
under Government Code Section 8625 due to
drought. The bill would exclude from this exemption
any liability resulting from failure to properly design,
install, operate, or maintain flood control facilities.
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the
Senate Committee on Judiciary.

AD 1580 (Cortese) Water resources: urban water
management: This bill would require each urban
water supplier to amend its urban water management
plan to include an estimate of agricultural water use,
to identify and evaluate wastewater recycling
activities currently adopted, and to describe watersaving fixtures and appliances for industrial,
residential. commercial, agricultural, and
governmental uses and the strategies proposed to
meet short-term and long-term supply deficiencies in
time of drought and emergency.
STATUS: This bill has been passed by the
Assembly and by the Senate; it has been
returned to the Assembly for concurrence in
Senate amendments, then placed in the
Assembly Inactive file.

SD 1168 (Marks) Water: drought relief: vessels
and water meters: This bill would increase vessel
registration fees and would appropriate revenues from
these increased fees to the Department of Boating and
Waterways for drought relief, with a priority of
maintaining or increasing water levels in lakes used
for recreational boating. The bill would require,
effective January 1, 1992, that all new service be
metered and, effective January 1, 1994, that all water
service be metered,
STATUS: This bill failed passage in the
Senate Committee on Transportation.

AD 1972 (Wyman) Agriculture: low-interest loans:
This bill would require the Director of the
Department of Food and Agriculture to establish a
program of low-interest loans to agricultural
producers who suffer drought damage to orchards,
vineyards, or other perennial agricultural plants.
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the
Assembly Committee on Agriculture.
AD 2247 (Areias) Loans: linked deposits:
agricultural operators and small businesses: This
bill would make legislative findings that the State's
recent economic downturn, drought, and freeze have
created great economic hardship on small farms and
businesses. The bill would create the California
Treasurer's low Cost Loan Program for Small
Business and Agriculture, a linked deposit program
(an agreement between the State Treasurer and
lending institutions where the Treasurer deposits state

Federal Legislation
B.R. 355 (LeIunan) Reclamation States Drought
Relief Act of 1991: This bill would authorize the
Secretary of the Interior to construct temporary
facilities and drill new wells to mitigate drought
losses; to assist willing buyers in the purchase of
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water from willing sellers; to purchase water for
delivery under temporary federal contracts; to
participate in State-established water banks; to make
projects and non-project water available, within and
outside an authorized project service area,using
federal storage and conveyance facilities, for
agricultural, municipal, and industrial, and fish and
wildlife purposes; to make loans to water users for
drought response activities; to study measures for
water conservation, augmentation and efficient use;
to prepare cooperative drought contingency plans;
and to study the need for a Reclamation Drought
Response Fund.
STATUS: This bill has passed the House
and the Senate. It has been returned to the
House for concurrence in Senate
amendments.

S. 711 (Seymour) Drought response: This bill
would provide the Secretary of the Interior with
authorizations similar to those proposed in H.R. 355.
Additionally, this bill would authorize loans for the
purchase of interim supplies of water and for
structural and non-structural activities to mitigate
drought effects, and it would authorize the Secretary
on the Interior to establish a $10 million
"Reclamation Drought Response Fund" to finance
drought-relief activities authorized by the act.
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural

Resources.
Public Law 102-575, Title 34 Central Valley
Project Improvement Act of 1992: The key
legislated purposes of this title are:
(a) to protect, restore, and enhance fish, wildlife,
and associated habitats in the Central Valley and
Trinity River basins of California;
(b) to address impacts of the CVP on fish, wildlife,
and associated habitats;
(c) to improve the operational flexibility of the CVP;
(d) to increase water-related benefits provided by the
CVP to the State of California through expanded use
of voluntary water transfers and improved water
conservation;
(e) to contribute to the State of California's interim
and long-term efforts to protect the San Francisco
Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Estuary; and
(t) to achieve a reasonable balance among competing
demands for use of CVP water, including the
requirements of fish and wildlife, agricultural,
municipal and industrial power contractors.

H.R. 1281 (Whitten) Dire emergency supplemental
appropriations: Among other appropriations, this
bill appropriates $25 million to the Department of the
Interior for the construction program of the Bureau of
Reclamation to meet the emergency needs of areas
affected by the continuing drought in the western
United States.
STATUS: This bill has been signed by the
President (Public Law 102-27, April 10,
1991).

s.

586 (Bradley) Reclamation Drought Act of
1991: This bill would permanently authorize the
Bureau of Reclamation, after consulting with
governors of affected states, to undertake
management and conservation activities to alleviate
temporary drought conditions, to provide information
and technical assistance to willing buyers and sellers
of water, to prepare drought contingency plans for
federal reclamation projects, and to contract for
storage and conveyance of project and non-project
water for use within and outside of authorized project
service areas.
STATUS: This bill has been referred to the
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural

Title 34 mandated ten major areas of change
in the management of the CVP:
• 800,000 acre-feet of water dedicated to
fish and wildlife annually;
• tiered water pricing applicable to new and
renewed contracts;
• water transfers provisions, including sale
of water to users outside the CVP service
area;
• special efforts to restore anadromous fish
population by 2002;

Resources.
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• Restoration Fund financed by water and
power users for habitat restoration and
improvement and water and land
acquisitions;
• no new water contracts until fish and
wildlife goals achieved; no contract
renewals until completion of an
Environmental Impact Statement (BIS);
terms reduced from 40 to 25 years with
renewal at the discretion of the Secretary
of the Interior;
• installation of the temperature control
device at Shasta Dam;
• implementation of fish passage measures
at Red Bluff Diversion Dam;
• firm water supplies for Central Valley
refuges; and
• development of a plan to increase CVP
yield.
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INTRODUCTION

This report discusses the Water Delivery Risk Analysisl for 1989 and its associated criteria and
implementation procedures. Risk Analysis is used to estimate the level of State Water Project
(SWP) water deliveries that can be met during a year while maintaining prudent storage reserves
for supporting deliveries in subsequent years. The estimated delivery capability is intended to
be conservatively low to assure the water contractors of a base supply to plan their annual
operations. Implementation procedures define the method for periodically updating that estimate
as the winter and spring water supply develops.
The Risk Analysis Curve is a graphical presentation of the relationship between the forecasted
Sacramento River Index2 (SRI) for the water year and SWP water delivery capability for the
calendar year. The SRI is used as an indicator of the available water supply. It is also the
parameter used in State Water Resources Control Board Decision 1485 (0-1485) for classifying
types of water years and establishing the corresponding level of protection for the SacramentoSan Joaquin Delta. Those classifications are shown in Table A which has been extracted from
D-1485. It should be pointed out that D-1485 uses median forecasts for establishing the year
classification but the Risk Analysis application uses the more conservative forecasts defined in
this report for determining water delivery capability.
Tables which show historical SRI data by water years, both chronologically and in ascending
order, are included as Tables D and E. These tables show the high variability of the historical
water supply.

SWP WATER DELIVERY RISK ANALYSIS FOR 1989

The 1989 Risk Analysis used the same operating and decision-making criteria to develop the
curve as were used in the 1988 Rule Curve procedure. The values of these criteria for 1989 are:
•

Storage threshold for scheduled surplus water deliveries is 3.0 million acre-feet
(MAF).

•

Average Annual Critical Period Supply (AACPS) is 2.26 MAF.

lIn 1988 and prior years the Water Delivery Risk Analysis was identified as the Rule Curve procedure.

2Jn 1988 and prior years the Sacramento River Index was identified as the Four Basin Index. It consists of the
forecasted or computed unimpaired flows of the Sacramento River near Red Bluff, the Feather River at Oroville
Reservoir, the Yuba River at Smartville, and the American River at Folsom Reservoir.
3A

water year begins on October 1 and ends the following September 30.
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•

Carryover storage4 for 1989 (on October 1, 1988) included 1.93 MAF storage
in Lake Oroville and San Luis Reservoir (State share) and 0.06 MAF water owed
to the SWP from the Central Valley Project in accordance with Article 6(e) of the
Coordinated Operating Agreement, for a total of 1.99 MAF.

•

Target storageS is based on the equation developed in 1988, which is applied to
carryover storage. The equation6 for determination of target storage is:
TS

1. 0

+ 112 (BS-1. 0)

Where
TS

BS

Target storage for the end of the water year in MAF
Carryover storage for the beginning of the water year in MAF

Target storage for October 1, 1989 is therefore:
TS

1.0 + 112 (1.99-1.0)
1.5 MAF

The procedure for determining delivery approvals has been changed somewhat for 1989 in two
respects:
•

The initial delivery approval is based on a probability of exceedence of
approximately 91 percent as determined from the 1906-1985 historical values of
the SRI. Last year's initial approval was based on the December 7, 1987
estimate of the SRI at 99 percent exceedence probability, provided by the DWR
Division of Flood Management. Monthly approval updates will be based on 99
percent probability of exceedence as in 1988.

•

The change in exceedence probability for the initial approval increases the
likelihood that a lower value of water delivery capability will occur in subsequent
months. For that reason, it may be necessary to partially rescind approved
deliveries beginning in March.

This Risk Analysis procedure is again being implemented on a one-year trial basis.

"The amount of combined storage in Lake Oroville and San Luis Reservoir (State share), together with other
water available for Project export, at the beginning of a water year.
SJ'he amount of combined storage in Lake Oroville and San Luis Reservoir (State share) to be reserved at the
end of a water year for supporting Project water deliveries during subsequent years.
6o'fhe equation expresses the strategy of allowing storage to decrease halfway from carryover storage to minimum
conservation storage of 1.0 MAP, which is dead storage of State share of San Luis Reservoir plus minimum power
pool in Lake Oroville plus a small allowance for excess of October deliveries over expected inflow.
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DevelQPment of Risk Analysis Curve
The 1989 Water Delivery Risk Analysis Curve (Figure 1) was developed by performing three
series of 57 one-year operation studies using historic water year hydrology from 1922 through
1978. In all three series of studies, the beginning storage in SWP reservoirs was the actual
carryover storage (1.99 MAF).
The end-of-water year storage (Oroville plus State share of San Luis) in the first series of 57
one-year studies was set to 1.0 MAF. That storage is slightly above minimum power pool
which allows for a small amount of continued drawdown during the following October. The
results of these studies indicate the maximum delivery capability using the water supply and all
available water in storage. These results are plotted as the curve segment from 0 to the AACPS
(2.26 MAF). The horizontal offset at 2.26 MAF water delivery capability represents the
additional water supply needed before further entitlement deliveries can be approved.
In the second series of these studies, the ending storage was allowed to be no less than the target
storage, 1.5 MAF. Regressing the delivery points from this series of 57 one-year studies
provides a curvilinear relationship of potential deliveries versus SRI forecasts. This is shown
in Figure 1 as the solid line between the AACPS and the requested entitlement deliveries.
The third series of 57 one-year studies required an end-of-year storage of 3.0 MAF, which is
the surplus water delivery threshold used in the Risk Analysis. The delivery points for this
series of studies were regressed to develop the curve for determination of the SRI necessary for
various levels of surplus water delivery. This is shown as the solid line above the requested
entitlement deliveries.
The horizontal offset of these two lines at the requested entitlements level represents a gross
estimate of the additional SRI water supply which must be available to recharge end-of-year
storage in Lake Oroville and San Luis Reservoir (State share) from the target storage for
entitlement water deliveries (1.5 MAF( to the threshold storage for surplus water deliveries (3.0
MAF).
Also shown on Figure 1 are the AACPS and the levels of requested entitlement and surplus
water delivery for 1989.
Reinstatement of applied reductions begins when the projected SRI runoff exceeds the amount
indicated by the Risk Analysis to meet further increases if verified by operation studies.
Figure 2, "Frequency of Sacramento River Index, " is included to provide a method of estimating
the probability of receiving any specific SRI runoff volume. For example, the probability of
receiving a SRI runoff of at least 9.2 MAF (the amount which occurred in water year 1988) is
90.6 percent.
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Monthly Awroval Updates
Shortly after the first of each month, January through May, DWR's forecast of the unimpaired
runoff of the four stations which make up the SRI, at the 99 percent probability of exceedence
level, will be used in conjunction with the 1989 Risk Analysis to provide a gross solution of the
annual amount of water available for delivery. This solution must be considered "gross" since
the annual index by itself is not indicative of the effect of monthly runoff distributions on annual
supply-a wet fall season is not overly beneficial if much of the water must be released to
maintain flood control reservation.
The gross solution of the amount of water available for delivery is then allocated to individual
contractors for input to an operations study, which is then made in order to verify that the
deliveries can be met while maintaining the target storages. That operations study utilizes actual
Oroville and San Luis storage at the beginning of the then current month, the forecasted water
supplies for the remainder of the water year at the 99 percent exceedence level and approved
facility outage schedules. The study also accounts for any special outstanding obligations upon
Lake Oroville storage (such as for share of Delta outflow owed to the USBR under coordinated
operations or 1988 Yuba County Water Agency purchase, or special entitlement carryover
agreements) .
1989 WATER DELIVERIES
Delivery requests submitted by the water contractors for 1989 total about 3.02 MAF for
entitlement and entitlement-related uses. In addition to that water, requests have also been
submitted for about 0.26 MAF of surplus water. A detailed breakdown of the 1989 requests is
given in Table B. These requested deliveries have not been approved.
Approved deliveries for 1989 are shown in Table C. These approved deliveries total 2.51
MAF. Approvals have been based on an estimate of 9.0 for the SRI, which is at a probability
of exceedence of approximately 91 percent. The 1989 Risk Analysis and operations study
support this level of delivery, which requires a 40 percent reduction in agricultural requests.
Subsequent approvals will be determined from the SRI forecasts at the 99 percent level of
exceedence and the 1989 Water Delivery Risk Analysis Curve (Figure 1), and verified by
operation studies. Entitlement requests in excess of the initial 2.51 MAF will be approved to
the extent allowed with increased SRI while maintaining the September 30, 1989 carryover target
storage of 1.5 MAF. If the Risk Analysis and operations study for January or February indicate
reduced water delivery capability, no reduction in approved deliveries will be made. If the
March approval update indicates less water delivery capability than previously approved,
approvals will be reduced accordingly. If the April or May approval update indicates less water
delivery capability, no reductions will be made, unless projected conservation storage falls below
1.0 MAF.
Surplus water deliveries will not be approved unless SWP operation studies show that the
carryover storage (Lake Oroville plus State share of San Luis Reservoir) on September 30, 1989
will be at least 3.0 MAF and then only to the extent that such deliveries are in excess of that
needed to maintain the 3.0 MAF surplus water threshold.
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TABLED

1989 REQUESTED WATER. DELIVEIUES
(Acre-Feet)

State 01 Califoruia

TheR~~

Jan
County of Butte
Plumas Co FCWCD
Yuba Citki
Feather ·ver 5

De=eat

State

File ID: F1989

Feb

Mar

Api'

May

120
41
0

70
75
0

70
99
0

Jul

J-

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov

Dec

Total

170
159
300

90
40
100

60
35
0

60
34
0

94

1200
1000
1500

3700

519
1520

513
1394

6166
18420

50
25
0

50
30
0

80

161

145

169

234

829

959

629

230

508
N;raa Co FCWCD
So ano Co FCWCD 1399
North Bay Serri
1907

501
1226

549
1413

574
1545

517
1671

410
1580

442
1735

444

556
1620

633
1592

Alameda Co WD
Santa Clara VWD
Zone-7 Alameda
South Bay Serri

2977
5200
1607

9784

County of Ki{W,
Devil's Den
Dudley Ridge WD

400
254
0
60
15428
0
625

~ireWSID

KernC~WA

Oak Flat
Tulare Lk BWSD
San Joaquin Val

AvekWA
Castaic Lake WA
Coachella ValIel
Crestline-La W
DesertWA
Littlerock CR
Metropolitan WD
MojaveWA
PaIindale WD
San Bernardino
San Gabnel
Ventura Co FCD
Southern Calif
Total State

75

1727

1962

2757
3900
1537

2977
6000
1826

400
381
0
90
21493
168
2271

400
762
3675
180
66470
336
1500

2119

3180
6500
2384

2188

3287
7500
3402

90
144
0

170
159
500

1990

2177

3180
8500
3841

3287
9000
4216

200
159
600

1725

2169
3287
9500
3986

01 Water
Resources
ater Project
~sis Oftiee
Date: U/05188
Page: 1

2176

3180
9400
2782

95

2115

2039

1907

24586

2977
8700
2288

2290
8000
1560

2321
7800
1571

35700

90000

31000 Entitlement

8194 10803 11064 14189 15521 16503 16773 15362 13965 11850 11692 156700
400
0
400
400
400
1016
1270
2032
2286
2286
2937
6499 10613 12990 11415
240
300
480
540
540
85344 143026 203269 200792 196348
616
672
896
1008
1008
1800
5954 19442 19m 19782

Water '!/Pes
400
4000 Includ
12700
381
55600 101MCI ENT WTIO
1343
3000 lllMGWFNI'WT08
90
31170 1112300 131BYPS ENT wr59
5600 151AGRENTWTOI
0
19782 109900 161AGWENTWI'22
39476 32704 53166 1303100 181BEN ENT WT46
191VALENTWT47
1732
55000
4070
2483
1986
1515
1515
24480
1831
21873
1822
1822
168
2465
192
192
3041
3049
36500
3041
230
0
2070
230
119137 116257 70000 1312627
60
60
360
60
910
0
8190
910
0
34800
4800
3000
13000
2000
0
0
0
0
0
0

400
400
1143
508
2560· 2548
270
120
89039 34376
504
224
12167
1300

16767 24803 73323 92353 157721 237132 237793 231779 106083

1672
1993
3895
5425
5530
6250
7495
7720
6735
1415
1415
1650
1986
2458
2458
2930
2222
2930
1822
1822
1822
1822
1822
1822
1822
1822
1822
227
133
133
362
265
137
184
207
265
3041
3041
3041
3041
3041
3041
3041
3041
3041
0
0
230
230
230
230
230
230
230
65137 120137 101137 115137 115137 115137 125137 125137 125137
0
0
60
0
0
0
60
60
0
0
910
0
910
910
910
910
910
910
2000
3800
2000
2000
2000
3800
3800
3800
3800
0
0
0
1000
2000
2000
2000
2000
2000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
381
1020
90
25545
168
5500

75314 130541 114818 131793 135832 136340 147690 1480U 1449U 138248 U9510 78355 1511365
103847 165345 201067 238474 310099 391217 404992 399692 269162 194144 176198 145214 2999451

Dudie Ridge WD 4089
Kern ou:tWA 30880
Oak Flat
250
Tulare Lk BWSD 10800
San Jo!lClUin Val 46019
Total State
46019

C

5478
58510
250
10800

0
0
0

0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0

0

0
0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

0

0

0

0
0

0
0

75038
75038

0
0

0

0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0

2681

3000

595

0

0

537

328

0

0

1433

0

0

0

0
0
0
0

0 UI057
0 UI657 291CYDV FNI' Wf69

Tulare Lk BWSD
San JOJlqUin Val
Total State

26
26

ReclFish&WddLf
South Bay Serri

34

30

34

33

34

33

34

34

33

34

33

34

Fish & Game
Parks & Recreat
ReclFish&Wlldlf
San Joaquin Val

20
3
5

20
3
4

30
5
5

80

90
11
4

190
26
4

240
26
4

230
26
4

210
26
4

50
20
4

20
8
4

20
3
4

ReclFish&Wildif
Southern Calif
Total State
Devil'. Den WD
txireWSID
Ke COU:tWA
Oak Flat
Tulare Lk BWSD
Val
T
State

s:J0JlqUin

10 Boswell
Shell Cal Prod
San JOJlqUin Val
Total State
Solano Co FCWCD
North ~ Serri
Total State

26

34

2681
2681
30

3000
3000

34

28

27

40

349

349

349

595
595
33

6
4

90
690

349
411

349
406

349
423

690
813

1496
390
0
0
35300

1349
160
0
57
31000

1438
320
0
211
18800

364
60
0
400
9300

1000
0

0
0

37186 32566 20769 10124
37186 32566 20769 10124
0
0

0
0

275

275
275

1000
1000
275

275
275

0
0

275

275
275

1000
0

1000
1000
785

785
785

0
0

34

105

537
537

0
0
33

34

no

270

34

260

0
0
33

240

690

690
943

927
U31

888

690

1182

0

0
320
0
300
27300

774
460
0
332
26300

690

829
0

0
600
5700

690

328
328

927

0
0
34

74

690

1750
0

1125

IllS
1125

1750
0

1750
1750

2500
0

2500
2500

1270

1270
1270
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1525

1525
1525

33

0

0
0
34

32

27

349

349

963

690

798

349
414

349
410

674
460
0
0
26600

0
330
0
0
11200

0
80
0
0
10400

0
260
0
0
4800

1205
160
0
0
26800

0
370

0
982

888

690

6300 27920 27866 27734 11530 10480
6300 27920 27866 27734 11530 10480

1750
1750

1433
1433

370
370
1525

1525
1525

981
981

1160

1160
1160

0
982

981
981

820

820
820

9567 1988 Carryover
89390
500 Water ~es
21600 Include

Wet Weather
8600 Water '!/Pes
8600 Includ
8600 lSIWEI' WIHR Wf(Jl
400

400

1200 Entitlement Related
163
50 Water '!/Pes
1413 Includ
7010 601RecIF&WL WI'02

7010
8823

7300 Surplus
3000
Water '!/Pes
1900 Includ
233500
245700 331AGR SUR WT04

o

5060 28165
5060 28165 245700
0
982

981
981
405

405
405

0
982

981
981

375

375
375

8000 Surplus Related
4298 Water ~8

U298 Includ
11298 401Repaymt WT09
9815 Local

9815 Water ~es
9815 Include

681VALPMTWT71

TABLEC

1989 INITIAL APPROVED WATER DELIVERlES
(Acre-Feet)

State of Ca6fornia
The RfBOurees
File ID: F1989

flf!fJ£y
Jan

County of Butte
Plumas Co FCWCD
Yuba Citki
Feather ·ver 5

DeC_
01 Water lteso1Jm!s
ater Project
Office

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

Jan

JuI

Aug

Sep

Oct

Nov
60
35
0
95
519
1520
2039

50
25
0
75

50
30
0

80

120
41
0
161

70
75
0
145

70
99
0
169

90
144
0
234

170
159
500
829

200
159
600
959

170
159
300
629

90
40
100
230

508
Na~CoFCWCD
So oCoFCWCD 1399
North Bay Servi
1907

501
1226
1727

549
1413
1962

574
1545
2119

517
1671
2188

410
1580
1990

442
1735
2177

1725
2169

444

556
1620
2176

633
1592
2225

Alameda Co WD
Santa Clara VWD
Zone-7 Alameda
South Bay Servi

~sis

State

2977
5200
1607
97S4

2757 2977 3100 3207 3100 3207 3207 3100 2897 2230
3900 6000 6500 7500 8500 9000 9500 9400 8700 8000
1560
1537 1793 2291 3220 3658 4018 3817 2775 2241
8194 10770 11891 13917 15258 16225 16524 15275 13838 11790
0
400
400
400
400
400
0
400
400
400
229
686
305
229
457
610
762 1219 1371 1371
0 2205 1762 3899 6368 7794 6849 1536 1529
612
54
54
324
162
72
108
144
180
288
324
14279 42472 54165 90280 131 008 128884 125191 57178 22249 16615
101
101
604
302
134
202
370
403
538
605
1363
780 3300
900 1080 3572 11666 11866 11869 7300
16426 46744 58531 990% 151487 151244 146608 67564 25469 20911

Date: 12/05/88
P!IIe: 1
Total
Dec

60
34
0
94

1200
1000
1500
3700

513
1394
1907

6166
18420
24586

2321
35080
7800 90000
1571 30088 Entitlement
11691 155168

4000
400
400
229
7620
Devil's Den
152
806 33360
Dudley Rid~ WD
0
1800
54
36
~ireWSID
20059 712660
10280
KemCou~WA
3360
0
Oak Flat
0
11869 65940
Tulare Lk BWSD
375
33417 828740
San Joaquin Val 11243
AvekWA
1661 1862 3099 4316 4950 5389 6021 6246 4501 3454 2340 1717 45556
Castaic Lake WA
1415 1415 1650 1986 2458 2458 2930 2930 2222 1986 1515 1515 24480
1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1831 21873
Coachella ValleI
168
2465
Crestline-La W
265
192
192
227
133
133
184
362
137
207
265
DesertWA
3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3041 3049 36500
0
2070
230
littlerock CR
0
0
230
230
230
230
230
230
230
230
Metropolitan WD 65137 120137 101137 115137 115137 115137 125137 125137 125137 119137 116257 70000 1312627
60
360
60
60
60
60
MojaveWA
0
0
0
0
0
0
60
0
8190
910
Palindale WD
0
0
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
910
0 34800
San Bernardino
2000 2000 2000 2000 3800 3800 3800 3800 3800 4800 3000
0 13000
San Gabriel
0
0
0
0 1000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
0
0
Ventura Co FCD
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
75303 130410 114022 130579 134532 134994 146216 146538 143988 137632 129367 78340 1501921
Southern Ca6f
Total State
98312 156837 173659 203265 249912 303963 316691 312798 229632 179394 164202 125450 2514115
COUJltyof~

Water~es

Include

101MCI ENT WTIO
111M GW ENI' wros
131BYPS ENTwrs9
151AGRENTWTOI
161AGWENTWI22
181BEN ENT WT46
191VALENTWT47

9567 1988 Carryover
0
0 89390
0
500 Wate~es
0 21600 Inclu
0 121057
0 121057 291CYDV ENI' Wf69

Kem
;r,WA
Oak Flat
Tulare Lk BWSD
San Joaquin Val

4089
30880
250
10800
46019
46019

5478
58510
250
10800
75038
75038

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0

ReclFish&WddLf
South Bay Sem

34
34

34
34

33
33
190
26
4
220

33
33

30
5
5
40

34
34
90
11
4
165

34
34

20
3
5
28

33
33
80
6
4
90

34
34

Ytsh & Game
Parks & Recreat
ReclFish&Wddlf
San Joaquin Val

30
30
20
3
4
27

240

170

230
26
4

260

210
26
4

240

34
34
50
20
4
74

33
33
20
8
4
32

17

ReclFish&Wddlf
Southern Ca6f

349
349
411

349
349
406

349
349

690

813

690

829

690
690
943

927
927
1231

888
888
1182

690
690
963

690

413

690
690

690
798

349
349
414

349
349
410

7010 601RecIF&WL Wf02
7010
8823

Solano Co FCWCD

275
275
275

275
275
275

275
275
275

785
785

785

1125
1125
1125

1270
1270
1270

1525
1525
1525

1525
1525
1525

1160
1160
1160

820
820
820

405
405
405

375
375
375

9815 Local
9815 Water ~s
9815 Include
681VALPMTWT71

Dudle~geWD

Total State

Total State

North Bay Servi

Total State

26
4

B-13

34
34
20
3
4

400
400
1200 Entitlement Related
163
50 Water~es
1413 Includ

Unscheduled water deliveries will be allowed when available by direct diversion from the Delta:
•

If such water is in excess of approved delivery amounts,

•

If electrical energy and excess pumping capacity are available,

•

If delivery of unscheduled water will not adversely affect other deliveries or
carryover storage, and

•

If SWP reservoirs south of the Delta are projected to be fully recharged by the
end of April. (This requirement does not apply to unscheduled water deliveries
from the North Bay Aqueduct.)

Requests for Additional Entitlement Deliveries
Approvals of additional entitlement deliveries will not affect previously approved entitlement
deliveries. Requests and approval of additional entitlement water may, however, cause one or
more of the following:
•

Reduced September 30, 1989 carryover storages in SWP reservoirs, which may
require a higher SRI runoff in 1990 to provide a comparable level of deliver

•

Delayed reinstatement of entitlement reductions

•

Reduction of previously approved surplus water deliveries pursuant to provisions
of the annual surplus water contracts

•

Delayed approval of requests for additional surplus water deliveries

•

Reduction of unscheduled water that otherwise would be available

Carryover Water
Requests have been made to defer until early 1989 the delivery of approximately 0.12 MAP of
entitlement water which would have been delivered in October-December 1988. Because the
Risk Analysis curve development procedure uses the October 1 through September 30 water
year, the determination of water delivery capability for the corresponding calendar year is not
significantly affected by this carryover of water. The carryover can be delivered in addition to
the 2.51 MAP delivery approval. Carryover quantities are not shown on the 1989 Water
Delivery Risk Analysis Curve (Figure 1).
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TABLED
SACRAMENTO RIVER INDEX FOR ENTIRE WATER YEAR
(Millions of Acre-Feet)
Year

Sacramento

Feather

Yuba

American

SRI

19931992
1991
1990
1989

9.7
5.2
4.0
4.8
6.6

5.8
1.9
2.1
2.1
3.7

3.0
0.9
1.2
1.2
2.2

3.4
0.9
1.2
1.1
2.3

21.9
8.9
8.4
9.2
14.8

1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981

5.4
5.3
10.9
5.5
9.5
17.2
13.3
6.4

2.0
2.1
6.7
2.6
5.8
9.4
9.0
2.5

0.9
0.9
3.5
1.3
3.2
4.7
4.9
1.1

0.9
0.9
4.6
1.6
3.9
6.4
6.1
1.1

9.2
9.1
25.7
11.0
22.4
37.7
33.3
11.1

1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971

9.7
5.6
12.0
3.4
4.8
9.4
15.9
9.6
6.6
10.8

5.5
3.0
5.7
1.0
1.8
4.9
8.4
4.7
3.2
6.0

3.2
1.7
3.0
0.4
0.7
2.4
4.0
2.7
1.7
2.9

3.9
2.0
3.2
0.3
0.8
2.6
4.3
3.0
1.9
3.0

22.3
12.4
23.9
5.1
8.1
19.2
32.5
20.0
13.4'
22.6

1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961

11.7
11.8
6.9
10.5
7.3
10.4
5.2
9.9
7.5
7.2

6.3
7.1
3.5
6.3
2.9
6.9
2.6
6.3
3.7
2.6

2.9
3.7
1.6
3.3
1.4
3.9
1.5
3.3
1.9
1.1

3.2
4.4
1.7
4.0
1.4
4.5
1.6
3.6
2.1
1.0

24.1
27.0
13.6
24.1
12.9
25.7
10.9
23.0
15.1
12.0

1960
1959
1958
1957
1956
1955
1954
1953
1952
1951

6.5
6.7
15.1
7.2
13.3
5.7
9.3
9.7
11.5
9.1

3.2
2.9
7.0
3.6
8.0
2.5
4.2
5.2
8.0
5.7

1.7
1.2
3.5
2.0
4.0
1.3
1.9
2.6
4.1
3.5

1.7
1.2
4.1
2.1
4.6
1.6
2.0
2.7
5.0
4.6

13.1
12.0
29.7
14.9
29.9
11.0
17.4
20.1
28.6
22.9

1950
1949
1948
1947

5.7
6.0
7.7
5.1

3.8
2.6
3.9
2.5

2.2
1.5
2.0
1.4

2.7
1.9
2.2
1.4

14.4
12.0
15.8
10.4
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TABLE D (Continued)
SACRAMENTO RIVER INDEX FOR ENTIRE WATER YEAR
(Millions or Acre-Feet)
Year

Sacramento

Feather

Yuba

American

SRI

1946
1945
1944
1943
1942
1941

8.2
6.7
4.7
8.5
11.3
14.3

4.2
3.7
2.9
5.6
6.7
6.5

2.4
2.1
1.4
3.1
3.4
3.1

2.9
2.5
1.5
3.9
3.9
3.1

17.6
15.1
10.4
21.1
25.2
27.1

1940
1939
1938
1937
1936
1935
1934
1933
1932
1931

10.5
4.4
14.7
6.0
7.1
7.5
4.5
4.6
5.1
3.3

5.7
1.9
8.6
3.2
4.3
4.3
2.0
2.0
3.3
1.4

2.9
0.9
4.0
1.9
2.6
2.2
1.0
1.1
2.1
0.6

3.4
1.0
4.5
2.3
3.4
2.6
1.1
1.3
2.6
0.7

22.4
8.2
31.8
13.3
17.4
16.6
8.6
8.9
13.1
6.1

1930
1929
1928
1927
1926
1925
1924
1923
1922
1921

6.1
4.4
7.6
11.0
5.7
8.1
3.3
5.3
6.7
11.5

4.0
1.8
4.2
5.7
3.1
3.1
1.3
3.1
5.1
6.0

1.8
1.0
2.4
3.5
1.6
2.1
0.6
2.1
3.0
3.2

1.7
1.1
2.5
3.7
1.4
2.7
0.5
2.8
3.3
3.2

13.5
8.4
16.8
23.8
11.8
16.0
5.7
13.2
18.0
23.8

1920
1919
1918
1917
1916
1915
1914
1913
1912
1911

4.2
7.8
5.4
7.1
10.7
12.6
13.7
7.0
6.6
10.1

2.2
3.6
2.7
4.7
6.2
5.4
7.0
2.8
2.3
7.1

1.3
2.0
1.3
2.5
3.3
2.7
3.1
1.5
1.2
3.6

1.5
2.2
1.5
2.9
3.9
3.2
4.0
1.5
1.3
5.6

9.2
15.7
11.0
17.3
24.1
23.9
27.8
12.8
11.4
26.4

1910
1909
1908
1907
1906

9.1
14.6
7.9
13.9
11.3

4.6
7.5
3.6
9.5
6.9

2.8
4.0
1.7
4.5
3.7

3.6
4.6
1.5
5.8
4.8

20.1
30.7
14.8
33.7
26.7

Notes:

•
1.
2.
3.

Refers to 1993 forecut for SRI, C-DWR May 1, 1993.
California cooperative mow surveys full Datursl flows.
Data 1986 aad later are pre1imilllU)'.
Stations are as follows: Sacramento River above Bend Bridge, near Red Bluff; Inflow to Oroville Reservoir; Yuba River at Smartville;
Inflow to Folsom Reservoir.
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TABLEE
SACRAMENTO RIVER INDEX FOR ENTIRE WATER YEAR
Listed in Ascending Order
(Millions of Acre-Feet)
Year

Sacramento

Feather

Yuba

American

SRI

1977
1924
1931
1976
1939
1991
1929
1934
1992
1933

3.4
3.3
3.3
4.8
4.4
4.0
4.4
4.5
5.2
4.6

1.0
1.3
1.4
1.8
1.9
2.1
1.8
2.0
1.9
2.0

0.4
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.9
1.2
1.0
1.0
0.9
1.1

0.3
0.5
0.7
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.1
1.1
0.9
1.3

5.1
5.7
6.1
8.1
8.2
8.4
8.4
8.6
8.9
8.9

1987
1990
1988
1920
1947
1944
1964
1955
1918
1985

5.3
4.8
5.4
4.2
5.1
4.7
5.2
5.7
5.4
5.5

2.1
2.1
2.0
2.2
2.5
2.9
2.6
2.5
2.7
2.6

0.9
1.2
0.9
1.3
1.4
1.4
1.5
1.3
1.3
1.3

0.9
1.1
0.9
1.5
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.6

9.1
9.2
9.2
9.2
10.4
10.4
10.9
11.0
11.0
11.0

1981
1912
1926
1949
1961
1959
1979
1913
1966
1960

6.4
6.6
5.7
6.0
7.2
6.7
5.6
7.0
7.3
6.5

2.5
2.3
3.1
2.6
2.6
2.9
3.0
2.8
2.9
3.2

1.1
1.2
1.6
1.5
1.1
1.2
1.7
1.5
1.4
1.7

1.1
1.3
1.4
1.9
1.0
1.2
2.0
1.5
1.4
1.7

11.1
11.4
11.8
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.4
12.8
12.9
13.1

1932
1923
1937
1972
1930
1968
1950
1989
1908
1957

5.1
5.3
6.0
6.6
6.1
6.9
5.7
6.6
7.9
7.2

3.3
3.1
3.2
3.2
4.0
3.5
3.8
3.7
3.6
3.6

2.1
2.1
1.9
1.7
1.8
1.6
2.2
2.2
1.7
2.0

2.6
2.8
2.3
1.9
1.7
1.7
2.7
2.3
1.5
2.1

13.1
13.2
13.3
13.4
13.5
13.6
14.4
14.8
14.8
14.9

1945
1962
1919
1948
1925
1935
1928

6.7
7.5
7.8
7.7
8.1
7.5
7.6

3.7
3.7
3.6
3.9
3.1
4.3
4.2

2.1
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.1
2.2
2.4

2.5
2.1
2.2
2.2
2.7
2.6
2.5

15.1
15.1
15.7
15.8
16.0
16.6
16.8
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TABLE E (Continued)
SACRAMENTO RIVER INDEX FOR ENTIRE WATER YEAR
Listed in Ascending Order
(MiUions of Acre-Feet)
Year

Sacramento

Feather

Yuba

American

SRI

1917
1936
1954

7.1
7.1
9.3

4.7
4.3
4.2

2.5
2.6
1.9

2.9
3.4
2.0

17.3
17.4
17.4

1946
1922
1975
1973
1953
1910
1943
1993*
1980
1984

8.2
6.7
9.4
9.6
9.7
9.1
8.5
9.7
9.7
9.5

4.2
5.1
4.9
4.7
5.2
4.6
5.6
5.8
5.5
5.8

2.4
3.0
2.4
2.7
2.6
2.8
3.1
3.0
3.2
3.2

2.9
3.3
2.6
3.0
2.7
3.6
3.9
3.4
3.9
3.9

17.6
18.0
19.2
20.0
20.1
20.1
21.1
21.9
22.3
22.4

1940
1971
1951
1963
1921
1927
1915
1978
1970
1967

10.5
10.8
9.1
9.9
11.5
11.0
12.6
12.0
11.7
10.5

5.7
6.0
5.7
6.3
6.0
5.7
5.4
5.7
6.3
6.3

2.9
2.9
3.5
3.3
3.2
3.5
2.7
3.0
2.9
3.3

3.4
3.0
4.6
3.6
3.2
3.7
3.2
3.2
3.2
4.0

22.4
22.6
22.9
23.0
23.8
23.8
23.9
23.9
24.1
24.1

1916
1942
1965
1986
1911
1906
1969
1941
1914

to. 7
11.3
10.4
10.9
10.1
11.3
11.8
14.3
13.7

6.2
6.7
6.9
6.7
7.1
6.9
7.1
6.5
7.0

3.3
3.4
3.9
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.7
3.1
3.1

3.9
3.9
4.5
4.6
5.6
4.8
4.4
3.1
4.0

24.1
25.2
25.7
25.7
26.4
26.7
27.0
27.1
27.8

1952
1958
1956
1909
1938
1974
1982
1907
1983

11.5
15.1
13.3
14.6
14.7
15.9
13.3
13.9
17.2

8.0
7.0
8.0
7.5
8.6
8.4
9.0
9.5
9.4

4.1
3.5
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.0
4.9
4.5
4.7

5.0
4.1
4.6
4.6
4.5
4.3
6.1
5.8
6.4

28.6
29.7
29.9
30.7
31.8
32.5
33.3
33.7
37.7

Notes:

*
1.

2.
3.

Refers to 1993 forecast for SRI, C-DWR May I, 1993.
California cooperative snow surveys full uatural flows.
Data 1986 aud later are preliminary.
Stations are as follows: Sacramento River above Bend Bridge, near Red Bluff; Inflow to Oroville Reservoir; Yuba River at Smartville;
Inflow to Folsom Reservoir.
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APPENDIXC
CALIFORNIA WATER CODE:
WATERSHORTAGEEMERGENC~

SECTIONS 350-358 OF THE WATER CODE, "WATER SHORTAGE EMERGENCIES"
Section 350: The governing body of a distributor of
a public water supply, whether publicly or privately
owned and including a mutual water company, may
declare a water shortage emergency condition to
prevail within the area served by such distributor
whenever it finds and determines that the ordinary
demands and requirements of water consumers cannot
be satisfied without depleting the water supply of the
distributor to the extent that there would be
insufficient water for human consumption, sanitation,
and fire protection.

needed for domestic use, sanitation, and fire
protection, the regulations may establish priorities in
the use of water for other purposes and provide for
the allocation, distribution, and delivery of water for
such other purposes, without discrimination between
consumers using water for the same purpose or
purposes.
Section 355: The regulations and restrictions shall
thereafter be and remain in full force and effect
during the period of the emergency and until the
supply of water available for distribution within such
area has been replenished or augmented.

Section 351: Excepting in event of a breakage or
failure of a dam, pump, pipe line or conduit causing
an immediate emergency, the declaration shall be
made only after a public hearing at which consumers
of such water supply shall have an opportunity to be
heard to protest against the declaration and to present
their respective needs to said governing board.

Section 356: The regulations and restrictions may
include the right to deny applications for new or
additional service connections, and provision for their
enforcement by discontinuing service to consumers
willfully violating the regulations and restrictions.
Section 357: If the regulations and restrictions on
delivery and consumption of water adopted pursuant
to this chapter conflict with any law establishing the
rights of individual consumers to receive either
specific or proportionate amounts of the water supply
available for distribution within such service area, the
regulations and restrictions adopted pursuant to this
chapter shall prevail over the provisions of such laws
relating to water rights for the duration of the period
of emergency; provided, however that any distributor
of water which is subject to regulation by the State
Public Utilities Commission shall before making such
regulations and restrictions effective secure the
approval thereof by the Public Utilities Commission.

Section 352: Notice of the time and place of hearing
shall be published pursuant to Section 6061 of the
Government Code at least seven days prior to the
date of hearing in a newspaper printed, published,
and circulated within the area in which the water
supply is distributed, or if there is no such
newspaper, in any newspaper printed, published, and
circulated in the county in which the area is located.
Section 353: When the governing body has so
determined and declared the existence of an
emergency condition of water shortage within its
service area, it shall thereupon adopt such regulations
and restrictions on the delivery of water and the
consumption within said area of water supplied for
public use as will in the sound discretion of such
governing body conserve the water supply for the
greatest public benefit with particular regard to
domestic use, sanitation, and fire protection.

Section 358: Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to prohibit or prevent review by any court
of competent jurisdiction of any finding or
determination by a governing body of the existence of
an emergency or of regulations or restrictions adopted
by such board, pursuant to this chapter, on the
ground that any such action is fraudulent, arbitrary,
or capricious.

Section 354: After allocating and setting aside the
amount of water which in the opinion of the
governing body will be necessary to supply water

Source: C-DWR, 1977
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APPENDIXD
NEEDED CHANGES IN WATER MANAGEMENT

Part 1.
Part 2.
Part 3.
Part 4.
Part 5.

State and Federal Government Perspective
Urban Perspective
Agricultural Perspective
Environmental Perspective
Point of View of Other Parties

PART 1. STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Society should establish priorities for evaluating alternative uses of water during droughts.
In times of shortages, certain uses of water may be sacrificed.
The state has to look at water pricing and eliminate the existing large differences in the
cost of water to different users. Because of price differences, some areas/users waste
water, while others conserve.
We need to refill about 8 million acre-feet of empty aquifers in California (subsidence,
reserve for future droughts).
The reservoir operations need to be improved; multireservoir systems should be
optimized to include incidental uses (recreation, fisheries).
An effort is needed to manage groundwater at all levels. Conjunctive use of groundwater
can relieve the adverse effects of the groundwater overdraft (conjunctive use needs to be
expanded in California).
Remove federal restrictive policies to wheel nonproject water.
The cost of saving the environment has to be evaluated, and water for the environment
has to be made available at taxpayer cost.
COB should handle a small loan program to assist small local communities during
drought.
Federal government should set quotas for U.S. immigration because 75 percent of new
immigrants wind up in California.
Greater centralization is needed to manage water in California.
Groundwater recharge projects have to be developed to enhance natural recharge rates,
and also more surface water should go into recharge during the times of high flow.
Fish and Wildlife needs more equitable basis in water allocation so it can share water
similar to that received by project users.
The state needs to develop a mechanism that triggers drought response actions (such as
the Water Bank) automatically without a lengthy and contentious legislative process.
There is a need for political recognition to deal with protection of natural resources so
that impacts to fish and wildlife are lessened in the future.
Changes in water laws have to be made to recognize in-stream water rights.
More goodwill, professionalism, and supportive legislation are needed to restore and
maintain environmental resources.
Media needs to reveal what is happening in agriculture (full spectrum of impacts and
what it means to California to shut down farming in the state).
The Warren Act restricting water movement should be revoked.
Make the federal and state bureaucracies work together better to smooth out operations
during drought.
The rights have to be better defined to groundwater.
The media should put more emphasis on the environmental and regulatory concerns rather
than concentrating on state agencies only.
The media should inform the public about the trade-offs being made during a drought.
Make risk assessments associated with the effects of spills and flood releases on fisheries.
Society needs to decided on what it wants.
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PART 1. STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE (Continued)

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

In-stream flow standards and estuarine water quality standards need to be reassessed.
All beneficial uses of water should be treated equally.
Water management should combine resource values with economic principles to satisfy
amount of water the customer wants.
California should cut down on the amount of firm hydroelectric production (Le., during
drought) to make water available for environmental and other purposes.
Water industry should use a more rigorous analytical process in its water management
decision-making process.
The state should look into groundwater regulation (after 1977 the aquifers recovered in
level but not in volume).
Large groundwater basins in San Joaquin Valley should be adjudicated possibly through
self-regulation.
Agricultural districts should adjust their water delivery schedules to fit the waterconserving farming practices.
Agricultural conservation should be enhanced through continued research and
development, advising and educating farmers on how to use less water, what kinds of
machinery to use, how to manage labor, and overall increase in agricultural technical
support services.
Build coding towers on thermal power plants to minimize thermal pollution during
drought.
Better coordination is needed between energy conservation programs and water
conservation programs, (e.g., showerheads-water, energy; toilets ULF-water, energy,
sanitation).
Water industry needs to remove subsidies and market water.
There should be fewer players in California water management (now there are too many).
The decisions on the operation of SWP should be made by the Director of C-DWR, not
the Governor.
SWP needs to build new facilities much faster than they are currently being built.
A better method to allocate the supply is needed. The existing rule curve is not
workable.
New legislation and more institutional cooperation will be needed to make water
marketing and transfers a viable alternative to more water development.
SWP should become a quasi-governmental agency (or corporation) instead of being a part
ofC-DWR.
Changes in water allocation in California need to be made.
Environmental standards must be revised.
More effort should be put into balancing in-stream and off-stream uses of water by
SWRCB.
A way of moving water through the Delta should be found to satisfy the purveyors and
environmental groups and to protect the resources in the Delta.
More emphasis should be placed on conjunctive use of surface water and groundwater.
The various impacts of drought (both short-term and long-term) should be quantified.
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PART 1. STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE (Continued)

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

California needs additional water supply to deal with the expanding population.
Water supply planning should not be used as a means of suppressing population growth,
because it does not work.
The most immediate need in water management is to resolve the Delta issues, even if
agriculture and urban sectors will have to lose some water to the environment.
Population growth in California has to be stabilized.
An unbiased state water policy is needed for responding to drought emergencies.
Appropriate measures of water supply reliability need to be institutionalized.
More emphasis should be placed on water conservation and recycling.
Water districts should pursue conjunctive use programs and groundwater recharge
programs in order to eliminate groundwater overdraft.
Special interest groups representing agricultural, urban, and environmental sectors should
reach a consensus and stop blocking the actions of each other.
Water marketing should be expanded, with provisions for not creating externalities that
affect the environment.
It is important to fix the Delta, because it is a major water transfer hub.
Off-stream storage south of the Delta is needed as a part of the solution to the Delta's
problems.
The Three-Way Process should seek help in employing alternative dispute resolution
techniques (ADR) to reach a consensus.
More conservation technology and know-how should be infused into the California
agriculture.
A system of adequate economic incentive should be developed to encourage more farmers
to adopt innovative and efficient irrigation technologies and practices.
Irrigation districts should revise their schedules for delivering water to individual farmers
to allow for optimum application of water.
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PART 2. URBAN PERSPECTIVE

1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

There should be clear long-term carry-over storage goals (e.g., two-year supply on
July 1).
Water districts should build interconnections to aqueducts.
A pipeline should be built to take reclaimed water from the Bay area to Central Valley,
where it could be used for irrigation and groundwater recharge.
Marginal cost pricing of water should be incorporated into water policy.
Need to abandon irrational policies. Instead of rationing, water should be bought through
the Water Bank.
A sophisticated economic way of drought management should be developed.
Massive education programs have to be implemented to educate the public on water issues
and droughts.
The water industry should be deregulated, and the market forces should determine the
price of water.
Water suppliers should prepare for the worst-case scenario during a drought and be ready
for desalination.
The state of California needs to talk and do some thinking ahead, look at issues
collectively.
Urban customers need to be advised on the meaning of "cutting down by 20 percent";
people need to read their meters; too much savings is bad for revenue.
Better communication with the public is needed, especially when the agency is in a crisis
mode.
California should think of appointing a water czar with the power to cut across
sociopolitical barriers and other types of problems.
Media should increase public service announcements to encourage conservation.
Improve the reliability of urban water supplies.
Planning for drought protection should seek long-term optimality.
Develop institutions for administering water marketing and water transfers and for
protecting third parties.
Communication and cooperation between state and federal agencies should be improved.
Local water agencies should join in public information programs because of the "news
shed effect" to save money and minimize confusion (act jointly and use common
defmitions) .
Water professionals should improve their ability to clearly communicate their situation
and decisions to the media.
State and federal government should determine the priorities of different uses of water
during drought.
State and federal government should get rid of constraints that prevent water transfers
during drought.
Long-term water supply plans should have an optimal level of drought protection built
into them.
More emphasis should be placed on practices with supply flexibility such as marketing
and water transfer agreements.

D-4

PART 2. URBAN PERSPECTIVE (Continued)
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Contracts for CVP and SWP water have to be rewritten so that appropriate response
actions can be taken earlier during a drought cycle.
The general public should be educated to stop believing that a drought is not an excuse
for water shortages.
SWP and CVP should not be governed by the mandate to serve water for municipal,
industrial, and agricultural uses; they also need to protect the environmental uses.
Urban water suppliers should address environmental problems and improve environmental
conditions of aquatic resources, because it is in their self-interest.
Reclamation and reuse of water should be looked at, and the existing barriers and
institutional impediments should be removed.
Some degree of political involvement is needed in making water supply policies at the
county, city, and local water district boards. The policymaking should not be made by
shortsighted technicians.
Agricultural interests should educate the farmers on how to deal with environmental and
urban sectors through consensual ways.
There has to be some degree of regulation in water transfers to minimize third-party
impacts.
Water Bank should be set up for normal supply year operations.
The state should set clear standards for the use of greywater and the design of dual water
systems to guide the local health departments.
Groundwater aquifers have to be better mapped throughout the state.
Regulatory agencies should not only look after environmental needs but also consider the
needs of water users.
Urban, environmental, and agricultural interests should make more efficient use of the
water resources that they have.
Drought surcharge should be used in the future as a water-rationing mechanism instead
of the percent reduction or other rationing plans unaccompanied by price incentives.
North and south as well as agriculture, urban areas, and environmental interests should
work together to build a water policy consensus.
Urban and other utility customers should be charged by separate bills for water, sewer,
electricity, and trash.
Rationing plans in the future should give urban customers certain amounts of water and
let them decide which uses have to be curtailed.
Rationing and pricing should always be used together to avoid revenue problems.
Urban areas need more flexibility in supplying water (e.g., more supply sources).
Overdraft of groundwater sources during normal weather should be avoided in order to
have that option for drought.
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PART 3. AGRICULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Water districts need to communicate better and more accurately water needs, available
supplies, shortages (to media, civic leaders, processors of crops).
People need to be educated about water needs, available supplies, and shortages to correct
perceptions about water uses.
Need groundwater banking, off-stream storage facilities in the Delta (10 years from now
another drought; demands will go up and things will be worse).
A Water Bank Office should be created independently of C-DWR as a broker and a
streamlined approval process for water transfers should be developed.
The Endangered Species Act has to be modified. It requires impossible things (barriers,
mitigation), and it is not well thought out.
Water managers should be allowed to do their job without bringing the public into the
decision-making process (it's unproductive).
The environmental constraints on Delta exports have to be reviewed, since more
developed water, more flows, and more exports are needed.
There is a great need for consensus building, the Three-Way Process and the state water
plan (Governor) have achieved a lot.
Something has to be done to improve the efficiency of transferring water through the
Delta through a joint effort.
A computer data bank containing water-planning and management information should be
developed, continually updated, and made available to water agencies.
Interconnections are a must, and all water districts should get these put in place.
More water should be stored either in the ground or in reservoirs.
Irrigation districts have to communicate better to the public the purposes for which they
use water and the efficiencies in use that they achieve.
More water storage facilities should be built and water supply infrastructure should be
expanded.
Bureau of Reclamation should build some safety valves into their operations and give the
Secretary of the Department of the Interior discretionary emergency powers to deal with
unexpected situations.
The general public in California needs to be educated to understand why it takes so much
water to grow food, that farmers do not waste water, and that the farmers do not destroy
the environment and cause pollution but are concerned about the status of wildlife and
fisheries and want to see these resources restored.
The Three-Way Process should be used as an instrument to find a solution to the Delta
problem, since the political process has failed to achieve its goal.
CVP should be transferred to the state so that California could determine its fate through
an integrated management of developed water.
Agricultural water districts should learn from Westlands Water District about water
management and water efficiency techniques.
There is a need for national and state policy on food production.
Agricultural water districts should be prepared to change their role during drought from
one of helping farmers to grow crops to one that is more of a regulator that restricts
water usage and acts more like a police force.
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PART 4. ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
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Long-term solutions should be sought instead of implementing ad hoc decisions during
a drought.
Long-term planning should focus on alternatives such as conjunctive use, in-stream flow,
water banking, and off-stream storage.
The institutional barriers to water transfers should be removed. These barriers include
issues such as, who owns the water, the district or farmers, the question of federal
subsidies, and inflexible legislation such as the Warren Act.
Efficiency of agricultural water districts with very cheap subsidized water has to be
improved. A fundamental skepticism exists about water users doing the right thing when
inefficiencies are allowed to continue indefinitely.
SWP and CVP should make early cuts in water deliveries and maintain more water in
storage in order to make drought progressively worse, but at the same time not allow
severe impacts to take place.
Better planning in anticipating prolonged drought is needed. The last-minute creation of
the Water Bank is a peculiar way to manage water.
A more flexible system of water management is needed. There needs to be more equity
and fairness so that environment does not suffer the most.
Standards generally set are not adequate to protect the environment. Locally it will be
best to set baseline standards and supplement them by mitigation of environmental
impacts.
There needs to be more optimization in operating major projects.
We need to be able to reallocate water rights into a fairer system to make allocation of
short supplies more equitable.
Environmental impacts need greater public recognition, and we must find more equitable
ways of protecting the environment. Long-term strategies are needed.
Urban areas should build in resiliency through conservation and water reclamation to
prepare for a 10-15 year-long drought in the future.
In the agricultural-urban-environmental process, people who sit at the negotiating table
should convince their constituencies of the reasons for the decisions taken.
Water reclamation should be a part of long-term water supply strategies.
A holistic approach to water management is needed. (Urban runoff should be captured
and infiltrated.)
More conjunctive use of surface-water and groundwater should be made.
General policy reform and consensual solutions should be emphasized in trying to change
water management in California.
Water resources should be managed better for the environment as well as for other
purposes of use.
Central coordination of water management is needed.
The quality of the tributaries in the upstream portions of the major rivers needs to be
improved.
Firm supplies of water are needed for the existing wetlands as well as more wetlands.
Media should try to understand the long-term changes that are needed to avoid future
drought emergencies in the state.
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Developing and passing new legislation during water emergencies should be avoided
because it is usually "too hasty" and does not produce solid laws and regulations.
A water fund should be established to purchase water for environmental purposes.
Changes in the existing water law should be made because these changes are critical to
realizing the full benefits of the structural and nonstructural solutions to California water
problems.
C-DWR should be divided into two parts-State Water Project and State Water
Resources.
More sophisticated water planning is needed at the local and regional levels of
government and water institutions.
More studies on water supply reliability conservation, reclamation, and other alternatives
should be undertaken.
Continuing work on water transfers is needed.
More work on groundwater storage is needed.
The Delta should be fixed to work better not only for the environment but also for its
overall enhancement.
Water institutions should be reformed and created that would not discriminate against the
environment.
The Governor needs to "twist [the] arms" of the agricultural sector in order to make the
Three-Way Process happen.
The risk of mismanaging the existing and new water supply facilities to benefit only
particular interests (mostly urban) must be removed by reforming water laws and water
institutions.
In the Delta, along with the improved reliability of urban supplies, environment should
be brought along, and all water use purposes should be optimized to achieve better water
quality in the Delta.
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There should be more cooperation between urban water providers and the "green
industry. "
The benefits of turf and urban landscaping on urban environment (air qUality) should be
assessed and articulated to the public.
Landscape contractors should be educated on efficient use of water, and a licensing
process should be established and enforced.
More data about dry-year hydrology should be acquired.
Anglers should be restricted; they are reaching spots in rivers and reservoirs that
normally cannot be reached. Salmon are depleted by fishing pressures.
The state should assist the "green industry" in achieving more efficient use of water for
urban landscapes by (1) establishing licensing and enforcing it, (2) passing laws to
encourage more efficient landscapes, and (3) educating landscapers and the public about
conservation in outdoor water use.
Water discharged from cooling towers in commercial buildings should be captured and
used for landscape irrigation on-site.
All water use must be measured, and people should learn how to read their water meters.
Rationing plans should be based on a reasonable allocation of water amounts and
combined with inverted block rate structures to force urban users to use water efficiently
during droughts .
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